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1956 – ROMANIA AND BULGARIA

РУМЪНИЯ И БЪЛГАРИЯ ПРЕЗ 1956 г.

В статията е изяснено влиянието на решенията на XX Конгрес на КПСС от 1956 г. върху международната политика на България и Румъния. Авторката се спира на новия политически курс, възприет от Румънската работническа партия и от БКП в резултат на дискусиите, проведени съответно на разширения пленум на първата от 23-25.03.1956 г. и на Априлския пленум на втората от 2-6.04.1956 г. Анализирани са новите моменти в отношенията на двете страни с Югославия, позицията им по полските и унгарските събития от 1956 г. и по Суецката криза. Направен е изводът, че след 1956 г. България и Румъния се отдалечават, що се отнася до основните насоки във външната им политика. След тази година политическите елити на двете страни имат различен произход, различни икономически интереси и различна външнополитическа ориентация. Румъния играе ролята на „послушна” държава, може би най-активно откликваща на призивите на съветското политическо ръководство от 1956 г. За България тази година донася нов политически лидер, по-голямо сближаване със СССР и нови възможности да докаже лоялността си към Москва.

Ключови думи: XX Конгрес на КПСС, разширен пленум на РПП от 23-25.03.1956 г., Априлски пленум на БКП от 2-6.04.1956 г., десталинизация, култ към личността, Суецка криза, полски събития, унгарски събития.

The 20th Congress of the C.P.U.S. that opened at Moscow on 14th February 1956, was an event with a special impact over U.S.S.R. history, international communist movement evolution and also over international relations (Donaldson, Nogee, Sharpe 1969: 44).

Among others, Congress settled restauration of “Leninist principle” about collective leadership and condemnation of personality cult, development of the relations with socialist countries including Yugoslavia, acceptance, even if formal, that the way of building socialism could altered from a country to another, and finally the promotion of a policy of peaceful coexistence (Khrushchev Remembers 1971: 559-618; Werth 2006).

For the West and especially for the communist countries material presented by Khrushchev was shocking (Fisher 1956: 317).

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s discourse at the 20th Congress, on 17th February 1956, declared the Congress proceedings as a success full of “*precious learning*” for Romanian Workers Party (R.W.P.) and not only (Gheorghiu-Dej: 156-157). Although, new course promoted by Khrushchev surprised Romanian and Bulgarian leaders the same. Statements

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at the 20th Congress and Khrushchev's *Secret Speech* hit strong position of Romanian and Bulgarian leaders, Gheorghiu-Dej and Valko Chervenkov.

After the 20th Congress, in socialist states according to Khrushchev's demands, were necessary report but limited sessions with Communist Parties (Marcheva 2002: 93). Because of this, in Romania, between 23rd–25th March 1956, took place enlarged plenum of R.W.P. during which were debated the problems at the 20th C.P.U.S. Congress and was established to be issued by Political Bureau a text concerning this. Anyway Khrushchev's *Secret Speech* wasn't mentioned (Breazu 2001: 147-155).

During the plenum some critiques to Dej were expressed². Miron Constantinescu, sustained by Iosif Chișinevschi raised many times and after the plenum Dej's regime abuses (Cătănuș, Tudor 2001: 57). Inner disputes determined Dej to try in his Report to turn away critique concerning Stalinism and direct it to Pauker-Luca-Georgescu group. Only few days after R.W.P. the plenum was organized in Bucharest a secret session of the Party's superior echelon in order to present a résumé of the Khrushchev's *Secret Speech*. With this occasion was emphasized that Soviet document wasn't relevant for R.W.P. because inside it the cult of personality excesses had been already eliminated through purges in 1952. Was admitted only the political and ideological mistake of excessive promotion of Stalin's name to the prejudice of U.S.S.R. but was denied existence of abuses inside country³. In following months, during meetings of the Bucharest Party cadre briefings of the 20th Congress documents were done in a manner that wouldn't allowed any deviation. The first communiqué about condemnation of the cult of personality issued in "Scînteia" newspaper hardly on 3rd July 1956 (Rusan 2008: 50). Also, measures against Miron Constatinescu and Iosif Chișinevschi were not taken immediately.

Perception of the C.P.U.S. new course in Romania could only be inauspicious creating a base for Romania's alienation of U.S.S.R. Dej's regime surviving condition was, in accordance to some opinions, detachment from Moscow and Khrushchev's new course⁴. Sheltered by Romanian-Soviet friendship, Romania, apparently an echo of Soviet politics, begun to be agile led since 1956 on change way (Frunză 1990: 428) reaching that: "*Communist regime and Romanian people to recover finally on common ground*" (Rotschild, Wingfield 2000: 162).

In Bulgaria, Valko Chervenkov's position was also vulnerable and determined him to the same reticences, like those of Dej, to the new course. Untill plenum of the C. C. of the Bulgarian Communist Party (B.C.P.) in Bulgaria were taken just minor measures concerning destalinization. In both countries, after the 20th Congress salaries, scholarships and children allocations raised. Collectivization stopped and agricultural cotes due to state eliminated (Marcheva 2002: 93). Through increasing industry development and slowing down agriculture rhythm on the benefit of the goods consume industries produced regime liberalization.

In Bulgaria, debates on the edge of the C.P.U.S. 20th Congress decisions took place scarcely in April. In the period February-April 1956, in Romania and Bulgaria maintained almost the same evolution. In April however, in Bulgaria was convoked plenum

of the C.C. of the B.C.P. (April Plenum) that brought a new leader, Todor Zhivkov, instead of Chervenkov according to Moscow demands and a new political line followed by Bulgaria until 1987.

Preparation of the plenum of the C.C. of the B.C.P. was made through Bulgarian communist consultations with Kremlin leaders (ЖИВКОВ 2006: 469). In response for Zhivkov's suggestion addressed to Khrushchev, the latest asked a meeting in Moscow with Bulgarian leaders for talks about plenum preparations (ЖИВКОВ 2006: 470). Among Bulgarian delegates were Todor Zhivkov, Valko Chervenkov and Anton Iugov. At the meeting Khrushchev criticised Chervenkov for his political position and cult of personality (ЖИВКОВ 2006: 471). In the same time, advised Bulgarians collocutors to maintain Chervenkov in Politic Bureau and as a President of Ministries Council, but Todor Zhivkov to be appointed Party first secretary⁵.

Plenum of the C.C. of the B.C.P. took place between 2nd–6th April 1956 and marked the beginning of a new stage in Bulgaria's political and social life. Plenum debated the 20th Congress decisions, accepted the ideas exposed by Khrushchev concerning peaceful coexistence between states with different political systems, existence of different roads to socialism from one country to another and cult of personality, decided amnesty of some exilates and rehabilitation of a part of Stalinist purges victims (Crampton 2002: 345; Djucev, Velkov, Mitev, Panayotov 1977: 453). Zhivkov's principal Report at the Plenum was worked out with active participation of Soviet Ambassador, Iu. K. Prihodov. Guilt for mistakes in leading for country and cult of personality consequences were thrown over Chervenkov and was proposed his dismissal (Volokitina 2008: 137). Resolution unanimous adopted by the plenum on 8th April 1956 was in conformity with C.P.U.S. 20th Congress line. On 11th April 1956, Zhivkov spoke in Sofia admitting that: "*innocent comrades were unfair accused and punished*" (Crampton 2007: 345) hitting by this Chervenkov which still maintained his position in Politic Bureau⁶. On 17th April 1956, Chervenkov was dismissed as prime minister and in his place was appointed Anton Iugov.

Destalinization „*implied an enormous work from Bulgaria's*" (ЖИВКОВ 2006: 409) told Zhivkov in his *Memories* but really was one á la Khrushchev. New B.C.P. leader was a Khrushchev's protégé. Plenum of C.C. of the B.C.P. in April 1956, political line indicated marked a pole in communist regime in Bulgaria.

On 17th April 1956 Cominform was eliminated (Fejtö 1969: 71) and favoured presumption that people's democracies could choose alone the road to socialism in accordance to the 20th Congress decisions (Duroselle, Kaspi 2006: 90). Statement concerning elimination of the Cominform underlined that: "*Workers and communist parties continues, no doubt, to proceed in common agreement taking into account theirs activities immediately conditions and changing views over general issues watching fight for peace, democracy, socialism, etc., in the same time with examination of the collaboration problem with that parties orientating toward socialism*" (Fejtö 1969: 71).

From that moment, April 1956, although in the same camp and with the same statute, between Romania and Bulgaria begun to appear sensible differences in theirs

evolution and in their attitude towards Moscow. Chervenkov didn't "survived" destalinization process. Gheorghiu-Dej maintained himself and consolidated power making a partial destalinization. The Romanian leader gained U.S.S.R. trust through his attitude beside 1956 crisis, and exploited this subsequent. Zhivkov was from the beginning wanted and sustained by Khrushchev⁷. Zhivkov approached his country more of U.S.S.R., aligned it totally to Soviet policy and Bulgaria became within socialist states that one which aped the best Moscow's model.

Generally speaking, Romania and Bulgaria during tumultuous 1956 have almost the same reaction but also differences and particularities that foresaw their subsequent evolution.

Within U.S.S.R. and other socialist states relations with Yugoslavia considerable improvement came up as a continuation of the process started in 1955 through Khrushchev's visit to Belgrad. On 20th June 1956, Khrushchev and Tito signed in Moscow a statement concerning Soviet-Yugoslavian reconciliation and the further cooperation on a base desired by Yugoslavia (Milenkovitch 1981: 285).

Soviet example was followed by other bloc states. Bulgaria considered timely, just before Tito's visit to Moscow, to invite at the April Plenum a delegation of the Yugoslavian Communist Party. Delegation, led by Moșe Pijade, had a discourse following the general line announced in F. Kozovski speech from B.C.P., which meant the principles generally admitted in international relations, but emphasized Yugoslavian point of view watching main premise that should be established at the base of Yugoslavian-Bulgarian relations. Main premise represented the principle of admitting different roads to socialism (Григорова 1985: 263).

At the beginning of 1956 Romanian evaluation concerning Yugoslavia's evolution was positive. After May 1956, not without some restraints beside Yugoslavian theory about every state own road to socialism, after the 20th C.P.U.S. Congress and Khrushchev's *Secret Speech*, Romanian views changed totally and reacted toward Yugoslavia rapprochement⁸. In his way to Moscow, Tito stopped on 30th May 1956 two hours in Bucharest and accepted the R.W.P.'s invitation that on his way back from the official trip to visit Romania. Therefore, Yugoslavian Communist Party delegation came to Romania between 23rd–26th of June 1956. Visit was considered as a proper occasion to re-establish friendship relations and to create new possibilities for approach between the two states⁹. Delegates of the two states and parties materialized in a joint communiqué that announced the concord for sign a future long term commercial agreement, build of the Danube Iron Gates hydroelectric power plan, conclude a convention for technical and scientific collaboration, support for direct contacts and cooperation between political and union organizations of the two countries¹⁰. During negotiations were stressed efforts made by both states for improving situation of the ethnic minorities Romanian and Serb from Yugoslavia and Romania. Tito beside Romanian leaders, concerning Yugoslavia's relations with other socialist states, expressed his dissatisfaction in rapports with Albania and to a certain extent with Bulgaria¹¹. Otherwise, from the Bulgarian side, as we can observe during meeting Zhivkov and Dej in spring 1957, were dissatisfaction toward Yugoslavia.

B.C.P. first-secretary explained his Romanian interlocutor that Belgrade government and Yugoslav leadership are not destalinized and have a hostile attitude toward Bulgaria (Marcheva 2002: 98). So, if in Romanian-Yugoslavian relation normalization was fast and interesting for both sides, evolving after that independent of other socialist states relations with Belgrade leadership (as was proved by the subsequent dissensions Moscow-Belgrade), relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were direct under Soviets auspices that sometimes were interested to consolidate camp unity and passed over Bulgarian-Yugoslavian particularities. Imposed nature of improvement in Sofia-Belgrade relation was to be demonstrated with first occasion in which Yugoslavia estranged again U.S.S.R.

At the beginning of summer 1956 was expected some profound relaxation between East-West relations and within communist camp. However, events hastened especially in communist space¹². Consequences of the 20th C.P.U.S. Congress felt. In Poznan (Poland), on 28th June 1956 begun a rebellion defeated with tanks (Simons Jr. 1991: 97; Duroselle, Kaspi 2006: 91). On 4th August, Wladislaw Gomulka was reappointed in the party. Simultaneously, were announced elections for December 1956. Concomitant with Poland events in Near East begun crisis because of the Suez Channel (Fontaine 1993: 232-249; Rus 2008: 34).

In both situations Romania and Bulgaria sustained U.S.S.R. in foreign policy. Concerning the conflict in Near East Romanian and Bulgarian governments issued public statements in August 1956. On 12th August 1956 Romanian government expressed public support watching Suez Channel: “1. *Romanian Government consider that Egyptian government act of nationalize Suez Channel Company is perfect legal, an Egypt legal right as sovereign independent state [...] 2. Romanian government disapproves that Romanian People’s Republic, as every country interested will not be invited to participate in London Conference*” (Stanciu 2004: 84-89).

Romanian interest over Egypt situation is accountable not only through its conformity with Moscow position, but because of the economic interest with this if we consider that Romania used Suez Channel as a trade route with India, China, Indo-China, Ceylon, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and has also important economic exchanges with Egypt (in this respect in 1956 signed a three years treaty with it) (Stanciu 2004: 84-85).

Two days after Romanian government statement was public expressed Bulgaria’s reaction to Suez Channel and its situation. Statement content revealed same pro-Egyptian attitude (Баев 1995).

On 17th September 1956 Bucharest government reasserted through a statement its support for Egypt (Popișteanu 1976: 123). In November C.C. of the R.W.P. Politic Bureau established first directions for delegation that represented Romania at the United Nation was Organization. Among directions was specified that the problem had previously been discussed and coordinated with Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹³. At United Nations Romanian representative, Atanasie Joja, asserted that his country wanted to be included among those members of the Organization that offer Egypt military aid¹⁴.

With the occasion of Romanian high level visit in Sofia, in spring 1957, Romania and Bulgaria declared: “*We will further make efforts to eliminate until the end the*

aggression consequences and rehabilitation of Egypt sovereign rights [...] Romania and Bulgaria will support further on Arab peoples endeavours for national independence and are ready to enlarge friendly cooperation with Near and Middle East countries..."¹⁵. Otherwise, in 1957 in Bulgaria stopped Israeli Committee (Baeb 1995: 277).

As can be observed from the discussions during 1957 visit already mentioned, concerning Poland situation evolution during autumn 1956, Romania and Bulgaria expressed disapprove for purges in Polish Workers United Party (P.W.U.P) and for the way in which this made public *Secret Speech*. Bulgaria, even more vehemently than Romania, condemned Poland continuously democratization and Polish communist alliance with Catholic Church (Marcheva 2002: 96). Obviously, because events in Poland, in both states were adopted domestic measures¹⁶. In Romanian and Bulgarian press "imperialism" aggressive actions were again condemned¹⁷.

In autumn 1956 international situation complicated. On 19th October Political Bureau of the C.C. of the P.W.U.P. was convoked. Next day, in Moscow was decided to be called fraternal parties for report (Furusenko 2003: 174). As a consequence of W. Gomulka appointment, on 21st October 1956, as first-secretary of the P.W.U.P, 1956 appeared again necessity of a new meeting of Communist Parties in Moscow. On 23rd October Poland events marked P.W.U.P victory beside Moscow. Consequently, next day, representatives of the "fraternal" parties, without Romania (Popișteanu 1976: 178), met in Moscow. In this meeting Bulgaria and German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) leaders manifested agreement with Soviet evaluation over situation in Poland and Hungary (Furusenko 2003: 174).

Yet during summer 1956 in Hungary political situation became effervescent and in this context was Rakosi attempt to stop a meeting of Pétofi group and to determine C.C. of the Hungarian Workers Party (H.W.P.) to condemn opposite party activity of Imre Nagy quarter. The last attempt resulted in first-secretary resignation (Constantiniu 2006: 28). When found out about Poland coup, on 23rd October 1956, Hungarians students organized sympathy manifestations. Nagy was reappointed as a premier in consequence of the revolts.

In the night 23/24 October 1956 manifestations became fights. Because of that arose necessity of special internal measures in socialist states, so Bulgaria and especially Romania. Among measures were decided reports for population in terse terms, without mentioning precisely about Hungarian government requests (Explozia 1996: 74-78; Migev 2008: 285; Kramer 1996: 370).

On 26th October, in C.C. of the R. W.P. Politic Bureau concerning Hungary situation was established: to realize briefings with workers in industrial units and institutions and with students based on publicized news; to take measures for people provisioning; Ministry of Domestic Affairs plan of measures for strict and rigorous checking of all suspect elements; control on materials about Hungary events publicized in press and transmitted on radio; reinforcement of the political work in military units; strengthen measures for

Oradea, Baia Mare, Timișoara borders guard; proposals for salary growths¹⁸. Measures stipulated by R.W.P. leadership were not accidental. Hungary situation had effects on people in Romania. On 28th October 1956 were student's and worker's manifestations in Bucharest, Cluj, Iași, and Timișoara. Students asked, among other things, Russian language elimination from schools and universities (Deletant 2006: 140).

Through press and radio R.W.P. tried to minimize real situation in Hungary. Occidental radio channels were jammed. Newspapers mentioned only about changes in Hungarian government and explained mixture of capitalist states in Hungary events. Also, was reasserted conviction about constructive work for a new socialist world led by the Soviet Union¹⁹.

Hungary events had repercussions in Bulgaria also. Between 25th–29th October 1956 in meetings of the party members were presented reports, somehow equivocal, over Hungarian situation. Anyway, in briefings accent was on the mistakes of the Hungarian leadership. Some of the participants in such meetings asked installation of red terror. Armed workers detachments of were established and long time party members received arms (Migevev 2008: 286). Bulgarian students, like the Romanian ones, open expressed contrary to ideological disciplines and Russian language study and shouted “*we are always the last, always at the end, we drag after Soviet Union*” (Migevev 2008: 286).

Bulgarian press explained causes of the Hungarian revolution as the Romanian communists neighbours: capitalism and its agents intervention. Press mentioned also U.S.S.R. and there were references to unity between people and Party and Bulgarian-Soviet friendship²⁰.

In Romania tension intensified. On 30th October 1956 was held a protest meeting of 1000 students from Timișoara. One day before, rail workers from Grivița plant Bucharest organized protests meetings asking better work conditions. In the same time, Iaci citizens, requested better food provisioning (Deletant 2006: 141). On 31st October 1956 C.C. of the R.W.P. Politic Bureau²¹ met for debates over the position Party should take beside Soviet Government Statement from 30th October 1956 and decided reassertion about Romanian attachment beside camp, strong friendship between Romania and Soviet Union, total agreement with Warsaw Pact and necessity to maintain this military organization.

The same day met in Sofia Plenum of the C.C. of the B.C.P. where Bulgarian premier Anton Iugov described situation in Hungary as a counter-revolution blow (Baev 1995: 186-187). Hungary events constituted for Sofia government unique prove that should not doubt Soviet Union leader role (Marcheva 2002: 98). As a consequence, on 1st November, in Khrushchev's meeting in Bucharest with Todor Zhivkov and Gheorghiu-Dej²² the last ones pronounced for a quick military action against Hungary revolution and offered to send troops²³, but Kremlin leader refused support offered by Romania and Bulgaria motivating that it “*is not necessary to implicate here troops of other states, only Soviet troops in Hungary*” (Khrushchev Remembers 1971: 420).

Even from the beginning R.W.P. expressed “*for necessity to crush counter-revolution in Hungary*”²⁴, position that have sense because of Romanian alignment to

Soviet politics and especially because Romanian specific interest in this case. *“Beside this created situation in Hungary neither our Party could not be indifferent. It pronounced from the beginning for necessity of crushing counter-revolution and intervention of the Soviet troops. In second place it considered necessary to contribute through means that can be available for restoration of the old state of facts, for normal life in Hungary and as a result we found necessary to bring our contribution”*²⁵. This way Romanian government explained retrospective its position.

Romania implied directly in Hungary events (Betea 1997: 132). Romania was not interested to see a success revolution in Budapest which would of take out Hungary from camp and give the possibility to claim over Transilvania²⁶. In Bulgaria’s case reaction reasons join its general attitude beside U.S.S.R. without particular interests.

1st November 1956 Imre Nagy declared Hungary neutrality, so emergence of its country form Warsaw Pact (Mastny, Byrne 2005: 83-84).

Until Soviet troops intervention in Hungary and after that in Romania and Bulgaria were daily and repeated briefings about situation there²⁷. On 2nd November, Radio Bucharest, following Hungary neutrality statement, addressed to people in terms: *“Nagy government reactionary orientation is proved by one-sided denunciation of Warsaw Treaty, an act that is against Hungarian people and Romanian-Hungarian friendship”*²⁸. Same day met B.C.P. active where Zhivkov declared that *“if enemy lifts up head in Bulgaria”* (Migevev 2008: 286) we had to return to at the extraordinary measures after 9th September 1944. Simultaneously police measures were taken.

Imre Nagy knowing about Soviet military intervention asked on 2nd November, through Romanian ambassador in Budapest, advices from Dej. Dej answered that he was going to send Aurel Mrlnrean. This was an action in order to divert Nagy’s attention from Soviet operations and to brake him taking an action against Soviet Union intervention²⁹.

On 4th November 1956, Red Army troops defeated Hungarian revolution³⁰. Imre Nagy and his co-workers withdrew to Yugoslav embassy (Migevev 2008: 286). On 5th November 1956 Radio Bucharest made an appeal to vigilance until revolution total elimination³¹ and in Bulgaria were almost 400 arrests. Those arrested were taken to Belene reopened camp (Migevev 2008: 287; Crampton 2007: 180). Next day *Rabotnichesko Delo* announced under title *“Conspiracy against Hungarian people failure”* Soviet military intervention victory and expressed Bulgarian People’s Republic for this³².

Romania was decided to help Kadar government and made public this intention on 7th November 1956. In press was announced that situation in Hungary was normal³³. In messages toward Hungarian Workers Party, C.C. of the R.W.P., Romanian government and Prezidium of the National Assembly on one hand and Bulgarian government and Sabranie on the other hand expressed sympathy beside *“fraternal Hungarian people right fight”* (Explozia 1996: 216; <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/29-2-165>).

On 8th November 1956, at United Nations Romanian representative Atanasie Joja declared that Soviet troops had the right to be in Hungary in conditions stipulated by Warsaw Treaty³⁴. Short time after this, Bulgarian representative in United Nations asserted like Romanian colleague that *“Soviet Union was obliged to intervene in Hungary*

*because fulfilled Warsaw Treaty stipulations and reacted to Hungarian government invitation*³⁵.

During November 1956 Romania continued to imply in Hungary situation. Between 22nd–25th November 1956 Dej went to Budapest. At Soviet wish Dej accepted to keep Nagy captive in Romania, in Snagov, until his handing to Moscow which judged and executed him.

Romania and Bulgaria reactions beside Hungarian revolution were determined by causes partly common and partly particular. Both of them were compelled to follow Soviet example because of the camp discipline. For Romania was however Ardeal were could appear inter-ethnic tensions because of the Hungarian revolution and need to obtain U.S.S.R. total trust. So beyond conformity with U.S.S.R., between Bucharest and Moscow were common interests in defeating Hungarian revolution. At the same time, Romanian government had to obtain Soviet Union trust especially that Dej maintained himself grace to his own forces. Hungary events were the occasion that Dej to defend national interests defending Transilvania and personal interest to stay in charge and this only through further detachment from Moscow.

Events in Hungary produced same time with Suez Crisis. This created a reaction handicap to Western Powers. This does not means that Occident was willing to risk a military conflict with U.S.S.R.. for Hungary. Revolution impact was profound and semnification huge. Hungarian revolution destroyed Soviet invincibility and communist camp unity myth in context of a precedent, Yugoslav-Russian schism. So, seems to be truthful Central Intelligence Agencies estimates about possibility to establish autonomous regimes in Eastern Europe states, among them Romania³⁶.

26th November–3rd December 1956 in Moscow were negotiations between Romanian and Soviet sides. Soviet government statement from 30th October was also debated. There was talks about danger represented by military blocs maintain, German Federal Republic remilitarization, hold of U.S.A and other states military bases near socialist states. A common declaration was signed. In accordance with this U.S.S.R. and Romanian People's Republic governments had to consult with other socialist states, members of the Warsaw Pact, about necessity, depending on international situation, of Soviet military units stationing on R.P.R. territory (Niculescu-Mizil 1997: 90).

Romanian-Yugoslavian relations progressed rapidly from 1956 not only because Moscow's spur. This was necessary for explaining further Romanian position³⁷. For Bulgaria resumption relations with Yugoslavia were only a Soviet necessity that respected without hide its discontent beside neighbour state. Romania had specific interests beyond alignment to Soviet commands. Bulgaria was conformed.

Since 1956 Romania and Bulgaria separated. After 1956 leadership of these two countries had different roots, different economic interests and foreign relations. Romania played very well role of obedient state maybe the most active to Soviet appeals in 1956. For Bulgaria 1956 meant a new leader, more rapprochement beside U.S.S.R. and new occasions to prove its loyalty for Moscow.

NOTES

¹ Even during the 20th Congress through complete uninspired tactics, Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chișinevschi tried to determine Dej "to drop himself ash into his head" through a speech concerning statements of the 20th Congress in front of the students (Sfetcu 2000: 275).

² Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (A.N.I.C.), fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar 27/1956, f. 96, f. 249.

³ In his Memories Silviu Brucan tells: "Dej called me to Bucharest for participating at the alienation strategy from U.S.S.R. [...]. To him [Dej] desovietization didn't meant destalinization, contrary, desovietization served in a measure as a line or better said as a Stalinist political system selfdefending trench (Brucan 1992: 95).

⁴ In his Memories Zhivkov reveals support that Khrushchev gave him saying that Soviet leader had an important and real contribution to strengthen his position and in the same time talks about new course and incomplete destalinization launched by Moscow in following terms: "Khrushchev made a step in detach Stalinism but did not looked for continue". About Khrushchev Zhivkov stated that "before Stalin died I heard something good about him". About Khrushchev's first visit in Bulgaria, Zhivkov reminds that was a meeting between him and the guest in presence of Soviet Ambassador in Bulgaria and gives some details: "I had the impression that at any issue Khrushchev raised referring to our country Ambassador hurried up to speak before me on behalf of me. Waiting for a moment, Khrushchev categorical interrupted him and told "You leave us at once. I am here not for hearing you but to talk with comrade Zhivkov. Leave. How it is possible such behaviour?" As follows, relates Zhivkov: "Like this was made the beginning of something new and divers. Was creating complete another ambiance..." Sometimes later, during the meeting, Khrushchev assured Zhivkov of his support: "Don't mind, I am looking to help you. We love you, do you really understand? [...] I know around you have critiques [...]" (ЖИВКОВ 2006: 467).

⁵ Chervenkov explained his policy as follows: "I am convinced that act correct, that like this I understand the work for Party interest. My guilt, my misfortune, is here in this, that sincere and honest I had lasting conviction for the right of points of view namely party interests, building of its cult" and continued saying that he preferred to communicate and consult with Stalin instead to communicate disputed issues in Central Committee because he was afraid of complications, members of Central Committee made reports one to another (Rumiana Bogdanova, pp. 41-42).

⁶ "I would be unfaithful with historic truth if I wouldn't say that during Khrushchev and Brezhnev our main political course through conformity with "line" briefed in Moscow was kept. I don't consider that this is a B.C.P., Bulgaria leader or Bulgarian communist historic guilt. Friendship with U.S.S.R., the most important upholder, assured our existence and development as self-standing country [...] Because of many reasons due to historic, ethnic, emotional and personal character, this political line was natural for our people and desired by this" (ЖИВКОВ 2006: 460).

⁷ A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, 190/1956.

⁸ Ibidem, dosar 71/1956.

⁹ Ibidem, ff. 16-17.

¹⁰ Ibidem, f. 22.

¹¹ On 30th June in U.S.S.R., Central Committee of the C.P.U.S. adopted resolution entitled "About surpassing cult of personality and its consequences" that marked the basis of the post-Stalinist conservatism, a big leap behind in comparison with *Secret Speech* (Werth 2006: 25).

¹² A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar 128/1956.

- ¹³ <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/pdf/29-1-46.pdf>.
- ¹⁴ A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar 13/1957.
- ¹⁵ A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar 121/1956, f. 4.
- ¹⁶ Ibidem, dosar 13/1957, f. 18.
- ¹⁷ A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar 170/1956, ff. 1-5.
- ¹⁸ <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/28-5-54.pdf>.
- ¹⁹ <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/28-5-77>.
- ²⁰ A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar 126/1956.
- ²¹ Dej had to interrupt a visit in Yugoslavia for participate at the meeting.
- ²² Тentralen Dorjaven Arhiv (Ю.Д.А.), fond 1B, Plenul C.C. al P.C.B., inventar 5, dosar 259, f. 46.
- ²³ A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar 174/1956, f. 7.
- ²⁴ Ibidem, f. 7.
- ²⁵ Situation in Hungary determined Dej that during the events and in 1957 to close Babeş Bolyai University and High School "Dr. Petru Groza" from Cluj and to move a part of education in Hungarian language in schools with bilingual teaching.
- ²⁶ Ю.Д.А., fond 1B, Plenul C.C. al P.C.B., inventar 5, dosar 235, ff. 8-9; България и Студената война 2002.
- ²⁷ <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/29-1-136>.
- ²⁸ <http://wilsoncenter.org>.
- ²⁹ <http://wilsoncenter.org>.
- ³⁰ <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/29-1-54>.
- ³¹ <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/29-1-62>.
- ³² <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/29-1-46>.
- ³³ <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/29-2-158>.
- ³⁴ <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/29-2-146>.
- ³⁵ N.A.R.A, RG 263, folder 90, Box 3, second set, f. 2.
- ³⁶ It is interesting to remark that in C.C. of the R.W.P. meeting from 1st December when discussed about the Hungarian problem was expressed appreciation that it is not correct to blame Yugoslavia for Hungarian events because a fault had also U.S.S.R. that had sustained too much time Rakosi and Gerц; A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar 174/1956, f. 33.

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