

THE UTILITY OF ROMAN INGARDEN'S RESEARCH IN THE FIELD OF ONTOLOGY
AND METAPHYSICS OF TEXT IN THE CONTEXT OF MYSTICAL TESTIMONIES¹

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Abstract: The article explores the ontological status of mystical testimonies by applying the phenomenological framework of Roman Ingarden. To navigate the methodological confusion surrounding the definition of a “mystical text,” the author utilizes eidetic reduction to determine the necessary conditions for such a text’s existence. Within this framework, a mystical text is classified as a purely intentional being. It lacks an autonomous existential foundation and relies entirely on the creative acts of consciousness of its author. The study examines the structural layers of the text, specifically focusing on schematized appearances that hold the text in a state of extra-temporal potentiality. Ultimately, the mystical text is actualized through the process of concretization during reader reception, where places of indeterminacy are filled with concrete senses. This phenomenological lens provides a rigorous basis for the typology of mystical writings without adjudicating the theological validity of the spiritual experiences themselves.

Keywords: Roman Ingarden, phenomenology, ontology of text, mystical text, purely intentional being, concretization, existential foundation.

Introduction: The Significance of the Study

The significance of this research lies in its attempt to resolve a fundamental methodological confusion surrounding the concept of the “mystical text”. While the term is frequently used in both colloquial language and academic studies, it often serves merely as a “typological master key”—a vague concept masking research helplessness. This ambiguity is particularly problematic given that, for many readers, recognizing a text as mystical profoundly shapes their spiritual lives and profiles the direction of their internal quests.

Furthermore, scholars frequently struggle to reconcile the absence of a “strong textual subject” with a naive belief that exactly identifies the textual subject with the living, writing author. By applying Roman Ingarden’s rigorous phenomenological and ontological methods, this study breaks through these textual structures to establish a precise typology of the mystically entangled text. Ultimately, this research is crucial because it provides a stable philosophical foundation for diagnosing the possibility of

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the mystical text's existence and recognizing this specific phenomenon in reality, moving beyond theoretical chaos and unexamined presuppositions.

When setting out to write a work on the possibility of the existence of a mystical text, I was aware from the very beginning of the difficult material I was dealing with. It is a highly specific research field—if only because, for many people, recognitions in this subject profile the direction of internal quests and shape spiritual life in at least certain respects. For this reason, I must clarify a few issues at the very beginning so that the reader can understand why such a dissertation was created at all and what tasks it fulfills.

The main problem for me was the question: “Is this [in relation to a specific testimony] really a mystical text?” What are we really asking about when raising this issue? What exactly do we want to know about a given text then? I will not provide an answer immediately, as it is not simple, and I will reveal it gradually throughout the course of the argument.

In the first place, it has to be acknowledged that the question presented above is always posed in our specific time and place, possessing a certain cultural, social, and historical endowment of our consciousness. A Christian, believing in their Savior, understands the concept of a “mystical text” and mysticism itself as something entirely different compared to a Buddhist, whose belief system is auto-soteriological. A follower of Hinduism will answer differently, as will someone immersed in New Age ideas or the so-called atheistic spirituality, a subject of discussion further in the text. It seems that there is something within specific worldviews that guarantees the coherence of contextually functioning concepts. These might be ideas whose discovery has—so to speak—an order-creating power, organizing the chaos of many concrete, individual entities.

I must emphatically point out here that rooting my research in a specific tradition, i.e., in a concrete understanding of mysticism itself, is not aimed at depreciating testimonies functioning in other cultures and religions. I attempted to expand the proposed theory to non-Christian testimonies, but I am aware that this is merely an outline and an introduction to further research. By maintaining the controversial distinction between “mysticism” (*mistyka*) and “mysticism” (*mistycyzm*), I also do not adjudicate the “inauthenticity” of non-Christian writings—I merely refer to the division that appears within the described paradigm and the tradition associated with it. Thus, my aim is to specify that the idea of a mystical text in Christianity is altogether different from the idea of such a text in the so-called atheistic spirituality or in systems related to models of religiosity different from the Christian one.

When asking about an “authentic mystical text” and “true mysticism,” we always understand this authenticity in relation to the features of the chosen paradigm. In this way, Franz Delitzsch, the author of the book *Wer sind die Mystiker (Who Are the Mystics)*, writes about “true mysticism” and contrasts it with “false mysticism” within the context of the religious paradigm he believed in and accepted as correct (Delitzsch, [no date]). Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 19th century, these terms both in Polish and German (Stępień 1981, 3–18) were used interchangeably, and I maintain their firm separation in order to describe the “mystical text” within the specific context I have chosen. By doing so, I do not claim the right to resolve contradictions between various practical ways of leading a spiritual/internal/religious life.

Assuming that there is an order that could provide the basis for creating a typology of texts, I wanted to investigate whether speaking of “mystical texts” makes any sense at all, i.e., whether it is possible to distinguish something that constitutes the “mysticality” of a text in the same way something else constitutes its literariness, for example. In both colloquial speech and scientific studies, I have often encountered the term “mystical text,” which makes me wonder if it is merely a “typological master key,” a concept used in cases of research helplessness and methodological confusion. This concept tries to reconcile the belief that a “strong textual subject” does not exist with the unwavering and naive belief in the exact identification of this subject with a living, writing author.

This article is an attempt to break through textual structures to a certain typology of a mystically entangled text—hence it is not directly dedicated to the philosophy of Roman Ingarden; the point here is not to present it precisely or attempt to refine issues that Ingarden himself did not sufficiently explain.

The presentation and operationalization of basic concepts obviously entail taking a specific stance on disputed matters regarding the understanding of individual issues.

Therefore, it is fitting to start with the methods and the problem. Phenomenological methods concern what is given and how it is given. These methods reach what is cognitively pre-existing, only in the next step obtaining an appropriate description (Ingarden 1963, 318). In this paper, much space is dedicated to presenting the state of research, and this state of research constitutes the beginning of reflection on the possibility of the existence of the phenomenon of a mystical text. Phenomenological viewing and description should fulfill the postulate of atheoreticality, that is, there should be a peculiar liberation of cognition from existing thought schemes, prior convictions, and presuppositions. It is crucial, however, that to neutralize these schemes (both in the form of scientific theories and “colloquial”, common-sense beliefs), they must first be revealed. This revelation is the starting point: to move to phenomenological viewing and description, one must first examine the concepts and paradigms within which these concepts function. Therefore, a process of deconstructing existing theories must occur to expose their strengths and weaknesses.

In such a process, a crucial tool is the so-called eidetic reduction. Phenomenology aims to achieve “apriori cognition of the essence of objects” (Kmieciowski, [no date], 11). Relying on the relationship between the subject and the object of research, eidetic reduction strives to reach the essence of the phenomenon. Trying to break through to the sphere of necessary connections, and thus to the “hidden rational interior” extending beyond randomness (Gierulanka 1972, 77), by a meaningful ordering inherent in reality, one must, in a mental operation, reject successive features of a given object until discovering the one whose rejection will cause the object to lose its identity.

The point is therefore to reach the sphere of necessary connections and reject randomness, i.e., to show the structures that are somewhat “embedded” in the entirety of the factuality of an existing entity (Tymieniecka 1972, 185). Such structures are “hidden in the opacity of concrete existence”. However, it should be noted, as observed by Paweł Rojek among others (Rojek 2021, 109–138), that this does not mean that ideas and general ideal qualities are contained in an individual object. To the question about the relationship between the individual and general essence, the author of *Controversy over the Existence of the World* gave the following answer:

“This is a very difficult, old, Platonic problem—whether the essence is as individual as the object and [whether it is] contained in it. What [is] “reines Wesen” [pure essence] is not at all in the object, that makes no sense. It is one for many. One cannot say—although there were such attempts, someone once spoke about it in Lviv in the 1920s—that if I have a black blackboard here [in Krakow] and there is a second black blackboard in Oxford, it [...] means that there is one blackness and they are fused by this blackness. One cannot say that. Individuals are closed, separate entities to each other. And now, one must find what is above this in a certain sense, what is [...] the same” (Ingarden 1937).

Although important, this problem fundamentally extends beyond the scope of the presented study. However, it must be noted to lay the groundwork for further analysis related to the existence of a “mystical text” within the context of Ingarden’s philosophical findings. At this point, I limit myself only to stating that the ontology of the author of *The Literary Work of Art* had its fundamental task to determine the horizon of what is necessary and what is arbitrary for every possibly existing object. This task—in the case of examining the possibility of the existence of a mystical text—can be realized with a partial adaptation of Ingarden’s system to the considerations presented in this dissertation. It is thereby necessary to explain the key concepts that will be applied in the further part of the argument and their operationalization. For what is crucial is not a detailed analysis of the concepts themselves but their functionalization in building the theory of the mystical text.

Ingarden’s Tools and the Study of Mysticism

Regarding modes of existence and existential moments, Roman Ingarden was a proponent of existential pluralism (Garbacz 2011, 91–102), which means that he accepted different modes of existence of entities. In Volume I of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, in paragraph No. 31

entitled *New Concepts of Modes of Existence*, he distinguishes basically four such modes: absolute being (supra-temporal?), extra-temporal being (ideal?), temporal being (real?), purely intentional being (Ingarden [no date], 93). In simplification, everything that can exist can be classified as absolute, ideal, real, or purely intentional existence. Modes of existence are constituted by so-called existential moments, which can be grouped in four pairs: existential autonomy (self-dependence)–existential heteronomy (non-self-dependence); existential originality–existential derivation; existential self-sufficiency–existential non-self-sufficiency; existential independence–existential dependence. To better understand how to describe the ontological possibility of a mystical text taking this division into account, one must refer to the explication of the moments themselves as useful terms. In this way, the “mystical text” will reveal its existential dependencies, i.e., in the context of indicating the existence of necessary relations between objects which constitute the conditions for the possibility of the existence of a mystical text (Makota, 119).

Existential actuality characterizes everything that exists in time and, existing in it, “passes through the present”. The “happening” of a given entity in time causes this actuality to pass away, i.e., a temporal entity falls out of actuality and becomes something past. It is worth noting that the domain of ideal objects does not fall under such defined actuality, because ideal entities are essentially “extra-temporal” (Makota, 116). Furthermore, ideal objects do not have access to the actuality proper to objects enduring in time.

Existential originality and derivation constitute mutually exclusive existential moments. What is existentially original cannot, due to its essence, be produced by another object, i.e., it is in reality established in itself. This results in existential durability—an entity of this type cannot be annihilated. There is a dependence between an existentially original object and an existentially derived one (constitutive for the latter), but one cannot identify this dependence with a “cause-effect” type relation because it is a completely different kind of connection. An existentially derived object, by its essence, can only exist “from being produced by another object” (Ingarden 281). This can be illustrated with the dependencies between ideas and individual objects in Plato and the contrast between forms and individual items in Aristotle.

Existential self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency are moments distinguished on the basis of whether a given entity must, by its essence, coexist with another entity within one and the same whole (Ingarden 242). Existential non-self-sufficiency can have an unambiguous or ambiguous character, i.e., it can demand something unambiguously defined for existence or allow many different completions (Woleński 1980, 81–82). Unambiguous non-self-sufficiency can, moreover, be divided into one-sided and two-sided, i.e., these are differentiated based on the occurrence of mutual dependence. The popular example of the color red as a property of an object that cannot exist without that object is often given to illustrate existential non-self-sufficiency. In this case as well—as Ingarden argued—there occurs a different degree of “fusion” of the existences of non-self-sufficient entities (Makota [n.d.], 118).

Existential autonomy and heteronomy belong to objects depending on what they possess their existential foundation in (this important concept will be discussed further). A given object exists autonomously if it has such a foundation in itself. Conversely, if the existential foundation lies outside this object, it exists heteronomously. Therefore, in line with Ingarden, one can say that only a pure ideal quality is exclusively itself and nothing more (e.g., redness in an object is heteronomous, i.e., it constitutes only a determination of a certain property in a red object whereas redness as an ideal quality is solely and exclusively itself, characterized by perfect immanence of the moments determining it) (Makota, 118).

Existential dependence and independence can occur between existentially self-sufficient objects and is divided into relative and absolute. Simply put, existential independence occurs when, by its essence, an object does not require another object for its existence. In the case of dependence, on the other hand, the existence of another object/objects is necessary for its own existence. In the Dictionary of Roman Ingarden’s Concepts, existential dependence is illustrated through the examples of “father–son”, “husband–wife” (Makota [n.d.], 118).

The characterization of this mode of existence as purely intentional is crucial for the presented findings concerning the possibility of the existence of a mystical text, because on the basis of the distinc-

tions made by Ingarden, every text can be defined precisely as a purely intentional being. Why? Because a purely intentional object is dependent in its being on acts of consciousness – it is also for this reason left to their “mercy” (Ingarden [n.d.], 90; Kmicikowski, [n.d.], 8). Examining intentionality allows one to notice the existential status of the creations of human imagination and the human spirit. Such a creation—dependent in its being on acts of human consciousness, among other things—is every text, including the mystical text described in the perspective of the possibility of existence.

Giving the floor to Ingarden himself, it should be noted that, “Purely intentional objects are also not such absolute nothingness as they would have to be if existential monism were right. They do not possess, however, any essence of their own, as Husserl had already claimed [...]. One’s own essence (Eigenwesen in Husserl) is a certain specific set of qualifications immanently contained in the object that possesses it. Thus, only autonomous objects have it. Such immanent qualifications, naturally, do not appear in the contents of purely intentional objects. All their material determinations, formal moments, and even existential ones that appear in their contents, are merely ascribed to the intentional object, but they are not, in the strict sense of the word, embodied in it. [...] Creative fantasy causes only a certain habitus of reality to be given to the intentional object and illusorily evoked. [...] The creative poetic act cannot, in other words, create an autonomous object. It is ‘powerlessly creative’: what is produced by it lives by its grace and at its mercy and cannot become something ‘self-willed’, ‘independent’, ‘autonomous’. In other words, it cannot ‘rebel’ against the acts of consciousness that produce it [...]. It does not possess any existential foundation in itself as it lies in the act of consciousness that intentionally produces it [...]” (Ingarden [n.d.], 100–102). Ingarden indicates here two possible variants of combinations of existential moments which constitute, according to him, purely intentional existence: heteronomy, derivation, inactuality, self-sufficiency (I) / non-self-sufficiency (II).

Certain preliminary resolutions regarding the main problem of the dissertation and the question that will have to be answered later are already emerging here. Much of Ingarden’s terminology introduced here constitutes a helpful tool, whereby its implementation is also a certain interpretation of it already. However, some more orthodox researchers may consider that an insufficient “adhering” to the expanded system of the author of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Yet, it should be understood that certain simplifications are necessary here so that the philosophical theory of the mystical text reveals itself in its basic outline, which can only subsequently be subject to reinterpretations, specifications or, if necessary, falsification. Moreover, the research philosophical procedure related to diagnosing the possibility of the existence of a mystical text does not run in this dissertation parallel to the analyses present in the work *The Literary Work of Art*, if only because its goal is completely different; Ingarden instrumentalized research on purely intentional objects to solve the main problems concerning the dispute between realism and idealism. The goal of this work is much more modest and specifically focused on the possibility of the existence of a particular phenomenon and recognizing it if it actually appears in reality.

Based on the existential moments distinguished by Roman Ingarden, one can ask several questions regarding the object that is a mystical text, relating to the characteristics of these moments, namely: Can a “mystical text” possess its existential foundation in itself? Is a mystical text produced by another entity? Is a mystical text temporal or extra-temporal in character? Must a mystical text coexist by its essence with another entity within one and the same whole? If a mystical text does not have to coexist with another entity within one and the same whole (i.e., it is self-sufficient), is the existence of another entity (entities) necessary for its existence?

If points I and II seem obvious, i.e., this work assumes that the creations of the human intellect and spirit have their existential foundation in acts of consciousness, they are also produced by a human subject within individual acts, but hidden behind them is a certain order grounded in ideas (i.e., they possess the existential moments defined as heteronomy and derivation), then one must further explain—although resolved by Ingarden in the case of all purely intentional entities—the issue of the inactuality of the mystical text. It must also be defined what a mystical text is, and a text as such in general, to explain the problem of its possible “existential fusion” within one whole with another entity or the existence of a dependence between the mystical text as existentially self-sufficient and a second, also self-sufficient,

object. While for researchers of Ingarden's output these issues may be simple, it will be useful to explain them gradually subsequently. Thus, the concept of a "mystical text" reveals itself, making it possible to reach the essence of this phenomenon, as well as to establish the necessary conditions for the possibility of the existence of a text of this kind.

Existential Foundation

Although the term "existential foundation" has already appeared above, its definition should be recalled here (which is not entirely clear given Ingarden's inconsistent linguistic practice), enabling a decision on how to functionalize this term within the framework of this study. The clear separation and explanation of issues related to this term also serve to emphasize its importance for further findings, present in the argument. First of all, one should clearly distinguish between the "existential foundation" and the "existential basis" (*podstawa bytowa*), which directly affects the features of the object built upon it and is related as a term to the moments of non-self-sufficiency and existential dependence. The determination of the object's properties by the existential foundation always takes place indirectly, and the concept itself refers to the heteronomy and derivation of a given entity. It is worth noting that Ingarden accentuated the intricacy of the discussed issues in Volume II of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, and the terminological difference recalled in this point is sometimes not used at all (Nowak [n.d.], 78–81). Additionally, as Andrzej J. Nowak emphasizes, the concept of "physical existential foundation" is internally contradictory, because no material thing can act as an existential foundation (Nowak [n.d.], 78). Such a contradiction does not occur in the case of an existential basis. It seems, therefore, that the dependence presents itself in such a way that existential foundations determine the matter of the objects founded in them, i.e., they function as "substitutes for the essences that these objects do not actually possess" (Nowak [n.d.], s. 79). The most important thing, however, is to notice the difference related to intentionality—the existential basis may not be intentional, whereas the existential foundation always "has an intentional structure" (Nowak [n.d.], 80).

For the findings contained in this dissertation, ultimately, the dependence on intention will turn out to be crucial, i.e., on acts of consciousness, without which an object such as a text could not exist. Apparently, the existential basis of the text enables the entry of this purely intentional being into the intersubjective space. The very issue of existential affinity in its various varieties turns out to be so complicated that a detailed development of this problem could obscure the actual subject of research. For the constructed theory of the mystical text, it is important that the term "existential foundation" is always associated with an intentional structure in this study.

Appearance

One of the most known elements of Ingarden's theory is the distinction of its stratified structure in a literary work. It will not be functionalized in its entirety in this study. However, it is worth recalling the content of the statements of the author of *The Literary Work of Art*. Describing a literary work, Ingarden distinguished the following strata:

1. the stratum of word sounds and phonetic formations of a higher order;
2. the stratum of meaning units, including sentence meanings and sentence complexes;
3. the stratum of schematized appearances, "through which various kinds of objects represented in the work appear" (Ingarden 1937, s. 19–20);
4. the stratum of represented objects, revealing themselves through schematized appearances.

Since the first two strata seem characteristic of texts as such in general, crucial for the research on mystical texts will be the so-called "stratum of appearances" and the stratum of objects represented in the text connected with it. The description of these strata will enable noticing a possible difference between a literary text and a mystical text.

It is necessary, however, to specify what exactly appearances are. It is worth indicating that the term "appearance" (*wygląd*) was incorporated into Ingarden's system from colloquial language and referred to the natural human way of interacting with reality (Makota [ed.] [n.d.], 309). Similar to the way we see an object in reality only from one side, as conditioned by our positioning relative to it, what is de-

scribed in the text reveals itself only partially. We retain, however, the knowledge that the object does not consist only of what is revealed to us but also has sides escaping perception. An appearance can therefore be understood in such a way that it is the form in which an object shows itself when it is perceived from a specific place. Thus, appearances are something different from the thing itself. The text is a special case here, in which the schematic nature of appearances guarantees a certain repeatability of reception, which Ingarden described in the treatise *The Literary Work of Art* as follows:

“One can claim that any moment of a thing determines a multitude of schematized appearances, constituting a skeleton of concrete appearances in which it appears. Therefore, one should understand schematized appearances as the totality of moments in the content of a concrete appearance. The presence of these moments is an indispensable condition for a certain object, or more precisely, a certain selection of objective properties of a thing, to be self-presently and bodily given in perception. The remaining elements of a concrete appearance are not conceived of here as absent but only as variable within those limits in which they can be, if the relatively independent elements [...] are to be preserved” (Ingarden [n.d.], 335–336).

Therefore, it seems that when we interact with a concrete text, we receive in it a system of schematized appearances. In other words, we receive an incomplete description of a thing that demands completion in the act of reception and interpretation. Appearances are “kept in readiness for actualization” (Ingarden [n.d.], 338). The simplest example is a character description—one can look here even at how St. Faustina was characterized by Zofia Podgórska:

“In the coffin I liked her very much: she had as if vivid blushes [...]. During her life I didn’t like her at all, but I liked her after death. External appearance [was] unattractive, one could say ugly [...] When smiling, a gold crown showed in the side dentition” (Siepak [oprac.] 2013, 264).

This unusual description of the saint’s appearance authored by her mentee directs the reader’s attention to certain details (a gold dental crown), omitting however—and leaving to the reader’s imagination—among other things, issues such as St. Faustina’s height, eye color, posture, size of nose or lips. The actualization of the appearance that takes place in reception is limited by the statement: “external appearance [was] unattractive, one could say ugly,” leaving the features undetermined by the description to the reader themselves, to supplement them in reception, i.e., to imagine Sister Faustina in detail (taking into account the clearly marked presence of the gold dental crown) according to their own impression concerning the explication of the determination “external appearance [was] unattractive”.

Here we are dealing with something that Ingarden calls concretization, and thus the actualization of places of indeterminacy in the text in the act of reader’s reception. Schematized appearances—possessing such unfilled places—remain, as Ingarden wrote about it, in a specific “readiness” (Ingarden [n.d.], 336). This aspect, it seems, decides the answer that should be given to the question whether a mystical text is an actual or inactual entity. Actuality belongs to the text only in the process of reading, when places of indeterminacy are filled with concrete senses. As such, the text itself is, as assumed within this dissertation, extra-temporal, suspended in potentiality regarding the readings actualizing it in the process of interpretation. To specify the problems appearing here, one must move at this point to the next important concept: concretization connected directly with the schematic nature of the appearances of objects represented in the text.

Concretization

The operationalization of the concept of concretization requires a certain extension in the presented dissertation relative to Ingarden’s findings. The author of *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* writes about the so-called “aesthetic concretization” concerning literary works. When referring to the possibility of the existence of a mystical text that can simultaneously be a literary work, but does not have to, it seems one should speak of a different kind of concretization. The issue of aesthetic concretization—relating this term both to Husserl’s findings and other researchers (including Wolf Dohrn [Dohrn, 1907, 10] and Oskar Becker [Becker, 1994])—is presented by Beata Garlej in her work *On the (Basic) Meaning of Ingarden’s Aesthetic Concretization* (Garlej 2018). Some of the findings of this researcher also prove helpful in the case of the issue of the “mystical text” (Garlej 2018, 168-177). The main question that must be answered in this point is as follows: What significance does its concretization have for

the existence of a mystical text as a purely intentional being? In the case of a literary work as described by Roman Ingarden, in brief, the dependence is such that artistic values, located in the work itself, are subsequently transformed in the process of concretization into aesthetic values.

The “aesthetic object”, different from the work itself, is therefore precisely the concretization, because the work itself, as a schematized creation, maintaining its “appearances” in a specific “readiness”, is aesthetically neutral (Ingarden 1957, 224). It is worth emphasizing a few important findings which will turn out crucial—after their appropriate reformulation—also for the ontological analysis of the “mystical text”:

Concretization has its existential foundation not only in the receiver’s experience but also in the work itself. It is, therefore, transcendent both in relation to the work itself and to the experience arising in the reception process (Ingarden, 1937, 365). However, it retains a significant connection with these two elements (Ingarden, 1937, 365).

A concretization of a specific kind (in the case of a literary work—aesthetic concretization) can appear during the receiver’s adoption of a specific attitude (aesthetic attitude when regarding a literary work).

A literary text/literary work is “a tool for the constitution, under appropriate conditions, of valuable aesthetic objects, and thus of its concretizations” (Ingarden 1957, 427). The perceiver does not have to concretize the work in the way the author projected it during creation (Makota [red.] [n.d.], 50). The receiver’s experience “cannot proceed entirely arbitrarily, but must be regulated by a specific way of cognizing the work fulfilling itself in this experience”, i.e., the multiplicity of concretizations is in a way limited by the work itself (Garlej 2018, 160). In the case of a literary work, it is necessary to constitute an overall aesthetic situation, having its source both in the emergence of an appropriate attitude of the receiver, and in the emergence of an aesthetic object (Garlej 2018, 160).

The aesthetic attitude consists in passing from the interest “in the fact of the real existence of certain qualities to an orientation towards the qualities themselves”, i.e., the occurring quasi-judgments do not state anything about reality and, in this specificity, they are accepted by the receiver (Garlej 2018, 118).

The subjective existential foundation of a literary work is the artist/their creative activity on the one hand, the receiver and their activity of reconstructing the work in the process of reception—on the other, i.e., its actualization in concretizing schematic appearances.

Therefore, it seems that what “awakens the work” and extracts it from silent potentiality, turns out to be significant for the existence of the work itself. One can argue also that the work (with its artistic values) does not so much pass into an “aesthetic object” being a concretization but passes from the phase of potentiality into “life” (i.e., Ingarden’s metaphorical “skeleton” of the work-scheme is clothed with the “flesh” of reception-concretization). The way of actualizing the schematic artistic object, in other words, supplementing the places of indeterminacy in the work itself and the constitution of the aesthetic object is accomplished—as one can presume—in connection with the prior experience of the receiver (e.g., in connection with interacting with real objects). The context of reception (extratextual conditions, be it historical, cultural, social, personality, etc. but also intertextual [!]) take a significant part in the constitution of concretization. According to Roman Ingarden, a concretization has an individual and unrepeatable character. However, interpretive practice shows that some concretizations consolidate (see the so-called “strong interpretations” in the pragmatic theory of literature [Kuźma 1997, 69–73]) and enter the intersubjective space, profiling further readings (concretizations) in the individual dimension of particular readings. The consolidated part of concretization can therefore also have, like the work itself, the character of a fully-fledged purely intentional object. The existence of a concretization actualizing a schematic text in the process of reception is a strengthening of this text in being, so to speak. Hence, as one can presume, the quality of this reception does not remain indifferent to the duration of the text as a purely intentional object. It is important, however, to appropriately describe concretization in relation to the existential foundations inherent in the creator’s acts of consciousness. It is assumed namely that concretization—not being entirely arbitrary in its form, but conversely, limited by the work itself—retains an essential, although mediated, connection with the acts of consciousness of the text’s creator. One should also consider whether the very use of a typologizing concept (e.g., “mystical text”) in relation

to the text is not already a certain element of concretization, however unorthodox this claim would be regarding Ingarden's own philosophy. Similarly, the occurrence of works in different editions, and thus in different records/transcriptions, does not also constitute an element of concretization. One can even mention here—referring already to mysticism itself—the problems with the transcription of Marcelina Darowska's *Kartki* or the multiplicity of editions of St. Faustina's Diary.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the application of Roman Ingarden's phenomenological and ontological framework provides a rigorous methodological foundation for the analysis of mystical testimonies. By approaching the mystical text as a purely intentional being, researchers can separate its essential structural features from subjective or culturally conditioned assumptions. Much like a literary work, a mystical text does not possess its existential foundation within itself; rather, it originates from the creative, intentional acts of consciousness of the author (Ingarden 1937, 100–102).

Furthermore, the text initially exists as an extra-temporal entity, characterized by a schematic structure of appearances that are kept in "readiness for actualization" (Ingarden 1937, 338). It is only through the active process of concretization — when the reader engages with the text, adopts an appropriate attitude, and fills in its places of indeterminacy—that the mystical text transitions from mere potentiality into actual "life" (Garlej 2018, 160).

Ultimately, while a mystical text is ontologically grounded in the specific intentional acts of its creator, its continued existence, actualization, and entry into the intersubjective space depend heavily on the receiver's context and subsequent concretizations (Kuźma 1997, 69–73). Utilizing Ingarden's categories—such as existential moments, schematized appearances, and concretization—allows researchers to move beyond methodological confusion and meaningfully investigate the ontological status of mystical writings without arbitrarily adjudicating their theological or spiritual truth.

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