

ROYCE'S *OTHER* ETHICS:
ASPECTS OF ROYCE'S ETHICAL THOUGHT UNRELATED TO LOYALTY

Marc ANDERSON

Abstract: Josiah Royce's 1908 work *The Philosophy of Loyalty* is often taken as the summit and major statement of his thoughts on ethics. However, this view is mistaken. Royce's ethics is far broader. Not only did Royce have early “non-loyalty” insights into ethics, e.g., society studied as a pre-moral aggregate or mass, and scholarship as a development of moral selfhood, but he also provided alternatives to loyalty — love, work, and dissatisfaction with experience — as unifying themes in practical ethics. Moreover, he practised a mode of ethical modeling based upon analysing the lives of prominent people, and most importantly, he extensively worked out a Logic of Ethics. These advances are characterized here as Royce's “Other than Loyalty Ethics,” a body of work which provides strong material to be built upon further by contemporary ethicists.

Keywords: Josiah Royce, ethics, logic of ethics, ethical modeling.

Introduction

The elements of an “other than loyalty” Roycean ethical outlook are often not merely prescriptive utterances regarding ethical action but reflective guidance regarding ethical ways of seeing aspects of the world, along the lines of “if you look at your surroundings from an ethical perspective, you tend to find this...”. In light of Royce's later appreciative/descriptive characterizations of experience they are what one might call descriptive ethical groundwork — descriptive in the sense that Royce uses the term in reference to science, as we shall see later — something which blurs the nice boundary between the appreciative descriptive divide. And yet this groundwork is important: one cannot begin exploring practical ethics until one comes to recognize that the world *has* an ethical aspect. The condition of life prior to carrying out descriptive ethical groundwork and recognizing the ethical character of experience is similar to what Royce describes explicitly in the first Urbana lecture—bluntly stated: might makes right in the arena of warring interests.

In the first section, the question explored is, “What are the elements of Royce's ‘other than loyalty’ ethical reflection?” In the second section, what might be called Royce's Ethics of Models is considered, looking at Royce's biographical reflections—they are never simple biography—of prominent people of his own or earlier times. In the third section, some of Royce's efforts toward a logic of ethics are examined in brief. The overall goal is to show in outline how this “other” Roycean Ethics in the title comes together in its own right, as a flexible interweaving of the types of ethical methods.

The aim here is not to delve deeply into any one of the alternate modes and insights of Roycean ethics but rather to outline and explore a number of them in order to set up some pointers for further work.

“Other than Loyalty” Ethical Insights Recurring Throughout Royce’s Work.

Early Ethical Insights: Royce’s Berkeley Analysis of Social Interactions

In the winter of 1874, while Royce was still a student at Berkeley, he wrote several connected pieces in the *Berkeleyan*. Royce the Philosopher is there already, both in writing style and in the interest in social problems along with his developing sense of the ethical. The second *Berkeleyan* piece was entitled “The Problem of Class Feeling”, and several elements of an “other than loyal” Roycean ethical outlook can be teased from the piece.

While not yet embarked on a philosopher career, Royce has already become attuned to the social aspect of experience in his own particular university context. He argues that by the nature of the case in a college, the distinction of incoming school years will create various differences between students by default, which will be contentious (Royce 1874, 5). He thus already recognizes, at this early stage of life, *the root of social conflict in diversity of interests*—later to be re-framed as diversity of values.

He goes on to suggest that a common interest that would make students forget their differences and come together would be helpful, but he points out that it would need some special object capable of provoking that unity. Moreover, by implication, there is no such special object at hand. Merely massing holders of conflicting interests together “by decree” will gain nothing (Royce 1874, 5). This evokes notions of the social mass, subject to focus on a number of occasions in Royce’s later philosophy, in opposition to the notion of community. *The Roycean analysis of the idea of society as a mere mass*—with corresponding affinities to the notion of physical facts in what Royce would later call Descriptive experience—has been somewhat ignored by Roycean scholars.

In order to generate common interest, Royce suggests that the furthering of “enterprises” which each student can take part in and support, e.g., the university newspaper, is a step in the right direction. This is a primordial notion of what will later become special communities, but there is also *an emphasis on the future*, which is noteworthy.

In addition, there is an emphasis on freedom in the *Berkeleyan* article. Royce carefully defines this freedom: each of us is shaped by our context (the age we live in and our particular circumstances)—this context, including the social mass, is for Royce the exterior, immovable, and chaotic external “nature,” insofar as humans take part in nature, to be discussed in the later Schiller paper. Thus, we/the students have no internally (i.e., morally by implication) “superior right” to anyone else. This insight of Royce’s may already be coloured by a Kantian outlook, whether by chance or otherwise. The effort should be made to get students to appreciate this “freedom”.

Yet another insight has already occurred to Royce by the time of the *Berkeleyan* article, namely an insight regarding certain types of careers. Specifically, the path of the scholar and researcher—later to be made more emphatic in speaking of science, business, and the arts, as morally organizing enterprises—is emphasized as one of the ways that a more conciliatory outlook on differences can be had (Royce 1874, 5). Thus, constantly engaging in a task whose *modus operandi* is to seek out and interpret between differences, historical, current, and otherwise, is a morally developing endeavour.

As exemplified in philosophy and scientific contexts, this means, e.g., interpreting such problems as: how late Kant differs from early Kant, how Mill agrees with Bentham, how realists disagree with idealists, how Rutherford’s model of the atom differs from Bohr’s. Such interpretative efforts train the researcher to see that differences closer to home, in one’s personal social interrelations, are much less serious than they first appear. This, in turn, implies a practical aspect: participating in the “great ends of life” such as the bettering of knowledge, develops the moral spirit, i.e., in terms of resolving differences generally within the sea of conflicting interests that one encounters throughout life.

Royce clearly retained the above very early insight for his whole career, as shown by his constant allusions to a sort of “brotherhood of scholarship,” and his recurring use of phrases such as “I am but a student...” or “for me, however, as a student of philosophy. . .” He sums up the insight with regard to his problem at hand as follows: “When all are thus imbued with the spirit of study and of liberality, any strong jealousy of class and clique is impossible,” while acknowledging that this is an ideal for the future and looking for a difference of degree; differences will be lessened but not utterly removed (Royce 1874, 5).

One sees immediately how relevant the insight is to the moral aspect of social experience, particularly when recognizing that those who wish to be immoral also understand it at some level. In contemporary moral social tendencies, authoritarian leaning social groups actively encourage social division, seeking to break down the moral fabric of social interpretation by attacking the enterprises and institutions that Royce talks about, more specifically academia, the arts, science, and business, insofar as all are viewed as arenas of rules.

What then can be drawn from Royce's very early suggestions? Four insights can be reiterated: 1) *The root of conflict in social experience lies in the diversity of interests (values)*; 2) *Society, apart from practical ideas and actions which integrate and accentuate – i.e. organize – moral experience, is a mere mass or aggregate*; 3) *Our freedom—seemingly—stands opposed to a chaotic and external aspect of experience, later to be connected, by Royce, to the nature studied by science and characterized as the Descriptive*; and finally, 4) *The career of scholarship and research is an endeavour which develops moral selfhood*. The final insight already stands as an undeveloped but potent solution, with which to practically engage the first three.

Are any of these elements of the notion of loyalty? No, although later in Royce's career at times they will figure to greater or lesser degrees as problems and conditions which lead Royce to develop the practical solution of loyalty. Yet they do not inevitably lead to that solution, even for Royce. That is to say, Royce tries other avenues besides loyalty, several of which I will highlight further in the text.

Ethical Insights from Royce's Professional Era—the Schiller Reflections

Royce's 1878 writing on Schiller is a good starting point for uncovering some further ethical insights. Schiller, says Royce, is an *ethical* poet, ethical because he is always “grappling with some problem as to the conduct of life.” (Royce 1878, 373). Moreover, Schiller's ethical orientation is bound up with ideal aspirations toward betterment, or “life as a free construction,” in comparison with Goethe's stance of trust and self-surrender in nature to life as a process (Royce 1878, 374). In other words, Schiller's case highlights that ideas are bound up with action: to think is to act, as Royce will later insist on multiple occasions.

Our desire for freedom in action is bounded by the necessities of nature however. Nature and its laws seem to be indifferent to human aspirations toward higher development. Schiller's initial attempt at a solution to this problem is to invoke friendship as it involves self-surrender to a natural urge. In effect, we have a nature-driven need for friendship, which combines with the highest freedom and the fullest self-consciousness. On the surface, this resembles loyalty to some extent; abstractly, one has a mode of conduct (freedom and full self-consciousness) woven into a more encompassing mode of conduct (natural friendship), in such a way that the two are integrated out of their “conflict.”

On closer analysis however, it differs from loyalty, primarily because the necessitated aspect—the state of being driven by nature to act in a certain way so as to gain friendship—does not appear in the account of loyalty. And again, it seems that many naturally necessitated modes of conduct could interchangeably replace the urge to friendship. Indeed, Schiller later comes to perceive sympathetic *love* as one such replacement (Royce 1878, 381). One might wonder then why Royce did not go with love as the unifying mode interpreting the individual and social: love for family, for friends, for mankind, or love for one's job. Love has a long and honoured history in ethical currents of idealist, particularly Neo-Platonist, thought, as the concept best able to unify existence and value in experience, as Mander notes, (Mander 2016, 16) and Royce's idealist contemporary J.M.E. McTaggart gave it just such a central role (McTaggart 1927, 468, 479).

In fact, Royce *did* go with love for a time, during the period of *The Conception of God*. There, it is love which individuates (Royce et al. 1897, 262–265). Moreover, Royce is clear that love individuates by focusing on particular *interest(s)*—as implied by his use of that word much later in the Richmond lectures (Royce 1904, [20]–[24])—an exclusive focus which acts to individuate the ongoing individual moral self, as well as, like in *Conception*, the so called simpler “objects” which the beholder loves. The sameness or unchangeability evoked by both words—a resistance to change—is an active quality. Therefore, Royce had alternatives to loyalty available, with love being one of them.

However, love is only one such alternative. Schiller goes on to propose that acting with ideal purpose in the face of nature's unforgiving necessity, and thus becoming oblivious of the problem through "being yourself in your work," is another solution. The construction of the State as an environment, in defiance of nature, and a realization of the ethical urge, is also a solution (Royce 1878, 383). Royce is not unmoved by the solution of "chosen career." Not only does he often frame the negative moment of the search for individual meaning as "my work in life" and "my task," in writings other than *The Philosophy of Loyalty*,¹ but he also specifically highlights whole categories of work which impersonally organize our lives, work in arts, in science, and civic work (Royce, 1885, 212).

Moreover, when, in Royce's assessment, Schiller discovers Kant, he makes a considerable leap, in coming to see that the satisfaction in the law of the Ought instated by consciousness, is greater than the disappointment evoked by the moral confusion in the real/sensual world. The being that is conscious of the law of the Ought, is aware of its own superiority to the world of moral confusion and conflict. Let the world be messy and conflicting as it will, the moral law shines above it for anyone who yearns for something stable. Royce's reflections on Schiller's development might well be reflections on his own development, for although he might not be a poet as such, references to poetry recur constantly in his work. Indeed, just as Schiller did, Royce proceeded through an earlier, more directly poetic phase, in which he already understood the pull of the ideal—particularly the moral ideal—upon the poet (Royce 1875, 543), to appreciation of the same as highlighted by the more developed foundation of Kant's insight. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, filled with poetic style, poetic references, and discussion of poetry, is arguably the memoir of that process of surpassing the raw lure of poetry. It is Royce's first solution to the problem of the individual left to their own devices in a seeming sea of moral contradiction, that arena in which as Royce says, "among civilized men, yes, in our own hearts, each of us can find numberless conflicting and capricious estimates of action . . ." (Royce 1885, 53).

"But after all," students of Royce may reply, "didn't Royce outgrow the solution of *Religious Aspect*?" Certainly, he did, but only in the sense that it was the laying of the concrete foundation of the house that needed to be built. Once laid, he more or less let it be. The first steady insight provided the basis for further exploration of what it means to claim that there is an ultimate solution to the contradictions of the active processes of experience.

From one angle, this is a faith in the ultimate rightness of things in the universe, God under another name. From another angle, it is a hypothetical logical foundation which can provide a framework for understanding the interplay of morally consequential actions in our contradictory world of experience, i.e., our world of "hard nature" and mere society.

Anecdotally, this certainty as a foundation can hold considerable appeal. The first discovery this author made of Royce—having been searching for FH Bradley's works—in a used bookshop in Montreal twenty five years ago, was a yellowed copy of this thick little book with the curious title of *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. The book was devoured, metaphorically, and when finished, I had a moment much like Matt Berry's Toast of London character: "Yeesssss," a feeling which remained for weeks. Eight years later I was still arguing from *Religious Aspect*, to anyone who would listen.

So Royce explores two ethical alternatives to loyalty: 1) *love and work as ethically unifying—because individuating—acts*, and what one might call 2) *the hypothetical construction of the framework of the moral ought in its whole to part aspect*, i.e. the hypothesis that there must be a great interpreter—the one who "knows the dream, and the interpretation thereof" of *Religious Aspect* (Royce 1885, 428)—as a foundational ethical move which gets one through the hard times when practical hopes of implementing ethics in the "real" world seem dim. We saw that Royce follows Kant's lead in this—remember Kant's "starry skies and moral law within" insight—but Schelling says something similar in words that apply

¹ Some examples: "our share of the world's work" in Josiah Royce, "Reflections after a wandering life in Australasia," *The Atlantic Monthly* (1857–1932) 63 (June 1889): 818; our "life-work" in Josiah Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy: A Critique of the Bases of Conduct and of Faith*." (New York: Harper, 1885), 12–13. (Hereafter cited as *Religious Aspect*); "our individual lifework" in Josiah Royce, "The Study of Philosophy," *Occident* (Berkeley: University of California 1898): 51; and again our "life work" in Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, vol. 1 (New York: MacMillan, 1913), 408.

particularly to the Schiller/Royce connection being discussed: “Human beings keep rejuvenating themselves and become newly blissful through the feeling of the unity of their being . . . Not only poets, but also philosophers, have their ecstasies. They need this in order to be safe, through the feeling of the indescribable reality of that higher representation, against the coerced concepts of an empty dialectic that lacks enthusiasm” (Schelling 2000, xxxviii). In other words, it is the supporting energy of the conceptual certainty of the moral wholeness of experience, in whichever way it may be characterized.

There is yet another aspect of Royce’s ethics which the Schiller paper brings out. Through his review of Schiller’s problems, Royce highlights the inevitability of the diversity and thus conflict and disharmony in everyday life (Royce 1878, 390). Royce is right on this and mentions it often. Though “it is not satisfactory to be finite” (Royce 1904, 363) is part of the insight, as Royce notes in *World and Individual*, the more relevant part here is “the world is not as I wish it to be,” i.e. that our human nature “seeks not to hold the present, but to fly to the next; scorns the immediate, the presented, and looks endlessly for the oncoming, the sought, the wished-for, the absent . . .” (Royce 1906, 210).

The clashes of desires, the raging storm of many people rejecting that world as it is—and this is deeply true even of those who, in contemporary times, seem least able to offer practical, consistent, and constructive alternatives to the world which they rage against—is visible everywhere. Most people feel the urge for their experience to be different. Few see this character of the world in its larger scale and reflect on *why* the world creates this urge in us. Royce was one of those few, of course. This insight can thus be summed as 3) *the world is, through and through, an ethical world in prospect*, whether that prospect be consistent and well thought out as an ideal, or simply the “mush” of “tear this down and give us something else!” It is not, despite Schopenhauer, (Royce 1919, 247–248) or Bertrand Russell in his response to Frederick Copleston, or others, “just as it is” and indifferent, since we are a part of it and a part that is definitely not indifferent, despite our also often being part of it in this way as a mere lazy social mass or aggregate. It is thus a world which goads us to be ethical, *a world which makes ethical activity worth exploring*.

So far then, we have the four ethical insights noted earlier, and now two theoretical modes of ethics (love/work and the part-whole framework of the moral ought), as well as an insight into ethical experience as such, as being a context goading ethical interest. None of these have anything specifically to do with loyalty. Each of them is developed at length, in one place or another, through Royce’s writings.

Royce also notes, above all, Schiller’s endurance in the face of the above observation regarding the problematic state of the world as a realm of conflict and clash of interests (Royce 1878, 392). Schiller perseveres despite the intractable nature of the world problem. Even if he never quite gains satisfaction, he still fights the good fight. In short, he is a model of the active, ethically developing human. It is implied that, like Schiller, there are ethical models to look to *despite* their local failings.

Ethical Models as a Methodological Mode of Ethics

The whole of Royce’s paper on Schiller highlights one of Royce’s strengths. He had an ability to “read” ethical development in others. (Royce 1878, 389) The interesting thing is that, although Royce had it by instinct, he also honed it by training, and he was clear throughout many writings that ethical models should be reconstructed and referred to in our navigation of ethical experience, so as to act as both guides and warnings. Surveying Royce’s many essays in this light, you see how often he did this. A long but still incomplete list—because some of his writings on ethical models were not self-contained essays and are thus buried in larger works—includes: George Eliot, George Fox, Tennyson, Fremont, Bunyan, Paracelsus, Browning, Fiske, Nietzsche, Saint Paul, and even James. Who but Royce, except perhaps Emerson, has been so resolute, and selfless, in writing about *other* people and their work? Royce is constantly searching for the ethical meaning of other people’s lives.

One of the longer and more explicit works which displays this methodological mode of ethical models is Royce’s work on Spencer. Typical of Royce’s writings of this type, it is about the man himself and not his philosophy. As ethics, it falls under two categories. *First*, the human process relative to the ideal and relative to the full scope of the completed life is considered, i.e., how did the individual do in following their ideal? As Royce characterizes the task in Spencer’s case: “What, then, is the consequence

of considering the ideals and the methods of Spencer's philosophy in the light of his autobiography?" (Royce 1904, 10).

This method is, as such, not a loyalty related one, a point brought home to us better when we fully consider that any active loyalty is over, since the individual is usually deceased. More than simply ethical biography, Royce's approach is a sort of ethical "data gathering" rather, a sort of *inductive ethics* of the facts left over from a prominent life, a conspectus of what works and what does not in ethical development, or again, an assessment of man as a social artifact and as a standard.

As a *second* ethical mode, it is an analysis of the consistency of ethical ideals. It is what was sought by the individual—insofar as knowable—as assessed in terms of its broad consistency, along with what turned out to be, or not to be, possible, given the situation the individual was in, i.e., an informal logical analysis of individual choices.

While Royce considers Spencer as an actively developing individual, he weaves in a consideration of evolution as a conceptual and scientific framework, an endeavour developing from and alongside certain *leading ideas*. (Royce 1904, 20) Clearly, the implication is that the ethical striving toward ideals thus binds together both the individual under consideration and the greater project in which that individual takes part. Ethics couched as "an interest in the permanent significance of ethical truth," is one of three prominent and ancient, "leading interests", as Royce calls them—astronomy, logic, and mathematics are the others—and is placed on a level with its peers (Royce 1904, 30). This implies that ethics can make common cause with the other leading interests, an insight which will be expanded further below in discussing ethics and logic.

Spencer was seeking to bring all processes under a law of evolution (Royce 1904, 75). Royce devotes careful reflection to how successfully this could be done, and what success Spencer actually achieved in attempting it. Later on, Royce notes that Spencer applied his formula to ethics with varying success (Royce 1904, 93). Insofar as Spencer's formula helps link mental and material phenomena, and the study of the former through the latter, it helps ethics conceived as a fulfillment of the urge toward ideals (Royce 1904, 99). As a whole, Royce rates Spencer's theory as deficient, because of its contradictions above all (Royce 1904, 109). Generalizations, to be useful, need to define a series of ideal cases to which their formula can be applied (Royce 1904, 113-114), and "the business of a theory of phenomena is the arrangement of systems of facts in ideal serial orders . . ." (Royce, 1904, 116). So, it is also with the social phenomena of ethics.

Spencer had much to say about education as well, and what Royce considers an almost charming naïveté (Royce 1904, 149) about the subject (Royce 1904, 194 – 196) on Spencer's part nonetheless increases his usefulness as a model for ethical purpose in life, so that Royce's discussion indeed flows into a reflection on the influence of such models (Royce 1904, 151). Spencer views other men's life problems in terms of his own personal experience (Royce, 1904, 153). He projects himself as a moral model, and assumes that by following that model people will become, as Royce puts it "an essentially Spencerian sort of person" (Royce 1904, 154). With no small irony, Royce uses Spencer's case to show both the limits and benefits of referring to ethical models, where the lesson drawn is that "the purpose of training a man is, on the whole this: 'We want to fit him to take a definite place, as an individual, in human society.'" (Royce 1904, 173) One sees then, that just as much stress is put on individuation, here and throughout Spencer's biography (Royce 1904, 177), as there has already been over Royce's three decades as a philosopher.

Royce had referenced and even taught Spencer's philosophy in the context of the philosophy of science through the 1880s and 90s, setting it off against other science oriented philosophical positions.² Having thus covered much ground regarding Spencer's philosophical/scientific insights, Royce was well positioned to reassess that ground from the alternative perspective of ethical modeling. Consequently, while Clendenning rated Royce's *Spencer* biography as one of Royce's "least ambitious works," (Clend-

² See the reminiscences of A.H. Lloyd, one of Royce's students, regarding Royce's early 90s philosophy of nature class devoted to Spencer and Spinoza: A.H. Lloyd, "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," *The Scientific Monthly* 11 no. 2 (August 1920): 97–98; 111. See also John Clendenning, *The Letters of Josiah Royce*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 86–87; 234; 312.

enning 1970, 405) he—unsurprisingly, because Royce does not make the method *technically* explicit—may not have appreciated the aim of Royce’s biography as a more substantial effort regarding the notion of individuals as ethical models.

How in the end does Royce assess Spencer? Partly, and here Royce connects to the *Concept of God* notion of love as individuating again, in terms of Spencer’s difficulty to individuate. What Spencer’s “autobiography” emphasized, says Royce, is that the latter’s love of humanity was largely abstract, he “was peculiarly destitute of any large power to appreciate individuals” (Royce 1904, 175–176). Spencer need not have been entirely right because of this, but nonetheless, he himself can serve as a model of a wholesome process of development (Royce 1904, 158) and we can judge him not by the special aspects of his condition but by the larger views which his development gave rise to. One can “admire this entire process as indeed, when rightly estimated, a model for the training of other men” (Royce 1904, 158). Spencer’s life as a model of moral training is indeed faulty, but even in its deficiencies it highlights a solution that the methods of moral training need to be flexibly individualized to specific situations (Royce 1904, 158–159).

Here is another way of doing ethics: searching for models of ethical development and making observations and drawing principles based on those models. Human frailty, as Royce obliquely implies, dictates that this way will often be a *via negativa*, as is partly true with Spencer as a model, where we discover what *not* to do. This last interweaves with Royce’s ethical use of logic, as we shall see. Yet many positive suggestions are also uncovered, as we can show by glancing briefly at some of Royce’s further ethical models.

Shelley was an early interest for Royce. In 1880, a quarter century before the Spencer biography, Royce writes of Shelley that his interest is in “Shelley the moral man,” (Royce 1880, 545) specifically calling him a moral teacher who represents his age (Royce 1880, 544). Royce’s emphasis on the model mode of ethics could not be clearer: “It pleases the World-Spirit at times to think highly original and peculiar thoughts; and these, embodied in living men, may make them incomparable with their fellows in some one respect, *models and not things modeled after others* . . .” (Royce 1880). What we learn from Shelley as a model pertains especially to the mode of ethical model analysis itself. A model may be considered in relation to their age, or otherwise (Royce 1880). Models can act as types of their own times (Royce 1880), which evidently is helpful for comparative ethical purposes.³

George Eliot was yet another ethical model whose work and life Royce had considered deeply. That it is no futile task to consider Eliot in an ethical light, in terms of her life’s work, her output, is made clear by Royce. Among the lessons we learn from Eliot, Royce indirectly suggests that it is alright for an artist to reflectively pursue ideals in art, or, from another angle, “leading ideas” as Royce calls them in the specific but related context of scientific pursuits in the Richmond Lectures (Royce 1904). Eliot, says Royce, produced “novels with a purpose” and “artist as she actually was, theory was constantly in her mind . . . [and] she certainly wished to teach men” (Royce 1881, 301). Moreover, beyond early disappointments which caused her to rethink her worldview, she *acted*—a practical insight which Royce would play up many times—“she never rested in the early crude delight of negation [of her original views] but sought in all directions for more light” (Royce 1881). There are negative lessons as well. We might be angry that much of Eliot’s early life was wasted in types of writing which were not fitted to display her true gifts, and yet, the implied lesson is that those who work in the world with ideal purposes must learn to come to terms with the limitation of temporal waste (Royce 1881).

Alternately, in his essay on Tennyson, Royce shows Tennyson’s weakness as escaping to the distant ideal too thoroughly. Yet in this “disease” of the spirit visible in Tennyson, he grasps an insight that can then be used to diagnose any number of people in order to heal them, namely: they can come to use

³ This type of comparative ethics can be carried out in the context of the human creation of technological artifacts as well, where the model is the more complex response, or lack thereof, of human communities — an individuation at the level of larger communities — to their own creations. See Marc M. Anderson “Rare Opportunity or History Revisited? The Pitfalls and Prospects for Ethical AI in Light of Public Ethical Responses to the Telegraph,” *Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia* 18, no. 3 (2023). <https://doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.18.3.1>

their ideal longings as a seed which will grow to bear good fruit in the heavier soil of the messy world of the here and now.

As a model then, Tennyson's ethical advance is exemplified in his ability to tie together the process of his development from youth to old age, both in the Locksley Hall poems and in his other work as a poet. And yes, loyalty is present in this 1887 essay by Royce, intertwined in the discussion (Royce 1887, 128–129) but without overpowering the analysis. The discussion turns around what is the approach—and here at first the wrong approach—to finding the object of loyalty, of interest, or of love, amidst the undesirable clutter, contradiction, and strife, of life. We must find a solidier idealism or descend into pessimism (Royce 1887, 131) and Tennyson, as a romantic poet and an ethical model, does us the service of showing that even a person with the nature of a romantic poet can both come to terms with the difficult world of experience, i.e., grow ethically, and do good work to help us make the transition to solidity.

To mention a final example, Royce's shorter *Harvard Gazette* assessment of James after the latter's death directly highlights James's character as a moral model. James was a source of ideals, said Royce, regarding everyday moments of humans living and interacting together. From James's "massive and inspiring personality . . . men drew their ideals of human character and were grateful to him for being what he was. They found him the best of comrades—simple, engaging, generous . . ." (Royce 1910/11, 30).

The Logical Mode of Ethics

I have mentioned the analysis of the consistency of the ethical ideal above. It would be odd if this practice was not developed by Royce further. And indeed it is.

Logical Ethics and Royce's Doctoral Thesis

Royce's early efforts in this direction can best be found in his doctoral thesis. The aim of Royce's doctoral dissertation is to show that the ideal and the real are intimately related through various processes of reasoning, such that the Real, or realized, or more real, is experience whose relations to other aspects of experience are more fully countenanced by some containing thought, when considered relative to some given Ideal.

There is, as Royce puts it, a Real Synthesis of Ethics and an Ideal Synthesis. The Real Synthesis is the synthesis of judgments "extended to things as related to actions. All things are capable of being included in the Real Synthesis of Ethics, in so far as all things and events can be considered as assisting or opposing the ends of /317/ Right Action, or as possible assistants or opponents" (Royce 1878, 316–317). This view of ethics, if not wholly unique, is extremely rare in the history of ethics. In effect, Royce argues that the objects and *things* of the world—including of course both natural objects and human artifacts—have ethical import.

The argument and its broader implications are that ethics is capable of systematic treatment and engagement with the physical and mathematical content of experience and that it goes far beyond the more usual Ideal Synthesis which most ethicists countenance. The Ideal Synthesis is actively countenanced also, so that the assumption "that there is a Right and Wrong, a Good and Evil, and that this is independent of individual opinion or notion," (Royce 1878, 316–317) is no less important as a ground of ethical action. But there is a "more Real" ethics, so to speak, both experienced and in development, wherein ethics will attain a unity with other modes of engagement, such as mathematics. Another way to say this is that mathematics and other modes of reasoning need the ethical, just as the latter needs them.

The modes of countenancing experiences, then, are various processes of reasoning, which are *interdependent*—hence the dissertation title—with regard to their respective principles of knowledge. Royce enumerates five objects of processes of reasoning, of which determining the moral character of an action, a process which involves justifying the ethical judgment, is one. (Royce 1878, 31) The others are logical, mathematical, aesthetic, and psychological. Each of these five processes of reasoning can act upon the others, and their results can be used by the others. As Royce puts it: "All the Syntheses of the other Principles of Knowledge [logical, mathematical, psychological] give material to these two critical Principles [aesthetics and ethics], for their judgments. Conversely, however, the Results of these [ethical and aesthetic] Syntheses may be made the subject of the Syntheses of the other Principles of Knowledge;

and Ethics or Aesthetics may be treated as physical, as logical, or as mathematical sciences” (Royce 1878, 323). Thus, *a logic of ethics can be developed*.

Royce does not develop it as a discrete work however, in keeping with the viewpoint laid out in his doctoral thesis. There is no specific work from Royce entitled *The Logic of Ethics*. Rather, Royce typically weaves logical methods into various works, treating ethics as a logical exploration.

Logical Ethics and the *Religious Aspect*

The first work to do this on a large scale is *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. Although it uses the word *religious*, as previously noted, the work is about establishing a hypothetical framework regarding the nature of the world as a moral world. In other words, it is about demonstrating that a philosophically and logically delineated omniscience guarantees the moral potential of the world for the morally inclined being who is searching for ethics. This omniscience can be reached through the processes of reasoning characterized in Royce’s doctoral dissertation.

Each of the processes and objects of reasoning described above play their part in the work, as Royce considers what can be known of the world as a moral potential, but logic plays the major part. Having shown that satisfaction cannot be fully had “. . . with noble purposes, but merely poetical methods,” Royce insists that “our present method shall be coldly theoretical, however deeply our religious philosophy is concerned in the outcome” (Royce 1885, 337–338).

Logic of the rigorous but informal 19th-century kind is wielded to show that the condition for the possibility of error is an omniscient guarantor of the moral aspect of the world of experience. The religious aspect thereby becomes a “faith” actively built upon a logical process of reasoning. There is little difference between this and religious faith as traditionally understood, except that the Roycean version of this faith, i.e., the move toward accepting certain conditions of experience on the basis of “other” experience and inference—religious and mystical experiences, stories of such, etc.—is more active, more generalized, carried further and more rigorously.

In brief, *Religious Aspect* is a more considered philosophical version of the search for and finding of moral comfort, as noted in Schiller’s essay in the period where Schiller accepts the Kantian certainty of the possibility of a moral world. It is the philosophical counterpart, and logical at that, to the Biblical injunction regarding the lilies of the field: “your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. But seek ye first his kingdom, and his righteousness” (Matthew 6, 25–34). The point is: one can at least have the certainty, through logical reflection, that *his kingdom and his righteousness are there to be sought*.

The ideal of the moral, logically arrived at in *Religious Aspect*, passes over into the religious, because for the moral the outlines of the ideal of a good world are blurry and the certainty of its attainability is lacking—they are always mere ought—whereas the logical process worked upon the concept of error, adds both rigour to the outline of the ideal and the certainty of eventual attainability, or as Royce puts it: “Our first full assurance that our incomplete ideals have an actual completion as ideals [and . . .] our first full assurance that there is in the highest sense any definite ideal at all” (Royce 1885, 446). In other words, a logically arrived at and buttressed belief, or faith.

Logical Ethics and *The World and The Individual*

Logic having been put to use in the delineation of the religious ideal of the moral—there is a point to being moral and in developing ethics—Royce then turns it upon the conceptual development of the relation of the individual to the higher moral state. This work is in response to conceptions of the ideal which either downplay or actively destroy the possibility of the relations of individual moral experience to its fuller ideals, e.g., F.H. Bradley’s version of the Ideal, the materialist conception of Being, or to conceptions of Being which would simply take a moral holiday by depending upon the Ideal itself to exclusively fulfill those relations, e.g., the religious traditionalist and mystical conceptions of the Ideal as ultimate Being. This is, of course, the work of the two volumes of *The World and the Individual* and the supplementary essay to the first volume in particular.

The relations of Being such as Kantian Critical Rationalism views them, depends upon the notion of validity as upholding the being of the entities it considers, entities such as mathematical objects, and moral and social objects. It leaves the validity (truth) of that being as an internal affair, however,

not testable beyond present finite experience (Royce 1904, 268). Royce's problem to be solved then is: Where are the mere possibilities of internal meanings tested? Where is the *this* or *that* which goes beyond the mere universal and abstract *what* of things? (Royce 1904, 269). Moral life above all, recognizes and negotiates possibilities of action which are judged as best avoided, i.e., in moral life we contemplate actions which we could but do not take. (Royce 1904) The truth of such actions must be more than internal, otherwise each of us is trapped in our own world of personal truths, a world which has nothing to do with the worlds of others, and no truth beyond ourselves.

To arrive at the solution to the status of the so far "missing" individuals, i.e. concrete actions, Royce advances, Royce advances two lines of argument with formal logic: 1) truth is something which we judge to be so or not, from a perspective external to the query of validity, and 2) truth is correspondence between idea and object.

With regard to 1), methodologically Royce examines processes of judgment through Formal Logic. Judgments involve combinations of ideas which enrich internal meanings, but these internal meanings are viewed by us as referencing some reality, whether the ideal object is real, or not (Royce 1904, 271).

What logic teaches us is that external experience is sought as the fulfillment of processes of engaging internal meanings. That experience is not just "any old experience," but selected experience, i.e. experience shaped at least in part by ideas, by constructing hypotheses regarding external experience which are to be tested: ". . . man thinks in order to get control of his world, and thereby of himself" (Royce 1904, 285–286).

When Royce turns to considering the logic of particular judgments, he notes that individuals cannot be defined without losing the sense of their uniqueness. Neither does external experience present us with individuals; the particular cases we meet with in external experience, even though we take them to be individual, cannot be confirmed to be unique (Royce 1904, 293–294). Yet if universal judgments were confirmed such that no other individual object or objects were possible as expressions of our internal ideas, then we would have arrived at the Real, i.e., the "finally determinate which permits no other" (Royce 1904, 299).

On the other hand, with regard to 2), getting from the internal idea to its object needs a further reflection upon the logic of correspondence relations. Examples of correspondence are various for us: numbers corresponding to the objects of a collection, map parts corresponding to the land represented, etc.

Idea and object can differ very widely, but they correspond in terms of Purpose, i.e., the specific purpose embodied in a given idea, which possesses a value for your will; ideas are like tools: which is better depends on what you are using it for (Royce 1904, 306–309).

The idea always aims to find in its object "*the idea's own conscious purpose or will, embodied in some more determinate form* than the idea by itself alone at this instance consciously possesses" (Royce 1904, 327). Making up our mind about something is an example of how this occurs. The more expanded solution of the relation between ideas and objects is that our relation to the external world—essentially a relation between part and whole—is a vast process of "making up our minds" about it (Royce 1904), a search for what one wants. Through such an insight, one recognizes that Royce, while engaged in metaphysics, is in parallel deeply embedded in a practical moral project, the search for one's true purpose. One of Royce's favourite examples illustrating the process for satisfying an Internal Meaning with its External Object is found in mathematics. The mathematician defines a purpose from the beginning, to seek an Other or an Object and through the research process uses further conjectural constructions or hypotheses to refine the initial purpose. If achieved, the final Object appears as a fact or complex of facts of experience, i.e. a series of properties and relations in diagrams, symbols, or systems of such. The latter expression, if it reaches the point at which it fulfills the original purpose, puts the mathematician in the state of "yes this is true and I now see what my initial definitions meant," and the mathematician is satisfied and looks no further for the Object (Royce 1904, 330).

Another example might be: loving singing to the point of discovering, through hard searching work, and exhibiting in performance, everything which satisfies one's purposes about it, as the great soprano Maria Callas did in perfecting coloratura techniques, developing wide ranging tone colour, and mastering *bel canto* among other musical "objects" beloved by the operatic minded (Scott 1992, 53).

Whatever the focus of our search, we seek universal judgments. Finding is a more determinate experience of the contents of one's experience than seeking and we find in the form of particular judgments (Royce 1904, 336).

The finally determinate form of the object of a finite idea is the form which an idea would assume when it becomes individuated; no other content could or would be permitted to be substituted for it (Royce 1904, 337). The ultimate would be an absolute determination of one's purpose as an individual realization of the idea; no other realization would be sought (Royce 1904, 338–339).

Being is “an individual life, consisting of the individual embodiments of the wills represented by all finite ideas. Now *to be*, in the final sense, means to be just such a life, complete, present to experience, and conclusive of the search for perfection which every finite idea in its own measure undertakes whenever it seeks for any objects” (Royce 1904, 341–342). Characterized in Mysticism's terms: there is a partial self in relation to a completely integrated Self; Royce's argument to arrive at this solution depends upon a constant use of logical analysis which follows out the lines of implication from various other conceptions of reality and shows them to be self-contradictory (Royce 1904, 348).

Royce's ethics is thus built here, upon a metaphysical effort laced with logical method. The relation between universal and individual, between part and whole, between idea and object, between indeterminate and determinate selfhood, are an “absolute logical necessity,” as Royce insists (Royce 1904, 349). Indeed logic, because it deals with universal and particular judgments (and not existential judgments), is the (methodological road-map) of the part on its journey toward the determinate whole, i.e., logic as an activity exists, practically speaking, because of the incomplete character of indeterminate experience. The completion of logic, if such could be, would be the final determination of the Real. This is why logic is so important to Royce: methodologically, it is the obvious technical route to the completion of ethical activity, the mapping out of what can be ethical in anticipation of bringing it to be.

Logical Ethics and the Urbana Lectures

When he does not examine logic in itself to gain metaphysical and thus ethical insight, Royce uses logic to outline broad ethical options, to cut off or bar the way to bad possible options, and to develop frameworks for action in approaching ethical questions. In other words, he uses a very generalized logic of Order.

One example of this type of use is the Urbana lectures in which he works out what he calls the beginnings of “A little Moral Code.” The latter is meant to be a first heuristic approach toward engaging moral problems in general, a sort of order of actions to take. Just as the idealizations (i.e. laws) of science, have a heuristic value for Royce, as Kegley notes (Kegley 2022, 5), so also do the logically developed and ordered principles toward action of the Urbana lectures.

Royce suggests that a first principle of ethics is: “All sincere valuations of things, by whomsoever made, are themselves facts having value. Whoever wills anything—their will has its own value. Whoever wants to know the values of things must take account of all values that any will sets upon things. Here is already a starting point for an objective doctrine of values” (Fuss 1967, 70).

We thus find the world of our experience as a world of valuations which are facts. However, these facts of valuation are often in conflict. Nevertheless, these conflicting values have a commonality in belonging to the world as a world of values (Fuss 1967, 71).

Royce goes on to say that: “The beginning of an insight into the truth of the world of values we get when we see that it primarily makes no difference whereabouts in the world a valuation is situated, namely, whether it is a valuation made by A, or a valuation made by B” (Fuss 1967, 71). Values are thus so far similar to scientific facts, and if so, they can be approached in terms of logical ordering, which is a blurring of the domains of logic and mathematics, as applied to ethics.

What history shows us, according to Royce, is that when faced with severely conflicting valuations, we have had successes in reconciling these valuations. Despite destructive setbacks, success has often come not through the destruction of opposing facts of valuation, but through interpreting those facts in a higher synthesis which saves something—sometimes all—of both (or multiple) valuations. “Men have learned not necessarily to give up what was essential about their original valuations, but to

harmonize their valuations through a transformation, not so much of their own will, as of their social institution ... That this is possible the evolution of civilized life shows” (Fuss 1967, 73).

The proposing of such harmonizing plans would be one task of the ethicist, essentially a task of ordering facts of valuation, into more complex structures, real and ideal, according to a generalized logic of Order. Definitions analogous to the definition of laws of nature as invariant modes of change “apply to laws and lawfulness wherever these are present in the ethical or the metaphysical world, or in any world, real or ideal, which is properly to be conceived as subject to invariant modes of change or behaviour” (Royce 1917, 534).

In the Urbana lectures, Royce only gives the briefest outline of such a methodology of ordering value, but the example is potent still. Principle #1 of his “Little Moral Code” is: “Regard every man’s will, whatever it be, as something that in itself is worth carrying out” (Fuss 1967, 75). Principle #2, meanwhile, is: “If there be any course of conduct by which the wills of many may be made to cooperate instead of to conflict, prefer that course of conduct to whatever course of conduct tends to keep up the conflict” (Fuss 1967, 75).

These two very general principles can thus be used to begin to order our valuative facts and lead to a growth of value, since it can be taken as a logical result that the new and harmonized situation possesses more objective value than the old situation, as it is valued alike by both cooperating parties (Fuss 1967, 73).

Thirty years on, Royce is still very much applying the insights of his doctoral thesis: that there can be a logic of ethics, and here also—the lines blur— a science of ethics, as well as an ethics of science.⁴ If Science says: be objective, consider facts as they are, then Ethics can say: “view every valuation from the point of view of the one who makes that valuation. Put yourself in his place” (Fuss 1967, 76). Where Descriptive Science says: look to find the law in and beneath things, Ethics “expresses the resolution that there shall be a law whereby our chaotic elementary valuations may be harmonized” (Fuss 1967, 76).

The conjunction of human efforts toward ordering experience is thus obvious: “Man is restless. He acts. He creates values. And acting he strains onwards into the future” (Fuss 1967, 77). From this outlook, Royce introduces a third principle, making the move to the personal interpretation between our past and future, through our present, in order to harmonize our values. Principle #3 is: all valuations have reference to aligning past and future goals with present deeds, thus we have to look to the past, to the goals, and to the deeds. And then Principle #4 follows as a practical precept: you can then look to past harmonizations of human lives and present ideals to help in the effort to harmonize facts of valuation, (Fuss 1967, 78), and we see that ethical models as discussed earlier—specific past attempts at harmonizing life—are drawn into Royce’s moral code.

The principles thus unfold as an informal logic, even though they are general and heuristic enough to guide action in the world. They are the framework of a conceptual order system for ethics, a very generalized set of hypotheses about experience as value—along with their implications—which, as Royce states in his later article *The Principles of Logic*, anticipates observable facts when used heuristically, i.e., focuses ethical attention in the engagement of experience (Royce 1913, 75).

Logical Ethics and System Σ

Finally, outlining ethical routes for action can be broad, but it can also be very refined. *The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry*, of 1905, also called System Σ (System Sigma), is a much more refined effort.

System Sigma is as close as Royce comes to completing a technical logic of ethics. If *The World and the Individual* highlights the interdependence of the principles of knowledge wherein there is a logical and mathematical ethics demonstrating the possibility of the relation of the logical individual as a part process of acts to a whole process of acts, in a more or less popular manner, then Σ goes a step further. Σ shows how that interdependence looks from the side of a more formal logical system.

Here Royce is not concerned with the possibility of relations, those are already established, but rather with the systematic technical display of the logical possibilities of ordered experience extending

⁴ For more on this kinship of science and ethics from the perspective of the extended implications of Royce’s System Σ , see Marc M. Anderson, *Hyperthematics: The Logic of Value* (New York: SUNY Press, 2019), 402–412..

from definite courses of action (Royce 1905, 359), “modes of action” (Royce 1905, 134), in the logically ethical world, insofar as these intersect with the conceptual context of the world as developed by mathematical geometry and as used by all the sciences in ordering experience. A System Σ *mode of action* is a set of logical elements in a definite ordered relation to one another, and to other such sets, based upon initial existential choices of elements and ordering. In other words, if you choose *this/these* elements and order them into *this/these* relations, then System Σ can tell you the further sets of relations which are your possible outcomes. A fuller development of System Σ would thus tell you in ideal format, if one put the work in, both the general and then increasingly precise rules, the pathways of order to follow in order to create a moral world—and avoid an immoral one—in the real world of experience. As a domain which strives to create lawlike order within experience, ethics would begin to intersect smoothly with the efforts of science and integrate itself with the order found in the natural world (the latter including the natural human world of human artifacts: clothes, cars, computers, etc.).

Σ is thus the veritable *logic of ethics* in the formal and technical sense which, as Royce in his 1874 dissertation suggested, can be developed. Or at least, it is the foundation of such an ethics. That it has not been understood to be a logic of ethics, is perhaps due in part to Royce’s tendency to be understated in his aims in the work itself. Moreover, the formatting difficulties and likely publication venues of technical texts in logic presented, as they still do, a difficulty to publishing material that would bridge the gap between a technically trained and a broader readership.

These difficulties become clear in one of the responses to Royce’s 1913 *The Principles of Logic*, by the philosopher C.D. Broad. Broad agreed with much of Royce’s article, and thought it very good in its argument regarding the relation of order systems to mathematics and the natural sciences, but he took issue with Royce’s attempt to connect logic and mathematics with volition, and not least because, as he put it, “at this point one of the irritating consequences of this form of literature enters, and he has to refer us to a paper of his [the paper is *Relation of*] for a sketch of his real reasons” (Royce 1951, 378). In short, it was never going to be easy to get across an argument regarding the link between ethics, logic, and math and science in the encyclopedias and mathematical journals which were willing to publish technical works in logic.

C.I. Lewis, one of Royce’s most prominent students, called System Σ “a marvel of simplicity and compact neatness” (Lewis 1916, 419) in comparison to the complexity of the more analytical method adopted by Russell and Whitehead in *Principia Mathematica*. While Lewis clearly saw the novelty of Royce’s approach: “Professor Royce’s is the method of the path-finder. The prospect of the novel is here much greater,” (Lewis 1916) evidently he did not understand the ethical import of the work.

Even Bruce Kuklick, who took Royce’s logic very seriously, and who has perhaps the best understanding of System Σ and its relation to Royce’s other work—calling System Σ Royce’s “masterwork in mathematical logic” (Kuklick 1977, 378)—nonetheless makes no mention of a relation to ethics, suggesting that the 1905 work fails in its intent to show how the World of Description is an aspect of the World of Appreciation, (Kuklick 1977, 379) even as he notes Royce’s belief that “he had reduced logic and geometry to the entities and relations of Σ ” (Kuklick 1977, 380).

Kuklick suggests that what Royce thought he had accomplished was that the modes of action open to freely willing beings, as implied in Σ “did not merely give a consistent interpretation of Σ ; they actually were the entities of Σ ; Σ was the absolute” (Kuklick 1977, 384–385). This is partially correct as far as it goes, but it too easily substitutes a mere renewed categorical structure of consciousness,⁵ for what, upon a more broadly considered reading, Royce was really after.

As argued above, Royce’s true aim, from the very beginning, was toward a *Real Synthesis* of ethics in which well-considered ethical action, in increasing unity with other modes of human engagement of experience, would gradually fill out the *Ideal Synthesis* (Royce 1878, 317). The Absolute was an ethical

⁵ This weaker aim of a renewed categorical structure was hinted at early on in *Religious Aspect*, when he says, in reply to Kant’s imagined assertion that “‘you cannot stop [thinking according to the categories you have] . . . Your thought, being what it is, must follow this one fashion forever.’ Nay, we reply, how knowest thou that, Master? Why may not our thought get a new fashion some day?” 387. Royce anticipates Whitehead in his outlook here, but Royce could not rest content without drawing the means for the ethical completion of experience into the project.

hypothesis interwoven with mathematical, scientific, and other modes of engagement of the descriptive world, *but its real completion—if we cared to advance and follow the logic Royce developed—would be ours to achieve.*

My own past research, taking its cue from Royce's logical work and System Σ in particular, has concentrated here more or less, attempting to extend and test Royce's system. In that research, value is redefined in terms which are amenable to the transformations which can be carried out within System Σ : as a function of interpretation between logical elements (Anderson 2019, 1–4, 19–21). Repeated hypothetical transformations, compatible with Royce's System Σ axioms and assumptions, are carried out with regard to real world elements of experience (historical and otherwise) in various contexts. This is termed a hyperthematic method which is used to test and display the effects of various choices on the accretion or loss of value in experience. The aim is to show what kinds of choices of action increase value and contribute to a more moral world, and in general, to dynamically link the foundational insights of System Σ to real world experience (Anderson 2019, 13).

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have suggested that Royce's ethics is much broader than loyalty, a suggestion that may not be new but nonetheless needs restating. The Ethics of Loyalty is the ripe fruit of a popular exposition of one aspect of Royce's thought, sweet and easily picked, but there are many other deeper sources of sustenance in Royce's work for those interested in developing ethics.

In summary, though necessarily an incomplete account, we can point to the following insights that Royce advanced from the very beginning and worked out to varying degrees: 1) *the root of conflict in social experience lies in the diversity of interests (values)*; 2) *society, apart from ideas and actions which integrate and (accentuate) moral experience, is a mere mass or aggregate*; 3) *there is the insight that our freedom, seemingly, stands opposed to a chaotic and external aspect of experience, later to be connected to the nature studied by science and characterized as the Descriptive*; and finally, the insight that 4) *the career of scholarship and research is an endeavour which develops moral selfhood.*

He considered and developed at least two alternatives to loyalty, as practical modes of bringing the experience of the individual together ethically, namely love, and work as a calling. In *Religious Aspect*, he developed a hypothetical Framework of the Moral Ought and refined it in *The World and the Individual*. He advanced, in a number of works, the insight regarding the ethical world in prospect by considering the conflict of values aspect of human experience: we are never satisfied with our experience as value, i.e., we presume an ethical world.

Moreover, as I have argued, Royce advanced a methodological mode of ethical modeling, a sort of inductive ethics, in carrying out numerous close analyses of the lives and life-works of poets, writers, scientists, and other prominent, as well as less well-known, people.

Finally, he worked tenaciously toward a Logic of Ethics, both positing its possibilities in his doctoral dissertation, and working it out as methodology, and ultimately as formal logic in his System Σ and his later works on logical order.

After a review of Royce's "other than loyalty" types of ethics, one can see that they are not separate. For example, the Ethics of Models is another form of heuristic of the ideal synthesis of ethics. We look to the lives of other people, to experiences that we have not had, within contexts that we may not know, and play with the "what ifs" of their moral lives. In doing so, we use them sometimes as simple heuristics for our own uncertain moral action, and sometimes as jumping-off points from which to develop further our own more complex active engagements of moral experience. Indeed, ethical models in this sense are not far removed from scientific models; both types are bound together by our urge to order experience.

How do these "other than loyalty" efforts stand with regard to what is often taken as Royce's major contribution, the philosophy of loyalty? Can loyalty be viewed as a basket to catch various aspects of the solution described here? The simple answer must be no. As we have seen, all of these other ethical efforts both could and did proceed without the notion of loyalty, sometimes earlier, and sometimes in parallel.

It would be disingenuous to characterize everything before Loyalty as Royce's "early ethical philosophy," because *The Philosophy of Loyalty* was only published in 1908, and as we have seen, in 1907, only a year earlier, Royce was very clearly still following the line of logical ethics. Moreover, by 1908, Royce had only 8 years left to his academic career and output, and life. Despite several great works still to come, *The Problem of Christianity*, for example and even if one only considers Royce a proper philosopher from the attainment of his doctorate in 1878, then that still leaves 30 years prior to the publication of Loyalty in which Royce, as argued, most definitely pursued alternate lines of ethical inquiry. The great bulk of Royce's ethical work then, is not demonstrably to be characterized as wedded to the theme of loyalty.

Why, then, is Royce's emphasis on ethical models not more prominent in academic literature? Undoubtedly, this has to do with the non-systematic way of Royce's procedure. Larger volumes with firm titles—such as *Loyalty*—attract more attention. More scattered and adventurous modes of philosophy, such as the logical essays, and the recourse to ethical models in various essays, are more difficult to grasp, articulate, and interpret in their broad nature. Using them often requires methodology: the readers must strike out and apply them on their own rather than be led by the track of Royce's firm arguments, as in the major works. Thus, short of an explicit articulation of methodology, which Royce rarely did, being well aware of the dryness of such treatments and often apologizing for dry and abstract passages, the alternate ethical methodologies are never highlighted, and thus easily missed.

Loyalty is of course evoked well before Royce's 1908 book, but it is merely yet another one among the various paths he was interested in. A question emerges then as to which Royce are we talking about when discussing his solution to the problem of the individual as a developing ethical process in relation to the inconsistent, contradictory, and conflicted worlds of mere society and hard nature. We should not put too much emphasis on loyalty as Royce's primary solution to the problem, simply because loyalty *appears* to supercede love, work, practical logic, and the theoretical comfort of the hypothetical Kantian judge of the ought as solutions, since even loyalty is in turn superceded by the interpreter of the *Problem of Christianity*, and loyalty was there all along (it simply had not stolen the show yet).

Better to view Royce as a sculptor, working around his problematic stone block, first chiselling away at and revealing one aspect of the solution, then moving around to another side and revealing another aspect, and so on. The problem can be viewed from various angles, and Royce's solutions are both numerous and beautiful to behold.

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