

НЕОЛИБЕРАЛНИЯТ ПЪРФОРМАНС –
АНИХИЛАЦИЯ НА СРЪБСКИЯ
СУВЕРЕНИТЕТ И ИНТЕГРИТЕТ

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A NEO-LIBERAL PERFORMANCE –
THE ANNIHILATION OF SERBIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY

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Abstract. In this work the authors consider the negative influence of process globalisation of neoliberal ideology on Serbia. They consider the following themes: the relationships between law, moral and might in the contemporary world; are the humanitarian interventions an instrument for the development of human rights or for making of the world empire; what changes are taking in the structure of inter-state relations; what would be the best place for Serbia in the current historical juncture of the world.

In the next section, we talk about the neoliberal performance in Serbia in a form the tyranny of the majority.

Then we criticize the concept of the Second Serbia. By hypostasizing minority rights, which are justified by the claim that ethno-cultural groups need the state to protect their right to develop their own cultural tradition and, paradoxically, encouraging the dissolution of the Serbian cultural tradition in the name of modernizing Serbia, the Second Serbia actually rejects the logic behind both the civil state and the national state, because both of them are incompatible with those minority rights which encourage strong processes of ethnic homogenization whose ultimate outcome is the disintegration of the state.

Key words: neoliberalism, Second Serbia, sovereignty, integrity.

The struggle for world supremacy or the struggle for global power, which began with the Great War in early twentieth century as a logical consequence of the sweeping globalization of European Modernity, culminated in the war in Serbia which inaugurated the Great Leader (of the “free” world and the rest of the world) *de facto* rather than merely symbolically (as had been the case during the 1990s).

This marked the *true*, not virtual, end of the twentieth century. It concluded with a “natural” completion of the historical processes that had foreshadowed and created it: the victorious party is a very specific *national state* which does not want this to be revealed, while modern ideologies persist with unabated intensity in the new context, albeit within a narrower framework.

The race for limitless power ended, seemingly for the last time, in the inauguration of the global Winner that, paradoxically, does not seem to want to acknowledge the highly coveted triumph. Why is this so and where does this unexpected “modesty” stem from?

The answer can be found in the ideological cunning and political pragmatism of the Winner. Although the global Winner is well-known, *it* is obviously not prepared to assume the *direct* responsibility that inevitably belongs to it as the First One (the *only* sovereign one).

Despite the United States of America (USA) being the indisputable leader of the so-called *new world order* (whatever this expression means), it seems unwilling to accept its own responsibility for the Whole derived from this leadership. Instead, it prefers to hide behind strategic global institutions such as NATO, IMF and even OSCE. The absolute control over these and numerous other institutions, including the “unaffiliated” UN and faraway Europe (which defends itself from Washington), enables specific American interests to be fully realized. The reasons for this mimicry do not, however, stem from hesitation or modesty but rather belong to the “thing itself” – they constitute an organic part of the ideological basis of the current *real-liberalism* underlying the entire narrative.¹ This also reflects the historical *novum* of the upcoming millennium and era.

Despite or even *contrary to* its underpinnings, the historical system of real-liberalism, as a hallmark of the (post)modern era, is no longer prepared to make use of national states and therefore no longer has any interest in the idea of sovereignty. It has been discarded and consigned to

¹ Instead of the usual term “neo-liberalism”, we use the somewhat peculiar phrase “real-liberalism” which suggests and emphasizes the paradoxical drawing closer of past secular doctrines of the salvation of mankind on the one hand and the victorious system of unrestrained interests in a highly controlled order of things on the other. Hence, real-liberalism represents a product of modern decadence: a suspicious concoction of unenlightened vestiges of messianism, racism and mercantilism – the exact opposite of what it would like to be.

the infamous “scrapyard of history” while what was previously sacred has been replaced by “transnational”, that is to say “universal”, values manifested as the renewal of natural rights (transmuted in the meantime into the so-called human rights) and as the additional affirmation of freedoms that are increasingly beginning to rely on their economic basis (the market) and less and less on their recent ideological beacon – politics i.e. parliament.

The general suppression and rejection of *the national*, so easily, automatically, and unjustifiably equated with chauvinism, has resulted in the development of a new type of “liberalist” thought for which the very magical word of *democracy* is becoming more of a value “in and of itself” (more often than not, its contents are extremely vague: the more high-flown they are, the less useful they are and therefore more open to manipulation) and less, if at all, what it should be by definition: a set of transparent procedures used to articulate various interests and liberties.²

The suppression of these scorned procedures, which allegedly hinder “the right use of freedom”, is a symptom of way the modern will to power is being shaped to include a myriad of concepts, even the argumentation of supposedly “defeated” ideologies, especially those of socialist provenance, in its verbal repertoire. A new ideological hybrid is thus emerging, similar to a cloned eel: it is impossible to catch it barehanded in its natural habitat, while on dry land it keeps slipping out of the grasp of the political reason (mind) due to its slipperiness and coldness.

This perverse mixture of moralizing socialist mottos and liberal values (the order could be reversed) as a newly-created legitimacy framework of real-liberalism represents, together with openly militarist means, the final uncovering of the originally schizoid position of Modernity. It was based and developed on carefully nurtured internal differences which accepted their life as the death of something else. Communism saw itself on the grave of liberalism (capitalism) and vice versa, while fascism found its horrific “meaningfulness” in the elimination of both of them. Communism and liberalism, on the other hand, recognized their own dark sides in fascism which provided them with additional strength to eliminate a shared problem.

² See **Cvetoković, Vladimir N.** “Bermudski trougao moderne politike: demokratija, multikulturalizam, nacionalizam [The Bermuda triangle of modern politics: democracy, multiculturalism, nationalism]”, NSPM, Beograd, 3-4/1999.

When communism, under pressure from the outside (arms race) and especially from the inside (the unsustainability of the non-rational system of production), finally expired (although many are still unable to comprehend or accept this), the ideological winner had to change as well, transforming into a militant “social-democratic” half-breed of liberalism.

From a traditional viewpoint, the former democracy of the free world has retreated into oligarchy and hidden tyranny and left (moreover – laid the trail for) the natural evolution into more or less open tyrannies to its newly-found friends from the East. Naturally, neither of these tendencies with different directions but similar starting points has (so far!) been realized in its ideal-typical form; this does not mean, however, that significant portions of its social being do not abide by these classical models. In this way, Modernity has become a caricature of itself that nobody identifies with any longer.

What we have put forward so far does not mean that we reject the liberal concept altogether, especially in the case of some of its underlying principles that have demonstrated a certain historical vitality inasmuch as they have proven themselves less inadequate than the alternatives in the role of the basic principles of the state and society, despite some difficulties that have arisen in the process of their actualization.

At the most abstract level, these are the principles of parliamentarism, the institutions of the legal state, individual freedoms, the domination of private property, the market as the basis of production with government interventions and mass protests (including civil disobedience) as correctives. These principles have thus far not radically been brought into question either globally or in any of the crises of the developed world, including the present one. In and of themselves, they are not the source of American *Machtpolitik*; power politics, justified by the concept of globalization and the neo-liberal notion of deregulation; that politics originates above all from the position of the USA after the collapse of the Soviet Union: as the only superpower, it sought to globalize its supremacy, moralizing law and instrumentalizing human rights to achieve this as if the violent imposition of any constitutional and legal system did not stem from antiliberal notions. Of course, when historical experiences are taken into consideration, these liberal principles ought to be demystified and stripped of their gilded sacrosanctity in order to minimize the possibility of them being employed for imperial purposes.

In the next section, we turn to the neo-liberal performance in Serbia manifested in a form well-known both in theory and from experience – *the tyranny of the majority*.

Serbia and the tyranny of the majority

Although hopes were high for post-Milošević Serbia, it needs to be said openly and straightforwardly that it has failed and that there are no signs of Serbia's revival even now that Milošević's former allies, the the Serbian Progressive Party, formerly known as the Radical Party, have come to power.

One of the main reasons for this is that the parties which brought down Milošević's authoritarian rule have not been able to meet the formal and legal conditions for the functioning of the legal state which has resulted in the what modern scholars call "the tyranny of the majority".

As a form of government, tyranny is defined in different ways. Nevertheless, it seems that it can best be defined as the exercising of power outside the law: tyranny begins where law ends.

In traditional terms, we could say that laws do not rule in tyrannical regimes because the "king" or ruler has turned his will into law. In other words, unlike the parliamentary system where power ought to be limited by general constitutional norms and exercised within the laws derived from these basic constitutional principles, while citizens should be guaranteed the right to address an independent judiciary to identify and prevent any abuse and overstepping of authority, tyrannical systems subordinate the rule of law to the rule of man; since those who rule are supralegal arbiters, the motto *princeps legitibus solutis* – the ruler is above the law – applies.

This is why tyranny is most commonly associated with those political regimes whose rulers do not draw their legitimacy from the will of the majority. It is illusory to think, however, that a specific form of tyranny cannot be a characteristic of parliamentary democracies even though the legitimacy of those in power has been verified in democratic elections.

This was demonstrated by many modern theorists who examined the issue of the "tyranny of the majority" – most notably Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. This phenomenon, which characterized the

beginning of the development of capitalism, can have different causes and modalities. For example, for Tocqueville and his friend Mill, democracy is accompanied by the danger of the tyranny of the majority: democracy as the gradual realization of the egalitarian ideal is laden with levelling tendencies and can therefore turn into despotism. Yet the main cause of tyranny in the parliamentary context lies in the absence of the separation of powers, which allows the executive power to dominate over other branches. This is how Tocqueville approached the issue of tyranny in *Democracy in America* (1835).

He believed that the absolute sovereignty of the majority has numerous adverse effects: the instability of the legislature, the self-interest of officials, conformity of opinions, a lack of people worthy of respect in the political arena, and so forth. According to Tocqueville, absolute power is necessarily harmful regardless of who wields it – a monarch or the people. The real problem is not who wields the power but the manner in which this power is controlled and limited.

Whether a ruler or government is good or not should be judged based on how much or how little it is allowed to do. As Tocqueville wrote: “There is no power on earth so worthy of honor in itself or clothed with rights so sacred that I would admit its uncontrolled and all-predominant authority. When I see that the right and the means of absolute command are conferred on any power whatever, be it called a people or a king, an aristocracy or a democracy, a monarchy or a republic, I say there is the germ of tyranny, and I seek to live elsewhere, under other laws.”

Tocqueville saw the cure for such tyranny in the separation of powers: “If, on the other hand, a legislative power could be so constituted as to represent the majority without necessarily being the slave of its passions; an executive, so as to retain a certain degree of uncontrolled authority; and a judiciary, so as to remain independent of the two other powers; a government would be formed which would still be democratic without incurring any risk of tyrannical abuse.”³

As far as Serbia is concerned, the majority in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), which came to power on 5 October 2000,

³ **Toqueville, A. de.** *Democracy in America*, edition in Serbian. S. Karlovci: Izdavačka kwižara Zorana Stojanovića, 2002.

did not possess sufficient awareness that a democratic state needs to be based on the unity of legitimacy (the right to exercise power based on an electoral victory) and legality (legal limitations on the self-will of the government). This manifested itself immediately after 5 October 2000, when non-governmental organizations and almost all minor parties within the DOS began to fervently support the part of the DOS which marginalized legality and hypostasized legitimacy under the justification that there was danger that the old regime could be restored and that the civil consciousness of the public was still underdeveloped, as if the decisive victory of the DOS did not constitute palpable proof that the citizens had deligitimized that regime.

Legitimists put the lofty goals of the 5 October Revolution (preparing the citizens for democracy, European integrations, training the judiciary for its role in the modern society for which it supposedly was not prepared yet, guiding the citizens toward European values and so forth) above formal law – since the Serbian society, its citizens and judiciary were not ready for a modern democracy, those who won the elections needed to be relatively free from legal constraints in order to break out of this vicious circle of unpreparedness because their good intentions and moral conscience were not to be doubted.

Such an approach which rests on putting the principle of purposefulness above that of legality represents a form of revolutionary paternalism which leads into the tyranny of the ruling majority justified by the idea that the progressive majority purportedly knows better than the citizens themselves what the authentic interest of those citizens and the judiciary are.

This idea is informed to an extent by the Jesuit logic that the end justifies the means, which cannot be the basis of a legal state because such logic subordinates law to goals.

The tyranny of the ruling majority is made possible only when the separation of powers is inadequate, resulting in the supremacy of the executive branch over other branches and thus invalidating the legal state.

The “original sin” of the DOS, once it came to power, was that its majority was against setting up a constituent assembly and having elected representatives of the people adopt a new constitution which would not bear the stamp of either those in power or the opposition. This is what speaks so eloquently to the anti-legalist character of the movement. The representatives of the liberal faction of the French Revolution which brought

down the absolute monarchy did not wait for the citizens of France to be ready to adhere to the principles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen; instead, the constituent assembly integrated the entire declaration into the new constitution. Indian anti-colonialists did not hesitate at all when this country gained independence and unanimously supported the meeting of a constituent assembly which adopted the new, modern Indian constitution. The reason for this is that in both countries there was awareness the majority in the DOS lacked: the legal state cannot be constituted by nonlegal (authoritarian) but only by legal means.

An attempt to use a paternalist form of government to create conditions for the constitution of the legal state is, regardless of the potentially noble intentions of its proponents, a Sisyphean task because such a form of government will allow its protagonists to increasingly strengthen their privileged position and reap material gains on account of it over time. A democratic political culture can be developed solely within a democratic formal and legal framework: in the words of Hegel, in order for a man to learn how to swim, he must first venture into the water i.e. into an adequate setting.

Unfortunately, the domination of the executive power was never eradicated because the new constitution was the result of a compromise between the ruling coalition and one part of the opposition and therefore did not provide an adequate basis for the necessary formal and legal guarantees of an independent judiciary. The constitutional guarantees of the judiciary are neither comprehensive enough nor stringent enough because they have mostly been brought down to the level of laws while the idea of the so-called organic laws which shall require some form of a qualified majority was abandoned.

This means that the laws regulating the Serbian judiciary are adopted by means of a regular rather than a special procedure and are therefore easily changed. In the words of Omer Hadžomerović, the vice-president of the Judges' Association of Serbia: "In theory, it is possible for a quarter of the members of parliament plus one member to change the laws on the judiciary and regulate quite differently even those principles that guarantee the independence of the judiciary and its efficiency."

The dependence of the judiciary on political will is evident, for example, from the electoral procedure for members of the High Court Council which is supposed to guarantee the independence of the judiciary.

Although judges constitute the majority of the members of this body, it has been turned into a parliamentary body because its eight elective members are elected by the National Assembly, not by the judiciary, which in the context of Serbian parliamentary government means that these members are elected by the ruling majority.

Moreover, if we consider the fact that its members include the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Minister of Justice and the president of the relevant committee of the National Assembly, all of whom are appointed by the National Assembly, it becomes clear that this body has been turned into an instrument of the ruling majority since it is completely dependent on the will of that majority.

In principle, such a system is scandalous, especially in the case of Serbia, a country which endured a long undemocratic tradition and the domination of ideology and politics over law in the communist era.

The members of the National Broadcasting Agency (RRA), a regulatory body intended to guarantee the independence of the public broadcasting service from the government, are appointed in a similar way. Its members, all of whom are elected by the National Assembly, elect the members of the Managing Board of the public broadcaster of the Republic of Serbia which in turn vote to appoint the managing director of the broadcaster. Here, therefore, the central role of the parliamentary ruling majority in decisions on the election of managers of the public broadcasting service is less transparent. The current government has recently revoked the financing system of the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) by means of public subscriptions and introduced government funding of the institution, thereby revoking its financial independence. By contrast, in Germany, for example, only one third of the regulatory body is appointed based on the proportion of seats held in parliament, while the remaining two thirds are elected by secret voting of the so-called associations of civil society – the University, the Bar Association and so forth – so that the majority of the members are not dependent on the government in terms of how they are elected because these associations elect and dismiss them.

The system of party rule reaches its full potential in the case of state-owned enterprises as they are the main sources of funding of Serbian parties: for a long time, the managing directors of these companies were appointed by the Government which was always a coalition government,

meaning that the decisions on this matter were the result of inter-party arrangements between coalition parties.

Recently, the institution of the public call for applications, conducted by the Committee for Appointments which has a chairman and four members, was introduced; the chairman and two members are appointed by the government, another two members are appointed by a National Assembly Committee for economic affairs, while the last member is also appointed by the government for each individual managing director.

Furthermore, the body in charge of appointing managing directors has extensive discretionary powers while the appointment criteria, which are imprecise, are regulated by an ordinance, not a law.

One of the reasons why the domination of the executive power is possible is, therefore, that the key procedures for the election of the members of the Constitutional Court, the High Court Council, the managing directors of state-owned enterprises, the heads of the public broadcasting service and its regulatory body, and so forth were adjusted to allow for the alleged immaturity of the Serbian society and the lack of competence and professionalism of our judiciary which was said to still be bearing the stamp of authoritarian systems. These procedures enabled the executive power to have a dominant role in the election process of persons carrying out these functions in a direct or less transparent way.

Owing to this, all of the governments since 5 October 2000 could more or less be characterized as the Great Enlightening Tutor watching over the entire society, the media and the judiciary in order guide them in a direction desirable in the constitution of the modern world. Naturally, such a pathetic moralistic discourse employed by top politicians in Serbia represented only a superficial “cobweb” intended to conceal their ambition to control the key levers in society and state. This tendency of the executive power to instrumentalize everything that could limit its will inevitably opened the door to the cancerous spreading of corruption and organized crime, which consequently compromised the entire post-Milošević movement.

In the end, it proved inadequate for establishing a liberal-democratic formal and legal system and democratic rule.

Also contributing to the inadequate separation of powers is the fact that the Serbian public, including intellectuals – having been indoctrinated for a long time by the communist ideology of the unity of power which

subordinated law to revolutionary will – is suspicious of the claim that formal norms can limit power: for the Serbian public, formally existing law is a mere façade for the rule of the powerful – law is what the most powerful group in a given society wants it to be.

It equates government and power. In other words, even a large portion of the Serbian elite has not yet realized that the legal state is a unity of legitimacy and legality. It does not wonder why, if procedures are truly not important, the majority within the DOS opposed the constituent assembly and why the existing procedures, especially those that regulate appointments within the judiciary, differ from those in legal states.

This is, of course, not intended to fetishize or mysticize *Rechtsstaat*, as it is called in German, or ‘the rule of law’, as it is called in English, because the rule of law can be a front for great social injustice and for the tendency to create informal, hidden centres of political and economic power. A perfect legal system does not exist. However, having a constant critical attitude towards what takes place on a factual level in a legal state in order to rectify its faults is entirely different from proclaiming the basic principles of such a state to be the fountainhead of all negative tendencies in a society. The latter implies an impulse for a radical rejection of the principles of the legal state and the adoption of fundamentally different principles which have proved themselves to be the greater evil throughout history.

There is also the possibility that Serbia will require an investigation similar to what some in Italy dubbed “clean hands” (*Mani pulite*). This investigation came as a response to corruption and organized crime which permeated the political and social life in Italy as a consequence of the long rule of Christian democrats without sufficient oversight. But such an investigation cannot succeed unless it receives wide support from a critically predisposed public whose pillars are incorrupt intellectuals and the media open to diverse forms of civil disobedience.

The shaping of social (dis)trust

The problem is, therefore, in the nature of the institutions and in their role in social life in Serbia. What we should bear in mind, however, is that their existence and role – their application and functioning – are not possible or sufficient in and of themselves, independently of the people

they exist for. This issue is a “two-way street” where values, norms or patterns of identity meet with people in all their diversity, as individuals, families, and groups. It is, in fact, an issue of whether the traffic is adequate in both directions and whether the institutional arrangement of a society, always a specific one, contributes or fails to contribute to the goals of that society. Before we attempt to address this key issue in Serbia, let us visualize an image whose basic contours are institutions – a sketch of a phenomenon intended to serve as a model response to an antecedent philosophical question: what are institutions in the first place?

If we attempt to imagine a well-ordered society, we can gain insight into the presumed purpose of institutions as the connective tissue of such a society. Furthermore, if we consider this “connective” role in a society to be the measure or form of the public space that the society occupies or the framework of its generality, we can then see that a certain degree of “publicness” is a prerequisite for the existence and establishment of institutions. Public life in a society, separate from “private” lives, entails a publicly recognizable way of life. What we mean by “way of life” is that every society and its institutions are characterized by some degree of influence of values established by custom which develop into traditions, by historical experiences, and by estimates of a need for change, including the change of existing institutional arrangements.

There can, thus, be no institutions without the elements of *a world of lives* that make a society specific and distinguish it from other societies. Apart from these contours of institutions that serve as general and public meanings and cornerstones of a society, institutions can also be said to represent the public recognition of power and its dynamics in a social system.

The power to direct the role of institutions and interpret them in a certain way, and the power to reform institutions, highlights the importance of general social power in conjunction with the generality of the institutional network which represents political power to establish the “rules of the game” in social life.

Serbian (self-)recognition – the First and the Second Serbia

The power to influence the way institutions interpret the interests of the people brings us to the question of what it is that serves to identify

Serbia as a country: is it what we inherit and build upon or something that arises out of an entirely new political community after the destruction of the previous one – “the First One”?

The Serbian example shows how the conceptualization of national interests and the attainment of sovereignty and integrity depend on whether the model of national recognition “functions” or rather on the political action that supports or ruins it. The previous (first) national identity was largely built on the awareness about the timeless value of sacrifice for the homeland and the continuity of the existence of the people (ancestors and descendants) in sacral memory (as a unity of its earthly and heavenly being). *It was indelibly marked by the deeper and higher meaning of Kosovo and the Battle of Kosovo for Serbs, by the Kosovo sacrifice – the defeat and the victory*⁴.

The faith in the transcendental meaning of the Kosovo vow sustained the desire for the restoration of the Serbian state in the most adverse circumstances under the Ottoman yoke. National consciousness was the precondition for the establishment of a national state in the 12th century as an expression of strength and of an internal desire to secure freedom and enable an independent journey into the future.

The work of Ilija Garašanin, Serbian Edmund Burke, whose words reflect the sources of national consciousness as the legitimation of a national state in the making, represents perhaps the best testimony to this spirit: “Our present will, therefore, not be without ties to the past as they shall make one dependant, integral and arranged whole and this is why the Serbian people, their ethnicity and their statehood are under the protection of sacred historical right. Our aspirations cannot be criticized as new, unfounded, a revolution and overthrow, for everyone must admit that they are a political necessity, that they originated in ancient times and that they have roots in the previous state life and national life of Serbs”.⁵

The 19th century saw efforts to establish national integrity and sovereignty based on that identity and the Serbian national state gradually grew stronger. A strong influence of Western legal and political doctrines,

⁴ More about national identity functions in: **Bodin, Milenko** Nacionalna i ljudska bezbednost (National and Human Security), FB, Beograd, 2015.

⁵ From *Načertanije* by Ilija Garašanin, edited by Dušan T. Bataković i Miroslav Josić Višnjić, 1991.

stemming from the model of the civil-political moulding of a nation, mostly complemented the development of the basic model.

However, with the creation of Yugoslavia as a supranational state, the Serbian people lost their national sovereignty, followed by the dissolution of their integrity and even identity.

Consequently, there were no organizational prerequisites for the articulation of national interests in the unfolding circumstances, which led to a national catastrophe during and after the Second World War. For the better part of the 20th century, the Serbian people endured dire circumstances due to the severing of the tie between their cultural and political pattern on the one hand and the reality they found themselves in on the other.

It was only at the beginning of the 21st century, more than a hundred years since the adoption of the last constitution of their national state, that the Serbian people were able to express their national sovereignty (alongside the general popular one) through a constitution and thus create the basic preconditions for the affirmation of their national interests.

At the same time, however, they faced the combined liberal-communist concept of “the Second Serbia”.

The Second Serbia – what is it?

The term *Second Serbia* came into use during the stabilization of the 5 October Revolution in Serbia. It was intended to designate a radical dissociation from Serbia as it was under the regime of Slobodan Milošević. As time passed, however, it increasingly became an alternative to *the First Serbia* or Serbia as such.

This represents the most important issue regarding the meaning of the term. What kind of Serbia is it?

It is a country that is supposed to emerge from the dissolution of national consciousness or what is left of it. This is achieved by losing the guidelines that serve as models of self-recognition and adopting an attitude of a zombie towards objective existence.

Accordingly, in the narrative of the Second Serbia, a paternalistic framework of cultural and political decontamination has been imposed on Serbia as if Serbia were not the only state in the region that incorporated liberalism into its political tradition as far back as the 19th century.

Although the Second Serbia is a proponent of the citizens' state (civil state) in terms of self-understanding, it does not support either the original liberal concept of a nation – the nation -state – or the concept of the national state. The representatives of the Second Serbia consider special group cultural and political rights to be a necessary precondition for a citizens' state, which is not sustainable either on the factual-historical or the conceptual level. In the first two liberally constituted countries in the world, the USA and France, the state-political identity is separate from the cultural and ethnical structure of the society; nationality is therefore equated with citizenship and considered separate from ethnicity and the specific culture related to it.

As a result, those countries do not formally or legally recognize special ethnical and cultural, but only individual rights.

From a conceptual standpoint, the concept of the citizens' state came about through a radical deconstruction of the state whose basic formative principle was the ethnocultural identity.

Through the formal and legal recognition of special ethnocultural and political rights, ethnocultural principles are returning, to a larger or smaller extent, to the sphere of constitutional principles depending on the character of those special rights. On the other hand, the supporters of the Second Serbia have a negative attitude towards the national state whose citizens all have the equal civil rights, regardless of their ethnocultural identity, but whose titular is its founding people.

By hypostasizing minority rights, which are justified by the claim that minority ethnocultural groups need the state to protect their right to develop their own cultural tradition, and, paradoxically, encouraging the dissolution of the Serbian cultural tradition in the name of modernizing Serbia, the Second Serbia actually rejects the logic behind both the citizens' state and the national state, because both of them are incompatible with those minority rights which encourage strong processes of ethnic homogenization whose ultimate outcome is the disintegration of the state. The key source of this process of disintegration is the standpoint of the Second Serbia which implies that minority groups should be assigned the formal and legal status of a people in an ethnic sense, with their members having civil rights as well, while the ethnocultural population which represents the majority should be assigned the status of a people in a political sense (*demos*), their members having the status of citizens only.

Moreover, they are asked to adopt a radically critical attitude towards their own tradition, despite the fact that the constitutional and legal tradition of modern Serbia is a tradition of essentially liberal constitutions.

The attitude of quasi-liberal parties and corresponding NGOs represents an excellent example of (post)modern political rationality. This “principled stand” represents the political action of a party or parties in line with programmes which are intended to create rational individuals who belong to a nation only privately while publicly they are citizens wise enough not to beat the drum about being Serbian or shout “I am Serbian” in the street or (God forbid) in front of foreigners. The openly stated intention to have the country go from one failed integration (Yugoslavia) into another – *European* – which will this be time inevitably good and advanced, arises out of this context. It is not a matter of choice, but something so good and desirable that it represents the only way for “Serbia”.

We use this opportunity to note that this society has had too many institutional changes bearing an ideological stamp and too much uncritical acceptance of models of political systems, often imposed on Serbia, in the course of the last one hundred years.

Historical experience, therefore, requires us to bring up the issue of the fundamentals of a political system which would provide a solution to the issue of the constituents of institutions, tradition, experience, needs and reconstruction goals that we have discussed here and the purposefulness of changing them.

The way this society and state are understood and especially the political status of the relational issue between the concepts of people, citizen and nation should be re-examined in the light of these considerations.

After fifty five years of communism and new socialist government, a neo-liberal (liberal-democratic) political system assuming the status of common good is being imposed as their opposite, once again uncritically and without drawing on the necessary elements of institutional purposefulness.

In the case of Serbia, it is being accorded the status of common good through the proclamation of the new government that they are embarking on “a journey into Europe”. This phrase is supposedly intended to convey the change in institutional arrangement that will enable Serbia to join the European Union. Given the rush to do so and the implication that this is the only way for Serbia, one would think that it is a necessity rather than a superior value to be pursued as “the common good”.

Regardless of how skilled they were in employing all of the ideas and techniques of the left and the right, the old regime which remained in power for ten years and its caricatural dictator Slobodan Milošević probably could never have anticipated how much the “foreign factor” in Serbia would exploit them both while they were politically active and after their political “death” in the Hague.

The same is true of the “single-minded” efforts to enter the waiting room for Europe. In order not to enter into conflicts with “the entire world” and “the international community” as He did, it is necessary to “change the mindset” and realize that there are certain “global rules of the game” that we must all obey.

Setting aside what all of these expressions, including ‘Europe’ and ‘the world’ mean, let us note the call for rational behaviour. An old American saying that goes “if you can’t beat them, join them” conveys a typical message of pragmatic rationality. It does not, however, clarify whether the enemy is to be considered, and called, a friend or whether one should limit oneself to rational joining alone.

There is something not only twisted but also irrational in the attitude on the overnight friendship with (Western) Europe and the US, which together constitute the world we aspire to.

If liberal-minded politicians who are currently in power have become inaugurated as the common good, then “European values” are not a matter of choice and if they are not a matter of choice then they are a necessity.

If we must do this in order to prevail as “Serbia”, then it is reasonable to let the people, citizens, know that it is necessary to adjust our behaviour and political action to the power of the aggressor, to bend our head and survive until we can hope to have a freedom of choice. Presumably, it is not necessary to capitulate entirely and commit a “mindicide”.

This rationality gives in to the rationality hidden in party legitimacy. From that standpoint, it is not enough to justify a specific policy by “bowing one’s head” if that head remains capable of thinking and seeing through things and if it still cares about liberty and truth. Even though it is bowed, it knows why it is bowing and acts rationally because it is conscious of itself and others.

However, in order for this behaviour to be legitimate and rational given the interests of the political rulers we have described, that con-

sciousness needs to be changed, meaning that the perception of truth, liberty, and what represents (public) good needs to change so that “Serbia” in the West is perceived as a road to freedom where the overnight friend spoke the truth and we (including those who are in power in Serbia) lied and that we were truly the “bad guys” while they were the good ones. The goodness of the entire (Western) civilization we not only aspire to, but also belong to!?

It was based on this that the government negotiators were able to argue with a smile at the donor conference after 5 October that we “share all of the values” of Europe and “the World” – the world which was supposed to give us as much charity as possible.

It also informed the conclusions of the then Prime Minister that the write-off of 3 to 5 billion of the 12-billion debt represented the greatest success of the new government in its first year in office.

The comments that this was a uniquely generous act of the creditors towards a country in fact represented servile rhetoric and, objectively speaking, a reward for the “carrot and stick” politics.

Of course, the impact of the stick in the form of the direct destruction of material goods during the bombing, measured in tens of billions of dollars, and the less obvious impact of ten years of debilitating sanctions, measured in several times that amount, were swept under the carpet.

And yes, let us not forget the human losses, although they are consistently being relegated to the category of “collateral damage” – surely owing to the prevailing sentiments of the peacemaking policy of the civilized world.

If we lose the criterion by which we decide who our friends are, we lose a large portion of the criterion for deciding what political action is (this is not necessarily an exclusive criterion found in the work of Carl Schmitt).

From the First to the Second Serbia – denazification or denationalization

Denazification is one of the terms from the repertoire of the radical portion of the Second Serbia. It was, presumably, intended to indicate that Serbia is in essence Nazi-like. Here, the radical concept of the Second Serbia tacitly relies on an older communist concept of the creation of a “New Society”, even a “New Man”, cloaked in the fight against fascism. For Serbia is presumably also essentially fascist.

The popular and convenient guise of antifascism should presumably help us forget or help conceal that Serbia (the First One, as we have known it throughout its history) has long been branded not only as “old” but also as the enemy. The history of the Marxist-communist attitude to Serbia was characterized by the fight against *the hegemony of the Greater-Serbian bourgeoisie*. Up until the alliance with the Nazis themselves (for reasons difficult to comprehend, communists mistakenly like to call them fascist) in order to bring down the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (according to them, a Greater-Serbian state).

This could be the potential purpose of the change in the expression ‘the Second Serbia’ which essentially represents the negation of the concept it refers to – Serbia in general.

This is not so surprising if we recall that communists themselves claimed that they did not have a Homeland and that the party (the communist revolution) represented a substitute for it. Together with Nazis, communists thus beheaded the Serbian state, conducting the process of forceful denationalization of the state and the people of historical proportions.

In all honesty, communism and the liberal-communist concept of the Second Serbia neither emerged spontaneously nor were they solely a (successful) import. A (longstanding) phenomenon of apostasy of the Serbian people laid the historical foundations for this negative concept. This phenomenon manifested itself even before communists and their neo-liberal successors from *the Second Serbia* in the form of resignation, in a lack of faith (“in God or in the Serbian people”), and in the simple attitude that everything coming from abroad was better or more modern than anything Serbian. The Second Serbia is, therefore, the contemporary expression of the tradition of self-denial of one’s own national being.

It would not be appropriate to discuss here the deep ties between liberalism and communism as the key ideologies of the modern Western world, but we will nevertheless mention a few things.

The concept quite commonly referred to as neo-liberalism is only seemingly a new variety of liberal ideology. After the experience with the expansion of communism, the role of liberal ideology was re-examined in the 20th century as belonging to the offensive domain, rather than as being a property of stabilized regimes of European countries after the French Revolution, a landmark of nineteenth-century Western history. The issue regarding revolution has always been the question of how it will end.

As far as the philosophical foundations of a coherent liberal doctrine are concerned, liberal principles could be said to have been “extrapolated” and even politically instrumentalized. This is the case with the principles of the equality of citizens and multiculturalism on the one hand and the disqualification of nationalism and patriotism in the name of “Europeanism” on the other. However, the responsibility of neo-liberal ideology for the legitimacy of the concept of the Second Serbia lies in the role it played in the establishment of new global power relations.

The New World Order is supposed to signify the global success of the liberal revolution and this is why other philosophical elements of the liberal doctrine are set aside in the name of this ideology.

The goal is to impose political standards and rules of exchange of the entirety of global resources aimed at promoting the destruction of traditional values of states as such and of national values which are considered to be second-rate (specific).

At the same time, whoever opposes the revolutionary endeavour will be punished in order to set an example.

The trial in the Hague did not concern one man or individuals, despite attempts to conceal this by referring too frequently to the principle of a legal rather than a political process and repeated claims that the accused was a man, an individual, not an entire people. Nevertheless, not only did they intend to show that political and military leaders could be found guilty, but the indictments themselves revealed that the national being of a people was on trial.

The proceedings, similar in form to the Nuremberg trials, fuelled the rhetoric of denazification, while the content of the indictment and the essence of the charges helped the further denationalization of the Serbian state and the Serbian people. The trial, stood by an “individual”, began with the reading of the indictment founded on an interpretation of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. The signal from the Hague was implemented “in the field” in the form of action undertaken against the First, Vidovdan Serbia on various forums, in the media, and in different institutions.

This “denazification” required the so-called *demythologization of national consciousness* and *its decontamination from cultural heritage*. The primary victim was, of course, supposed to be national epic poetry and the national free-spirited ethics that sprung from it. To achieve this and to develop a tactic of “mouse bites” into the segments of public and

political consciousness, various political parties and parapolitical organizations worked and continue to work in Serbia on the joint task of “thinking” globally and acting locally. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is a typical representative.

Its name, combined with its activities, and the very the significance of their existence testify to the conceptual phenomenon of the Second Serbia as a liberal-communist or neo-liberal revolutionary project. And this by gathering old, Titoist cadres (from Latinka Perović, the dissident from Tito’s regime, to Jovo Kapičić, the commander of Tito’s gulag) and new ones, from under the wing of the *new age* revolution, the most famous being the brand of the liberal communist clenched fist of *Otpor!* (*Resistance!*) (a contribution to the sweeping exportation of revolutions).

The humanitarian verification of power – the merciful angel of neo-liberalism

Bearing in mind everything that we have discussed so far, we will draw on the example of the aggression of the NATO forces against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999 to show how the spirit of new ideological time acts against the principles and facts of a state’s sovereignty. We will also demonstrate how the self-reflection of neo-liberal actors was actualized in the course of the conflict. We begin by examining the oligarchy inside the „international community“.

Why did NATO attack Yugoslavia, in reality attacking Serbia?

From the moment the war began, the so-called analysts – domestic and foreign – provided an endless list of different motives for the military action other than or in addition to the official justifications offered by the allies of the Alliance⁶. These ranged from the most general ones –

⁶ Their evolution speaks for itself: first there was the general protection of minority or human rights in Serbia, then the problem was narrowed down to the exclusive “protection of Kosovo Albanians”, only for the most common and most important reason for the intervention (at the time when it was already in full progress) to become “the protection of Albanian refugees”. As the war went on, “the securing of lasting (all but eternal) peace in the Balkans” was being mentioned with increasing frequency. Finally, the leading members of the Alliance also mentioned the „toppling of the Belgrade regime“. As is usually the case of

geopolitical⁷, economic⁸ and political⁹ – to various (para)psychological explanations whose “subtleties” would be inappropriate to discuss here¹⁰.

course, any (official) reason is ultimately „good enough” of a reason. All of the declared and withheld reasons for NATO’s military intervention were, therefore, equally suitable for simulating legitimacy and satisfying the need for the ever-opaque justice in the eyes of the public at that time. It is indicative that, today, when there is complete lawlessness and anarchy in Kosovo, and when, despite the presence of the UN, that is NATO forces, literally every days sees a Serb massacred, killed or forced out of his or her home or apartment, no one in the so-called international community has mentioned the need to bomb those who are openly conducting “ethnic cleansing”. At the same time, the White House Press Secretary displayed unparalleled cynicism by saying that he had “understanding” for the vindictiveness and proneness to retaliation of the Kosovo Albanians who had been exposed to “Serbian terror” for so long (ten years) while at the same time telling Serbs not to have too great expectations from international troops who were, “after all!”, not capable of protecting every single citizen of Kosovo. Similar statements were given by representatives of the USA during the “air campaign” and after the agreement on the withdrawal of the Yugoslav armed forces and the Serbian police from Kosovo was signed.

⁷ Political and economic control of the entire Balkans by NATO and its expansion towards Russia as the ultimate goal of the USA, which constitutes the fulcrum of the Alliance and its driving force.

⁸ In line with the geopolitical strategy: the control of global resources and entering new, large and, most importantly, “free” markets (unprotected by tariffs and other means of protection).

⁹ Refers to international politics: creating new allies and intimidating old ones as a preventive measure; pulling Russia within the NATO sphere of influence; confronting China which is being forced to participate, in a similar way the USSR was, in an arms race it cannot win due to unequal starting positions and therefore strategically eliminating (in the long term) the main global competitor in the struggle for prestige and dominance in global politics and/or economy.

¹⁰ They were a specific domestic “topic”. The (so far) unconfirmed information from “well-informed sources” that war censors paid special attention to magazines such as Treće oko (The Third Eye) and other similar parapsychological and astrological magazines featuring astral charts and horoscopes of leading politicians from the aggressor nations and similar magical activities against the aggressor show that this was an important reason for war propaganda. In any case, it would be interesting to examine not only what appeared in the tabloids but what the supposedly “serious” newspapers and magazines in our country published.

There were also attempts to *synthesize* all of these factors – these reasons for an open military attack against a sovereign country which did not attack anyone *from the outside* or show any intent to do so. Time will tell how (un)justified all these reasons were, individually and taken as a whole.

Our explanation for the armed intervention of NATO allies against Serbia and (partly) Montenegro is fairly simple and not specifically related to any of the reasons given above. Briefly, it is as follows: NATO i.e. the USA (as the global Winner in the world contest for the unchallenged World Leader) and its real and coerced allies attacked the FRY primarily, if not solely, for *ideological reasons*. Ideology therefore does not serve here as *subsequent justification* for “real” (unexpressed, hidden) reasons for certain actions but as the true driving force of contemporary history.

Today, it has assumed the form of another meta-narration which produces and justifies itself – the self-sufficient ideological reality of the just “way of life” whose values are the common good. In this case, NATO appears as the global developer of peace and the guarantor of global security – the guardian and champion of “human rights”, of all good and of all humanity available to people.

To make the claim on the purely ideological background of NATO intervention against Yugoslavia clearer (and more acceptable), we should note that the fight for global sovereignty i.e. world domination was never a simple conflict of particular modes of modern ideology (liberalism, fascism, communism) but that it always manifested itself as the quarrelling of sovereign states over power, each of them preferring a different ideological legitimacy. In the struggle for global dominance, the systemic matrix of globalism (the USA) and of one ideology (liberalism) won.

Nevertheless, in order for this victory to be justified and lasting, it inevitably requires a somewhat changed ideological framework so that it can be further reinforced and imposed as an established fact of political common sense, a promoter of “common interests”. These particular interests are no longer (or no longer mean) the interests of a specific society but supposedly represent the interests of all Mankind!

This established fact of the new real-liberal discourse, which has, in the meantime, become the Great Guiding Principle of the “free” and “liberated” world, is concentrated in the ideological triangle of contemporary liberalism which is formed by some exceedingly vague concepts such as

human rights, multiculturalism, democracy, and so forth. The relations between them are such that one is conditioned by the other(s); at the same time, whoever threatens the equilaterality of the triangle through action or inaction is to be considered a global Enemy jeopardizing the world order and its basic values.

Our historical time rests on this ideological matrix which, like Anaxagoras' homoiomerous parts, contains a portion of every previous variety of Modernity.

It would seem that the determinants of the classical modern ideological pair of opposites – liberalism and socialism – which used to be mortal enemies, have blended the most. Their derivatives today form a specific eclectic mix that we have, for the purposes of this text, termed *real-liberalism*, though with a necessary degree of dissociation. This is, therefore, not a new (say “postmodern”) ideology, but above all a new political reality that inevitably draws legitimacy from old values randomly mixed and scattered within a joint historical framework.

One of the more important characteristics of this “new political age” is the general rejection or at least the greatest possible suppression of everything specific or *national* – from national identity (as the basis of state sovereignty) to the individual self-identification of the members of a community. The unconvincing and unfair equation of national and nationalist¹¹, has resulted in a peculiar glorification of democracy as universal – a mandatory value “in itself” capable of turning wood into iron and, if need be, of doing the reverse.

¹¹ This is why Svetozar Stojanović rightfully makes a distinction between what he calls nationality (*nacionalstvo*) and nationalism. Nationality is defined as “giving precedence to one’s own nation over a foreign one in a conflict of interests, rights, values, simply because it is one’s own, even though both have the same position and meet the same criterion”. Nationality represents “mass, normal, and benign group bias and the starting point of every realistic conception of society and societal practice”. By contrast, nationalism represents favouring one nation over another “by applying double standards even though they are both in the same position”. A nationalist thus violates the ethical principle of universalization which excludes “double standards”. See **Stojanović, Svetozar**. *Nacija, nacionalizam i građanizam* [Nation, nationalism and citizenism], Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju [Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory], Belgrade, February – June 1999 (manuscript in preparation).

By establishing liberal democracy as a *value system* which rejects everything specific (read: national) and transcends its earlier *procedural* purpose, real-liberalism promotes a virtually empty ideological-moralizing set which can be filled with diverse content – should the need arise.

The ideological “logic” is the following: given that democracy is the most developed in the freest among the free countries, the USA is necessarily the one to act as the leader of the new (postliberal) order – whatever it may be. In this way, common goals (“Mankind”) and specific interests (the USA) are intentionally confused in a way that has seen an endless array of variations throughout history. The vital interest of the USA, as the global Winner in the global struggle for absolute supremacy and the only truly sovereign state at present, is to portray its leading and practically dictatorial (if not tyrannical) role in international affairs as a sort of a *disinterested endeavour to create a world beyond specific “limitations” or beyond national sovereignty*.

In other words, an *absolute sovereignty*, the sovereignty of the most powerful, does not tolerate the existence of individual powers, let alone an order which limits its dominance. In order for this supremacy over everything and everybody not to be too conspicuous, potentially provoking resistance, the ruling global elite has rationally concluded that it is in their “best interest” to act according to an old, tried and tested ideological pattern: proclaim that which is specific general and present (and address) your problem as a global concern.

From this perspective, it becomes clear why the historical system of real-liberalism cannot and should not have one *conspicuous* leader. Instead of One de facto leader, there is now a *multitude* in the form of an alliance of liberal-minded countries advocating the liberty of all people and prepared for self-sacrifice to achieve that goal. This is one of the reasons why real-liberalism is in principle no longer prepared to accept the national sovereignty of individual states – including, paradoxically, even the Winner himself as the champion of the “new world order”. And this is why the latest (and unfortunately almost certainly not the last) Balkan war did not end in the usual way – with a clear distinction between the victorious and the defeated party.

Never before had a war ended in a “tie”, even seemingly. Someone *had to win*, at least temporarily; by virtue of things, the other party had to

lose. Instead of this differentiation, which is necessary in order for a war to *truly end*, the latest Balkan war resulted in some type of a transitional state of “divided sovereignty” and a state of the achieved goals of the “campaign” in which even the undoubtedly defeated party was left to interpret its defeat in whatever way it pleased.

The winner in the war which was *de facto* waged *for and against sovereignty* almost refused to acknowledge the victory. Why? If it had “won”, that would have meant that it admitted to really waging a war (not an insipid “air campaign”) and, more importantly, to defeating the opponent, meaning that it now had to pass the final verdict.

Yet, in a seemingly “decisive moment”, NATO donned the robe of the UN, entered Kosovo and introduced its troops, laws and institutions, unfortunately without ensuring the safety of Serbs in that area, at the same time “confirming the resolve not to alter the borders” and claiming to recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY (!?).¹²

The concept of sovereignty was thus been devoid of all meaning, while the Winner was openly and symptomatically cynical in recognizing the preservation of the opponent’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity” by *de facto* occupying a part of his “sovereign territory” (under the name of the neutral UN)! The defeated party was to be satisfied because it could have lost everything and even have been completely destroyed.

In this way, it was left with the hope that even if it was not six of one (defeat, occupation) that it was certainly half a dozen of the other (“victory”, “sovereignty”)!

This solution, which seems to have “satisfied everyone”, hides the secret of new global rules in the struggle for power: the intellectually and politically deplorable decision-makers and the immeasurable misery of those who are affected by the “compromises” of (trans)national and/or (new) democratic elites.

¹² This could be interpreted in the following way: someone cuts off your hand and then attaches it to the body of someone else. However, the “surgeon” keeps assuring you that the severed hand truly belongs to you and to you alone; it does not matter that you cannot see it, for you can surely feel it “as if it were there”. The imaginary hand on your body, that wound that keeps hurting, will have its imaginary life while the real (severed) hand will serve another person’s body, while the complexity of its movements will be decided on by the surgeon.

Obviously, when air-raid sirens in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Podgorica, and other cities and towns in Serbia and Montenegro marked “the beginning of danger of aerial attacks” and when “smart” and not so smart bombs began falling on the citizens of Yugoslavia, those who initiated the bombing had already formulated the justification. The ideological legitimacy for the devastating “campaign” could also be found in numerous earlier expert discussions – ethical and similar, but less subtle, military discussions – on the so-called *humanitarian intervention*. The humanists of the postmodern age, those sophists of real-liberalism (this motley group easily includes postmodernists but also their opponents such as Habermas¹³), absorbed in “soft truths” and worried about the dark islands existing in the sea of bright freedom, “mused casually”, albeit aware of the conscience and moral responsibility of mankind, and came to the conclusion that if “human rights” were being violated on a massive scale by a country’s regime and it was not possible to prevent this, then the “international community” had a duty to take the appropriate steps to put an end to it.

The government undertaking criminal activities, therefore, would have to be punished, freeing the oppressed (usually ethnic minorities) from the terror.

This position would be defensible but for those “darn details” that emerge when the principles adopted by consensus or general agreement are further elaborated. When we venture *beyond* this basis, what remains

¹³ In his examination of the war in Yugoslavia (see *Die Zeit*, No. 18, 1999), Habermas characteristically hesitated and offered numerous arguments for and against, but nevertheless came to the conclusion that the intervention had been and remained necessary. In truth, as Habermas noted, the moralizing braggadocio of the USA that “plays an instrumentalized role of the hegemonic guarantor of peace” left a bitter taste in one’s mouth, but this was the lesser evil compared to the prospect of jeopardizing what this philosopher of communicative action held the most important: “the cosmopolitan state/society” and the “citizen of the world”. Apparently, when it comes to defending their own ideological position and their work, the greatest philosophers (writers, humanists, and so forth) unbearably easily, even lightly, assume the vague positions of “a wider perspective”, such as “Humanity”, “the Cosmopolitan State”, “Human Rights”, and so forth from which even the infamous NATO’s “colletaral damage” seems less dramatic and somehow equally acceptable to the conscience and mind of considerate and mindful intellectuals.

is “only” to determine *who* decides whether an armed or military intervention is needed, and *where* and *when* this decision is to be made? When and if this decision is made through democratic institutions and procedures, a decision still needs to be made on *who* needs to act on this and *to what extent*.

Finally, even when the decision is made that an intervention by “international community” is inevitable beyond any doubt and when the party “obligated” to conduct it has been determined, it is necessary to determine the procedure and subjects that will decide on *when to end the intervention*.

The questions multiply in geometric progression: when does, for example, the intervention truly end – when the “government undertaking criminal activities” capitulates, when the country is occupied (the whole country or just a part of its territory?) or perhaps when the government changes the problematic laws and ends its current practice? Moreover: how is a war against a “government” to be waged without murdering (innocent?) citizens? Are, perhaps, these citizens already guilty by virtue of being alive and having a government?

Furthermore, if the government is not manipulating the votes its citizens, does this mean that they should be denied the right to vote after the intervention (until they are “politically mature”?) or is it perhaps more appropriate to “liberate” them of the state so that they can communicate with the international community and/or its Sovereign without impediments and, as the expression used in monarchies went, without “an intermediary”?

Be that as it may, all of these and many more questions that we cannot elaborate on here¹⁴ demand a lot of time, energy and financial resources to be politically operationalized while their outcome is exceedingly

¹⁴ Part of their operationalization on the case of the NATO war against the FRY was summarized by Zagorka Golubović in the article “Rat NATO-a protiv Jugoslavije i budućnost Srbije [NATO war against Yugoslavia and the future of Serbia]”, Republika, Belgrade, 218–219/1999, where the author provides an analysis of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research and demonstrates that democracy simply cannot be introduced by means of bombs. The consequences of such a way of “thinking” and especially of the resulting action are disastrous both for the victim and the “merciful angel” i.e. the aggressor (in terms of its declared intentions and long-term interests).

difficult to predict. What if, for example, the decision-makers – the public in a referendum or members of parliament of the countries belonging to the “international community” – decide that a military intervention is not necessary after all?

What if the “bad guys” win while these decisions are being made, rendering the entire effort meaningless? What if the threatened “minority” becomes as aggressive as the “majority”?¹⁵ And finally, what if those whose minority, and yet “universal”, “human rights” are threatened begin to exterminate their alleged exterminators? What if a minority turns into the majority and identifies with the opponent? Against whom should the “intervention” be and how long should it last in this case? The list of questions is endless.

Evidently, if such (unpleasant) matters (questions and interventions marked by scepticism) are to be avoided, it is necessary to have a powerful, quick and operational “transnational” organization capable of independent and timely decisions on the life and death of states i.e. on global justice and injustice. The attribute of “independent” means separate from national states while “timely” means in line with the current interests of the only truly sovereign state. In this way, real-liberalism was the first to generate a military organization, NATO, as an *ideological institution* – a real end-of-the-millennium “liberal” pseudo-Comintern!

This shows that the ideological matrix of Modernity functions through major moves and global institutions. Of course, it is understandably impossible to use “neutral” terms, “objectively” and “devoid of ideology”, when discussing decisive issues – Truth, Justice and the Welfare of Mankind.

On the other hand, whoever passes judgement on justice, good and evil in the modern age...must necessarily be immersed in one of its ideological matrices that govern thought and action. The newly built matrix

¹⁵ The example of Kosovo Albanians speaks volumes on the topic even though it is now easy for “spiritual shepherds” to interpret it as the ugly but “inevitable revenge”, as a lack of democratic tradition and tolerance, and so forth. It will be interesting to see if any of the intellectuals siding with NATO will have any words of criticism for the current mass racist actions of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia and the probably authoritarian, if not totalitarian, arrangement of inter-Albanian affairs in Kosovo in near and distant future.

of real-liberalism satisfies different participants in the game and gives opportunities for manipulation that those who entered the struggle for global domination at the beginning of the 20th century could only have dreamed about.

As far as Serbia is concerned, the goal of neo-liberal actors, both globally and locally, is its essential denationalization. In the alleged fight against “personal regimes”, the real fight is the one for the depersonalization or *desubstantialization* of Serbia and for a European, and therefore global, order of *eunuch states*.

Thus, instead of seeing Serbia as a user of liberal values, as a country which can be different but not bereft of recognition, we are entering a labyrinth of self-negation and radical refutations. The concept of neo-liberalism is not the concept of future but of its obfuscation. If Serbia has a future, it will most certainly not be the Second but the future of Serbia.

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