

## THE TEMPORALITY OF DEIFICATION: MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR'S EVER- MOVING REPOSE

What is the *temporality of deification*, what becomes of *motion* and *time* when a person becomes deified? This article represents the third part of a wider project dedicated to the reconstruction of Maximus the Confessor's conception of temporality as a *threefold* Maximian theory of time,<sup>1</sup> in which *time* (χρόνος),<sup>2</sup> the *Aeon* (αἰών)<sup>3</sup> and the *ever-moving repose* (στάσις ἀεκίνητος) form three distinct *modes* of temporality. According to the analysis that precedes this article's focus in the publications cited, temporality is a primary characteristic of createdness and is actualized in two different modes, time (χρόνος) and the Aeon (αἰών). Time is the numbering and delimitation of motion, temporality as perceived within sensible creation—as well as the reflection of the Aeon in the world of motion, *as we know and perceive it*. The Aeon is time deprived of motion, and the temporality of the intelligible side of creation's delimitation. The uncreated is not merely atemporal in the sense of not being either in time or in the Aeon, but is beyond any conception of temporality and createdness whatsoever—the very notion of a „temporality of the uncreated“ is considered as a contradiction in itself.

However, while there is no temporality of the uncreated, we can speak of the temporality of deification, or at least pose the question concerning it—i.e., the question of what happens in a person's *motion* and *temporality* when it reaches deification. The ecclesial community and Maximus the Confessor, as a potent articulator thereof, testify that it is possible for the

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<sup>1</sup> As reflected in my doctoral thesis, Mitralaxis, „Ever-Moving Repose: The notion of time in Maximus the Confessor's philosophy“ (footnotes contain short versions of cited works; see the bibliography for full entries).

<sup>2</sup> A first attempt at this has been published in Mitralaxis, „A Note on the Definition of χρόνος“ and in Mitralaxis, „Can we trace a comprehensive theory of time in Maximus the Confessor's work?“

<sup>3</sup> See Mitralaxis, „Maximus the Confessor's ‚Aeon‘ as a Distinct Mode of Temporality.“

human person to be *deified*,<sup>4</sup> that it is possible for created human beings to actualize in themselves (to hypostasize) the *mode* of the uncreated, the *mode* of freedom from every and any limitation of createdness.<sup>5</sup> Man's nature –

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<sup>4</sup>The subject of deification in general and the notion of deification in Maximus the Confessor in particular is too big of a subject to be exhaustively examined and analyzed here. Even a comprehensive introduction to it would be a major digression and outside the scope of this study. An excellent monograph on the subject is Russell's *Doctrine of Deification*, which dedicates a chapter to Maximus the Confessor's understanding of deification (262–295)—while more or less every major scholar engaged with Maximus has contributed to the subject as well. See also Larchet's *La Divinisation* and Thunberg's *Microcosm and Mediator*, 427–432. The general idea is that while participation in the divine and uncreated *substance* is absolutely impossible, a participation in the uncreated *activities* of that substance is indeed attainable (and always, of course, in its created activities i.e. created beings as well). This participation can result in the (still created) nature of a human person being hypostasized (actualized) through uncreated activities and thus (conjoining a λόγος of created being with a mode of uncreated existence) being granted uncreatedness, liberation from the constraints and limitations of createdness by participation in the hypostasis of Christ, where a coexistence of created and uncreated nature in one hypostasis has been made possible. This cannot be an achievement of the created human being, but a gift of God, granted by his grace and ἔρωσ for the human person. In Maximus' own voice, *Amb.Io.*, 1076C: „[the human image of God] rather becomes God by deification” — *Amb. Io.*, 1084C, “By this blessed inversion, man is made God by deification and God is made man by hominization” — *Amb.Io.*, 1088C, „In this way, man as a whole will be divinized, being made God by the grace of God who became man. Man will remain wholly man in soul and body, owing to his nature, but will become wholly God in soul and body owing to the grace and the splendor of the blessed glory of God, which is wholly appropriate to him, and beyond which nothing more splendid or sublime can be imagined.” (transl. Constas). — *Q.Thal. I*, 22.35f.: „[God] having completely realized this deification in those who are worthy” (transl. Blowers). Deification does not reflect the restoration of the κατὰ φύσιν, it is not man's restored and perfected nature but is *beyond nature*, ὑπέρ φύσιν, cf. *Amb.Io.*, 1237AB: „For the grace of deification is completely unconditioned, because it finds no faculty or capacity of any sort within nature that could receive it, for if it did, it would no longer be grace but the manifestation of a natural activity latent within the potentiality of nature. And thus, again, what takes place would no longer be marvelous if deification occurred simply in accordance with the receptive capacity of nature. Indeed it would rightly be a work of nature, and not a gift of God, and a person so divinized would be God by nature and would have to be called so in the proper sense. For natural potential in each and every being is nothing other than the unalterable movement of nature toward complete actuality. How, then, deification could make the divinized person go out of himself, I fail to see, if it was something that lay within the bounds of his nature.” (transl. Constas).

<sup>5</sup> The *mode* of the uncreated being relation, self-transcendence, ἔρωσ, love (where „God is love” [1 John 4,8] is taken as an ontological definition), a „being”

the λόγος of his substance— remains unchanged in deification, i.e. remains created and human, but his actual realization and hypostasis, his person—the τρόπος (mode) of his existence— is deified, actualized in the mode of the uncreated *in every respect*: „Then God will also completely fulfill the goal of his mystical work of deifying humanity in every respect, of course, short of an identity of substance with God; and he will assimilate humanity to himself.”<sup>6</sup> So, while we cannot enquire on the inexistent „temporality of the uncreated,” we have to ask: *what happens to temporality in deification*, what is the state of temporality in θέωσις? The Aeon is certainly not the „temporality of deification”: it signifies the deprivation of motion, the cessation of movement, the endurance and seeming changelessness of the intelligible— not the hypostatization (actualization) of a created nature in uncreated activities, not the direct participation of the created in the uncreated. The human person does not merely „enter the Aeon” in deification; deification indicates the transcendence of motionlessness and the Aeon, both of which are categories stemming from the perspective of createdness.

Maximus the Confessor does not formulate an elaborate doctrine on the ever-moving repose, nor does he designate the στάσις ἀεικίνητος as the state of motion in deification in the context of a systematic analysis or concise exposition of these matters. However, in searching the Maximian *corpus* for scattered indications on the state of motion and temporality in deification, his references to the „ever-moving repose” and „stationary movement” of the deified human being are most illuminating and characteristic of his perspective on the matter.

A word of caution on the linguistic aspect of our enquiry: Maximus’ philosophical language is inherently apophatic (both in cases of negation and affirmation). Formulations and signifiers do not claim to be identical with their signified realities and to exhaust them, language can only *point* to truth, it is not truth itself. However, this is even more the case when Maximus refers to deification and to the uncreated. In referring to them, Maximus attempts to signify something *beyond* the limits of our world, beyond the limits of createdness— and as such, *beyond* the limits of language. The fact that we can only look „through a glass, darkly” (1 Corinthians 13:12) prompts the Confessor to use a markedly poetic language in order to „circumscribe” and „delimit” the merging of created nature and substance with the mode of the uncreated. In this language, contradictory phrases like „ever-moving repose” or „stationary movement” are not mere rhetorical devices, but an attempt to signify a reality beyond the divisions, dualities

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that is defined in-relation-to (the *Father* to the *Son* etc.), and the *mode* of („fallen”) createdness being individual atomicity, nonrelation, death.

<sup>6</sup>Q.Thal. I, 22.40–44 (transl. Blowers).

and dichotomies of createdness (in this case: beyond motion and fixity alike). Before examining these passages, a clarification of deification being a renewal of the mode of existence but not of the λόγος of nature is needed.

## Renewing the τρόπος, Retaining the λόγος

Maximus and the Patristic tradition insist that θέωσις is a *real* deification of man's hypostasis and actual existence (not an either symbolic or incomplete „elevation“ of man to a very high state within createdness), the actualization of a human person through uncreated activities *in every respect*—without, however, an identification *in substance and nature*; man's substance and nature remains created and human,<sup>7</sup> but the human person is hypostasized (actualized) according to the *mode* of the uncreated. In explaining this, the Confessor analyzes the profound change—and distance from substantial/natural predeterminations— that can be effected in the actual existence and hypostasis, in the mode of existence (arriving at the „beyond nature,“ τὸ ὑπὲρ φύσιν)<sup>8</sup> without changing the unchangeable λόγος of substance/nature. This is not a theory that has been elaborated by Maximus in order to explain deification *per se*; it is rather his general view of the λόγος-τρόπος distinction, one application of which is his explication of the state of deification.

According to the Confessor, the renewal or innovation of a being that constitutes a real difference and distance from its nature (from the predeterminations of its substance) is not only possible, but also capable

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<sup>7</sup> Note how in *Amb.Io.*, 1308BC, Maximus stresses that the deified human person „becomes completely whatever God is, save at the level of an identity in substance“ (simultaneously deifying creation by assimilating it in God, in whom it will be „wholly interpenetrated“) by thrice using words signifying wholeness, completeness and totality in a row, i.e. ὅλος, ὅλω and ὀλικῶς, ὅλος ὅλω περιχωρήσας ὀλικῶς τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ γενόμενος πᾶν εἶ τί πέρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, χωρὶς τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ταυτότητος.

<sup>8</sup> Maximus repeatedly clarifies that deification is not our return to the „pre-Fallen“ κατὰ φύσιν, but something *beyond* nature. Cf. *Q.Thal. I*, 22.90–92: „We shall become that which in no way results from our ability according to nature, since our human nature has no faculty for grasping what transcends nature (τοῦ ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἢ φύσις καταληπτικὴν οὐ κέκτεται δύναμιν)“ (transl. Blowers). This attainment *beyond nature* cannot be an achievement of the created human person, but only a gift from the uncreated God, for nature cannot reach to what resides beyond itself, *Q.Thal. I*, 22.94–98, „Intrinsically it is only by the grace of God that deification is bestowed proportionately on created beings. Grace alone illuminates human nature with supernatural light, and, by the superiority of its glory, elevates our nature above its proper limits in excess of glory“ (transl. Blowers).

of reaching beyond the limits of its substance/nature itself.<sup>9</sup> This renewal and innovation according to the *mode of existence* is more of a common occurrence than an exception within existence: it is this *mode of existence* that manifests the difference of the hypostasis from its substance as a real difference and not as a superficial phenomenon.<sup>10</sup> Maximus writes:

Every innovation, generally speaking, takes place in relation to the mode of whatever is being innovated [περὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ καινοτομουμένου πράγματος], not in relation to its λόγος of nature, because when a λόγος is innovated it effectively results in the destruction of nature, since the nature in question no longer possesses inviolate the λόγος according to which it exists. When, however, the mode is innovated –so that the λόγος of nature is preserved inviolate– it manifests a wondrous power, for it displays nature being acted on and acting outside the limits of its own laws [ὡς τὴν φύσιν ἐνεργουμένην τε καὶ ἐνεργοῦσαν ὑπὲρ τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀποδεικνύς δηλονότι θεσμόν].<sup>11</sup>

The mode is innovated by the very existence of the being of which it is a mode of existence,<sup>12</sup> for it is actualized in otherness; the question that remains is how far-reaching this innovation is in any given case. Maximus asserts that this innovation/actualization can even „display nature being acted on and acting outside the limits of its own laws,” thereby manifesting „wondrous power.” However, even in that case, the λόγος of nature and nature itself remain intact,<sup>13</sup> for the subsistence of nature and of its inviolate

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<sup>9</sup> Maximus’ understanding of the innovation through the *mode of existence*, transcending the substance while leaving it intact, reminds us of existentialism’s distinction between *being* and *existing*.

<sup>10</sup> For example, in the case of humanity we term *mode* the way in which the common human nature is actualized (ἐνεργεῖται) into a specific human person, manifesting change and otherness without modifying nature itself, *Amb.Io.*, 1341D: „Now the λόγος of human nature is that it consists of soul and body, and this nature consists of a rational soul and body, whereas its mode is the order whereby it naturally acts and is acted upon (τρόπος δὲ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖσθαι φυσικῶς τάξις ἐστίν), frequently alternating and changing, without however in any way changing nature along with it” (transl. Conostas).

<sup>11</sup> *Amb.Io.*, 1341D.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Amb.Th.*, 5.117–119: „We know that the λόγος of being (ὁ τοῦ εἶναι λόγος) is one thing, and the mode of existence (ὁ τοῦ πῶς εἶναι τρόπος) is another; the λόγος is confirmed with respect to nature, while the τρόπος is confirmed with respect to the economy.”

<sup>13</sup> The λόγοι cannot change, for they are motionless, being uncreated and beyond temporality as intentions and wills of God. However, they are perceived as being in motion in their disclosure through the beings of which they are the λόγοι,

λόγος is a prerequisite for the existence of a being *as itself*, for the existence of a being as participating in a given mode of natural homogeneity. This general principle applies to deification as well, the difference being that it is the existence of the hypostasis of Christ (the actualization of created and uncreated natures in one person and hypostasis) that enables such a far-reaching innovation of the *mode* to take place.

This, the λόγος-τρόπος distinction, is the hermeneutic basis of Maximus' explication of deification: the τρόπος is granted divine uncreatedness, the λόγος remains created and human. To be more precise: the *mode* of the uncreated is actualized (ἐνεργεῖται) on the basis of a created and human nature. However, the reader would do well to resist the temptation of reifying either the λόγος or the τρόπος. A contradistinction of these two is only conceivable in the case of λόγος οὐσίας and τρόπος ὑπάρξεως, i.e. principle/λόγος of substance and mode of existence, pertaining to the substance and the hypostasis respectively. Apart from this specific context, and given that Maximus utilizes these terms with differences in meaning that are not always subtle, we could even say that the concept of the τρόπος in general is a λόγος of relations: an outcome of relations like the λόγος/ratio of a mathematical division. And that each λόγος<sup>14</sup> is also a τρόπος: a mode of existing as a divine utterance and intention. Both the λόγος and the τρόπος are equally indispensable, equally vital in disclosing truth, and the importance of neither of them is to be underestimated.<sup>15</sup> The substance and the hypostasis, their λόγος and τρόπος as well as the crucial role of created and uncreated activities (ἐνέργειαι) alike provide the semantic frame in which the possibility of deification is ontologically described. However, this does not suffice to provide us with the necessary explanation concerning the state of motion and temporality in deification: we must examine the notion of στάσις ἀεικίνητος, the „ever-moving repose.“

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created beings which are of course in motion. In relation to the actualization of their corresponding creatures in motion, they emerge as being in motion themselves. Cf. *Amb.Io.*, 1228BC: „What human being, as I have said, can know the intelligible λόγοι of beings as they are in themselves, and how they are distinct from each other? Who can grasp how they have an immovable, natural rest, and a natural movement that prevents them from being transformed into one another? Or how they have rest in motion, and — what is even more paradoxical — their motion in rest?“ (transl. Conostas).

<sup>14</sup>The λόγοι are not only λόγοι of natures/substances, but λόγοι of everything: *Amb.Io.*, 1228D: „What, in turn, is the λόγος that underlies each particular substance, nature, species, form, compound, potential, actuality, and passivity?“ (transl. Conostas).

<sup>15</sup>Cf. *Amb.Io.*, 1136BC: „Thence they are taught the divinely-perfect and saving meaning concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to which they are hiddenly illuminated that the meaning of the cause is not simply that of being but are reverently initiated about the mode of existence“ (transl. Louth).

## A Third Mode of Motion and Temporality: στάσις ἀεικίνητος

The notion of στάσις ἀεικίνητος emerges primarily in two questions of Maximus' *Ad Thalassium*,<sup>16</sup> in passages concerning deification or the process towards deification. In both cases, it is explicitly related not only to motion, but to temporality as well.

Maximus' reasoning unfolds with the assertion that motion is changing the beings that are in motion, and that this change is a fundamental trait of createdness. However, when nature will be conjoined with the Λόγος in motionlessness, this change will cease along with the motion that is causing it.<sup>17</sup> The relative and finite repose that signifies the completion of the beings' motion is to take place within the „presence of the boundless fixity” signifying the uncreated; it is within this fixity that the beings' repose naturally occurs.<sup>18</sup> The difference between the motionlessness of creatures and the motionlessness of the uncreated is that creatures, i.e. beings that are finite by nature, possess a motion that changes what they are, and it is the cessation of that motion that results in their kind of motionlessness—while we cannot know any changing motion in the uncreated (for it is not finite), resulting in an „absolute” motionlessness or rather a kind of motionlessness beyond the mere cessation of motion.<sup>19</sup> It is in this context that Maximus formulates his definition of time, according to which creation is „a finite space and a circumscribed fixity, while time is the circumscription of motion: as a consequence, life's motion changes the beings that are subjected to it”<sup>20</sup>—linking life, motion and time to *change*, which can either be the change of corruption or the change of transformation. Up to this point, Maximus describes the state of motion and time within creation and as subjected to createdness; however, he goes on to describe the ὑπὲρ φύσιν state and the transformation that it effects on motion and temporality.

Maximus writes that when nature transcends space (τόπον) and time (χρόνον), i.e. the dimensions of createdness comprized of the finite motion and repose *by activity* (κατ' ἐνέργειαν), it will be joined with

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<sup>16</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 59.122–159 and 65.509–553. It is also mentioned in *Opusc.*, PG91 185A, as the state following the motionlessness resulting from the *completion of yearning*, a state in which death is conquered: πόθου τε πλήρωσιν εἰληφώς, τὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ποθουμένου τελείαν ἐκνίκησιν, καὶ παύλαν κινήσεως τὴν ἀεικίνητον στάσιν, καθ' ἣν ὁ πάλαι τῆς φύσεως κρατήσας ἐξαφανίζεται θάνατος, οὐχ ἡττωμένης τούτῳ διὰ παραβάσεως.

<sup>17</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 65.522–524.

<sup>18</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 65.525–528.

<sup>19</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 65.528–532.

<sup>20</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 65.532–535.

divinity („the Providence”) in all immediacy and directness (ἀμέσως συναφθῆ τῆ προνοίᾳ). In doing so, divinity (the προνοία, Providence) will be encountered and disclosed as a naturally simple, single and motionless λόγος, completely devoid of any circumscription and motion.<sup>21</sup> The first thing to be noted here is that the absolute immediacy and directness of the described union, as well as the disclosure of divinity as devoid of any motion and delimitation whatsoever, point to the annihilation of *distance*.<sup>22</sup> The absence of *any* delimitation whatsoever and the absence of motion beyond its mere cessation do not merely signify an annulment of *distance*, but an existential annihilation thereof, *transforming* both motion and temporality. Neither motionless nor the Aeon are applicable signifiers for this state, for it transcends their constitutive definitions and delimitations.

Maximus proceeds to make this distinction himself: „Because of that, as long as nature exists *in time* (ὑπάρχουσα χρονικῶς) within creation, it possesses a motion capable of effecting change due to the finite fixity of creation and the corruption that is caused by the passage of time.”<sup>23</sup> However, „when nature arrives at God, because of the natural singularity of the One in whom it was created, *it will acquire an ever-moving repose and a stationary movement* eternally actualized in conjunction with the One and Single and Same. This ever-moving repose and stationary movement is known by the Λόγος as a direct and permanent firmness around the first cause of everything that has been created by the first cause”<sup>24</sup>—the use of πεποιημένων<sup>25</sup> indicating a *personal* first cause, a person that creates. Maximus clarifies this notion of the infinity *around* God in a passage from the *Ambigua ad Ioannem*, in which he notes that „infinity is around God,

<sup>21</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 65.535–541.

<sup>22</sup> The annihilation of *distance* is described by Maximus as follows, *Th.oec.*, 1165B–2.86, „It is the fulfillment of those who are moved by a longing for the ultimate object of desire. When they reach it they receive a special kind of repose from all movement, *because they will require no further time or period to go through* (ὡς μηκέτι χρόνου τινός ὄντος αὐτῶν ἢ αἰῶνος τοῦ διαβαθῆναι ὀφείλοντος) since at the completion of these they arrive at God who is before all Aeons and whom the very nature of time cannot approach” (transl. Berthold).

<sup>23</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 65.541–544: Διόπερ ἐν μὲν τῷ κόσμῳ ὑπάρχουσα χρονικῶς ἡ φύσις ἀλλοιωτὴν ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου πεπερασμένην στάσιν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ἑτεροίωσιν τοῦ χρόνου φορᾶν.

<sup>24</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 65.544–549: ἐν δὲ τῷ θεῷ γινομένη διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ γέγονε μονάδα, στάσιν ἀεικίνητον ἔξει καὶ στάσιμον ταυτοκινησίαν, περὶ τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν καὶ μόνον αἰδίως γινομένην, ἣν οἶδεν ὁ λόγος ἄμεσον εἶναι περὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πεποιημένων μόνιμον ἴδρυσιν. Note the use of αἰδίως, not αἰωνίως.

<sup>25</sup> Participle stemming the verb ποιέω-ποιῶ, „I create.”



but it is not God himself, for he incomparably transcends even this”:<sup>26</sup> describing the ones united with God as being *around* God can be understood as describing their non-dissolution in divinity, i.e. the fact that they retain their otherness even when enjoying the fullness of communion with divinity. Back in *Ad Thalassium*, the Confessor goes on to clarify that in this union of created nature with the Λόγος and divine Providence *in all immediacy and directness* „there is nothing at all that manifests generation and time.”<sup>27</sup> The beings that are conjoined with the uncreated and thereby transformed are not merely liberated from time, but also from something that has already happened, i.e. their generation: while retaining their otherness and not dissolving into divinity, they become liberated even from the fact that they have had a generation, a Maximian statement that greatly emphasizes the reality of the freedom from predeterminations thus attained.<sup>28</sup>

Maximus chooses to construct a terminology pertaining to motion when describing deification and union with God and when writing about the *ever-moving repose* and the *stationary movement* of the ones that will be joined with divinity in all immediacy and directness. It is this terminology that describes the created-uncreated communion as an event *beyond* motion (or even beyond the cessation/negation of motion) and *beyond* temporality in both its modes as time and the Aeon. As every definition of the Maximian modes of temporality has motion (or the absence of motion) as its component, it follows that the concept of the ever-moving repose is to be considered as the distinct mode of both motion and temporality in deification. If time is „the numbering of motion,” „the Aeon, when measured in its movement” and the Aeon is „time deprived of motion,” then the ever-moving repose and stationary movement around God is the „immediacy and directness” of their communion, the annihilation of *distance*—and not merely its cessation. Describing this state as a „direct and permanent firmness” around God entails that it is not a fleeting event or a temporary phenomenon, but an existential possibility that is a vital component of the ontological totality of existence as encompassing both created reality and its uncreated source and cause.

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<sup>26</sup> *Amb.Io.*, 1220C: „[which is known only to] the One who grants this ineffable grace to the worthy, that is, it is known only to God, and to those who in the future will come to experience it, when all things will be free from all change and alteration, when the endless, multiform movement of beings around particular objects will come to an end in the infinity that is around God, in which all things that are in motion will come to rest. For infinity is around God, but it is not God Himself, for He incomparably transcends even this.” (transl. Conostas).

<sup>27</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 65.549–553, and particularly: καθ’ ἣν οὐδεμία τὸ παράπαν ἐστὶ χρόνου καὶ γενέσεως ἔμφασις.

<sup>28</sup> Reminding us of Maximus’ reference to Melchizedek.

Furthermore, Maximus repeatedly locates this transformation in the *future*,<sup>29</sup> stressing the implicit transcendental temporality of this state, both when referring to the possibility of the person's deification and when referring to the common eschatological „end of the ages.“ Truth, both as the arrival at the *κατὰ φύσιν* and its transcendence towards the *ὑπὲρ φύσιν*, resides in the *future*, not in the present or past. We will examine what this entails in the subchapter concerning the „eighth day,“ as the very notion of *future* is relevant and applicable only in one of the three modes of temporality, i.e. time (*χρόνος*); neither in the Aeon nor in the utterly transcendental ever-moving repose.

### The Ever-Moving Repose of Acquiring Uncreatedness by Participation

In another passage,<sup>30</sup> Maximus attempts to describe this transformation beyond the limits of language with a torrent of descriptions and definitions which he equates with one another, literally trying to „circumscribe“ and point towards what cannot be *defined*. In doing this, the interrelation of his descriptions and definitions is truly revealing, with the concept of the ever-moving repose and stationary movement providing the basis of an understanding of deification in the context of motion as a primary characteristic of existence. Maximus begins by writing that the salvation and fulfillment (*σωτηρία*) of the souls is the end, goal and completion of faith, which in turn is the true disclosure of the object of faith.<sup>31</sup> The true disclosure of the object of faith is the ineffable interpenetration of the believer by the object of faith, according to the measure of the believer's faith.<sup>32</sup> This interpenetration is the return of the believer to his cause and beginning at the end and goal of his journey<sup>33</sup>—which, in turn, is described as the fulfillment of desire.<sup>34</sup> *And the fulfillment of desire is the ever-moving repose of those that desire around the object of desire.*<sup>35</sup> This ever-moving repose is the perpetual, eternal, dimensionless (and, as such, devoid of distance)

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<sup>29</sup> For example, see the above mentioned passage *Amb.Io.*, 1220C: „to those who in the future will come to experience it [...]“

<sup>30</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 59.122–159.

<sup>31</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 59.122–124.

<sup>32</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 59.124–126.

<sup>33</sup> Which in itself has connotations concerning temporality, as it signifies the liberation from the flow and progression of time and from the flow and progression of events as well.

<sup>34</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 59.126–130.

<sup>35</sup> *Q.Thal. II*, 59.130–131: ἐφέσεως δὲ πλήρωσις ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὸ ἐφετὸν τῶν ἐφιμεμένων ἀεικίνητος στάσις·

enjoyment of the object of desire, which in turn is *the participation in divinity beyond nature*.<sup>36</sup> This participation constitutes the likeness of the ones that participate to the one that is participated, i.e. the attainable identification of the ones that participate with the one that is participated *through the activities* (κατ' ἐνέργειαν) due to this likeness.<sup>37</sup> This is the *deification* of those that are worthy thereof.<sup>38</sup> Maximus hastens to link this to temporality: he goes on to say that deification is, „and let me stress my words,” the completion of all „times” and all „Aeons,” of all years and all ages (πάντων τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν αἰώνων) and of everything that is included in them.<sup>39</sup> This completion of all χρόνοι and αἰῶνες and of everything that is included in them constitutes the unceasing and dimensionless (i.e. devoid of *distance*) unity of the true cause and beginning of those that are saved, completed, fulfilled and deified, with their purpose and end.<sup>40</sup> And so on—concluding that this union of the uncreated God with the created human nature by far transcends any conceivable thought or formulation that can be arrived at within createdness.<sup>41</sup>

The third and ultimate mode of motion and temporality is the very transcendence and completion thereof. This ever-moving repose in deification is described as the completion of every possible mode of motion and temporality, „completing time and the Aeon and everything that is included in them.” The whole of creation is recapitulated in the deified person that embodies the completion of communion; the totality of existence is returned to its uncreated source, completing, recapitulating and transcending the fundamental components of createdness: beginning, end, motion and temporality. Humanity’s mediating task is to annihilate all existential divisions (*distances*) and to restore communion „so that they all may be one”:<sup>42</sup> Maximus notes that „the human person is to make the whole of creation perceived through the senses one with itself and undivided

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<sup>36</sup> Q.Thal. II, 59.131–134: ἀεικίνητος δὲ στάσις ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ἔφετοῦ διηνεκῆς τε καὶ ἀδιάστατος ἀπόλαυσις· ἀπόλαυσις δὲ διηνεκῆς καὶ ἀδιάστατος ἢ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν θεῶν καθέστηκε μέθεξις·

<sup>37</sup> Q.Thal. II, 59.134–138: ἢ δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων ὁμοίωσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων δι' ὁμοιότητος ἐνδεχομένη ταυτότης·

<sup>38</sup> Q.Thal. II, 59.138–141: ἢ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ἐνδεχομένη κατ' ἐνέργειαν δι' ὁμοιότητος πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον ταυτότης ἐστὶν ἢ θέωσις τῶν ἀξιουμένων θεώσεως·

<sup>39</sup> Q.Thal. II, 59.141–143: ἢ δὲ θέωσις ἐστὶ καθ' ὑπογραφῆς λόγον πάντων τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν αἰώνων καὶ τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ αἰῶνι περιοχῇ καὶ πέρας·

<sup>40</sup> Q.Thal. II, 59.143–146.

<sup>41</sup> Q.Thal. II, 59.156–159.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. John 17,21: ἵνα πάντες ἐν ᾧσιν.

[ταυτότητα μίαν ποιήσειεν ἀδιαίρετον], not dividing it spatially by intervals [τοις διαστήμασι] in any way.”<sup>43</sup>

The Confessor does not describe this as a subjective and mystical event that is contained and exhausted in the individual, but as a distinct possibility for reality’s mode of existence apart from the mode of the uncreated and the mode of createdness. The possibility of created nature’s hypostatization (actualization) in the mode of the uncreated (*without natural confusion, change, division or separation*) is not merely a „merging” of existential modalities, but a third, distinct mode of being. By its very definition, it does not take place within time i.e. at a certain time, for it *transforms* time: as such, both the „individual” ever-moving repose of the deified person and the „collective” ever-moving repose of creation itself are not wholly different,<sup>44</sup> but nonetheless seemingly situated in a distant and eschatological future<sup>45</sup>—for such a mode of temporality cannot be perceived as time’s „now” by those who do not participate in it. For all intents and purposes, it takes place *at the end of time itself*—i.e., beyond temporality. However, to encounter a deified person is to participate in the presence of this „future” in the present—and to suspect that this „future” is the expected dimensionless present that, in absence of an existential *distance* between the related othernesses in communion, actualizes the *vūn* as the hidden reality of temporality by annihilating the transition from the „before” to the „after.”<sup>46</sup> (By definition,

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<sup>43</sup> *Amb.Io.*, 1305Df. (transl. Louth).

<sup>44</sup> Maximus notes in *Amb.Io.*, 1368C-1369A that human persons are actualized in three different states, the present life, the state after death and the future age to come. The difference is that in this last state „we will partake without any mediation of the most sublime Λόγος of Wisdom, and being transformed in accordance with Him, we will become Gods by grace.” Each of these states can be seen as an icon of the other and a referral to it: εἰκονισθῆναι τῶν εἰρημένων τόπων τόν ιδιότητα.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Plass’ „Transcendent Time in Maximus the Confessor,” 268: „In the incarnation of the timeless Λόγος the perfecting of human nature which lies in the future is also present. [...] But ‘future’ also means the cessation of time, and Maximus can also see the future as the divine plan complete and present as a whole.”

<sup>46</sup> Note also Maximus’ reference to the whole of time and history as „God’s year,” as a singular temporal unit which is only actualized in its completion, *Amb.Io.*, 1357AB: „The year acceptable to the Lord (as Scripture calls it), when understood allegorically, is the entire extension of the ages, beginning from the moment when God was pleased to give substance to beings, and existence to what did not exist” (transl. Constatas) up to the „completion of the ages,” the „end of the λόγος of everything that is in motion” and the granting of the promised deification, as Maximus goes on to say. In *Q.Thal. I*, 9.8–12, Maximus notes -referring to John the Evangelist- that we do not know the exact *mode* of this future deification (τὸν τρόπον τῆς μελλούσης θεώσεως ἠγνοηκέναι λέγει). However, even this distant

these explication can be as concise as phrases like „stationary movement” and „ever-moving repose,” for they are attempts at signifying that which cannot be delimited, residing outside the limits of our world and language. They can only function as hints and indications).

Our conclusion is that in the light of the ever-moving repose, the world’s overall motion is disclosed not as an impersonal cosmological process and function, but as a relationship (between the uncreated and creation in all its „logical” manifestations) that can be either affirmed as returning motion or rejected in a deviation thereof. Temporality *measures* this relationship, the completion of which is the transformation of temporality into an ever-moving repose (the fullness of communion) and the refutation of which is measured as gradual corruption leading to death and inexistence. The complete affirmation of the returning motion, the full actualization of motion as *κατὰ φύσιν*, cannot be understood as resulting in a static motionlessness: this does not describe our experiences of its faint reflections accurately. The fullness of communion<sup>47</sup> and the proximity of the related „logical” othernesses, while presupposing the annihilation of distance and, as such, the ceasing of motion, catapults motion beyond nature and nature beyond motion, *ὕπερ φύσιν*: this can only be circumscribed in language as a motion beyond fixity and a fixity beyond motion, as an „ever-moving repose” and a „stationary movement.” The deified person is accounted as being „beyond the Aeon, time, and space, having God as his space.”<sup>48</sup> We have noted that

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future, this *completion of all ages* is already present, simultaneously *expected* and *already here*, cf. *Q.Thal. I*, 22.60–65, „Or rather, since our Lord Jesus Christ is the beginning [ἀρχή], middle [μεσότης] and the end [τέλος] of all ages, past and future, [it would be fair to say that] *the end of the ages*—specifically that end which will actually come about by grace for the deification of those who are worthy—*has come upon us in potency through faith*” (transl. Blowers).

<sup>47</sup> Maximus employs a language of *ἔρω* when describing this union, *Amb.Io.*, 1073C-1076A: „If it [the *νοῦς*, i.e. the human person beyond its mere perception of the sensible] loves, it certainly suffers an ecstasy [*ἔκστασις*] toward it as an object of love. If it suffers this ecstasy, it obviously urges itself onward, and if it urges itself onward, it surely intensifies and greatly accelerates its motion. And if its motion is intensified in this way, it will not cease until it is wholly present in the whole beloved, and wholly encompassed by it, willingly receiving the whole saving circumscription by its own choice, so that it might be wholly qualified by the whole circumscriber, and, being wholly circumscribed, will no longer be able to wish to be known from its own qualities, but rather from those of the circumscriber, in the same way that air is thoroughly permeated by light, or iron in a forge is completely penetrated by the fire, or anything else of this sort” (transl. Constatas). Cf. *Q.Thal. I*, 10.92–95 and 54.145–149.

<sup>48</sup> *Th.oec.*, 1108C–1.68: „The Aeon, time, and place belong in the category of the relative [*τῶν πρὸς τι*]. Without them nothing of what is included in them exists.

motion is the primary ontological characteristic of creatures together with their createdness. However, motion is manifested as a component of *relation* and *distance*, and it is motion that counts/discloses/actualizes this *relation* and *distance*, time being the *number, numbering, circumscription and delimitation* thereof. Time *measures* either communion or distance, which are disclosed as motion: but the consummation of communion cannot be described as mere timelessness or motionlessness, for it cannot but be, in a sense, *active*. An *ever-moving repose* that is a *stationary movement*. The dimensionless present of the fullness of communion: a radically transformed *vūv*, eternal by the very fact that it does not possess duration, i.e. temporal *distance*.

## Death and Relation

We have referred to relationality and self-transcending love as the mode of life and the mode of the uncreated, and to nonrelation and individual onticity as the mode of death, the mode of „fallen“ createdness. It must be stressed that this is not an *a posteriori* analysis imposed by our hermeneutical approach: it is Maximus himself who makes that distinction. According to the Confessor’s definitive formulation, „Death is, primarily, separation from God“<sup>49</sup>—and, consequently, from everything that God is, from everything created in which God is present through its *λόγος*: death is defined as the choice of nonrelation, and primarily as the refusal to be in communion with the *person* behind creation. Maximus continues: „and life is, primarily, the one who says, *I am the life*“:<sup>50</sup> life is defined as a *person* (the person of the *λόγος*), and participation in life is the participation in that person, the relationship with that person—a relationship that is also forged through the relationship with the ones who are made „in the image and likeness“ of that God, i.e. human persons (and the whole of creation in its „logical“ quality), a relationship manifested by *actualizing* the uncreated’s mode of existence, the mode of relationality, self-transcendence, *ἔρωσ*, love. Humanity’s mediating function, i.e. the personalization of creation, is also an actualization of this mode. To actualize this mode of existence is to *possess God*: „the one who possesses love possesses God himself, since *God is love*.“<sup>51</sup>

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God is not of the category of the relative because he does not have anything at all included in him. If, then, the inheritance of those who are worthy is God himself, the one who is rendered worthy of this grace will be above the Aeon, time and place. He will have God himself as a place“ (transl. Berthold).

<sup>49</sup> *Car.*, 2.93.1: Θάνατος μὲν ἐστὶ κυρίως ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ χωρισμός.

<sup>50</sup> *Car.*, 2.93.4: Ζωὴ δὲ κυρίως ἐστὶν ὁ εἰπὼν· Ἐγὼ εἶμι ἡ ζωὴ.

<sup>51</sup> *Car.*, 4.100.5–6: Ὁ οὖν κτησάμενος τὴν ἀγάπην, αὐτὸν τὸν Θεὸν ἐκτήσατο, ἐπειδὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν. (transl. Berthold).

However, there is a limit to how fully a human person can actualize this mode of existence while he himself is actualized through created activities inevitably dictating a distinct individual atomicity (and not merely an otherness)—for example, the natural atomicity of the human body. As long as this individual atomicity is preserved, the fullness of relationality, self-transcendence and communion cannot be achieved. According to Maximus,

so long as one is in the present time of this life even if he be perfect in his earthly state both in action and in contemplation, he still has knowledge, prophecy, and the pledge of the Holy Spirit only in part, but not in their fullness. He has yet to come at the end of the ages to the perfect rest which reveals face to face to those who are worthy the truth as it is in itself. Then one will possess not just a part of the fullness but rather acquire through participation the entire fullness of grace.<sup>52</sup>

We suspect that what Maximus implies is that if life is communion and death is nonrelation, then biological death need not necessarily be the severance of the created basis for the actualization of the person, but perhaps also the severance of our ultimate *resistance* to the fullness of communion and life, the annihilation of the ultimate frontier of individual atomicity preventing the fullness of relation and otherness: matter, the body.<sup>53</sup> The hope that the Confessor articulates is that if man's whole life constitutes an affirmative answer to God's continuous call from nonbeing into being, then the *Other* of that relationship could grant the uncreated hypostatization (actualization) of the person to those who are receptive to it:

For I do not think that the limit of this present life is rightly called death, but rather release from death, separation from corruption, freedom from slavery, cessation of trouble, the taking away of wars, passage beyond confusion, the receding of darkness, rest from labors, silence from confused buzzing, quiet from excitement, a veiling of shame, flight from the passions, the vanishing of sin, and, to speak briefly, the termination of evils. By achieving these things through voluntary mortification, the Saints commend themselves as strangers and exiles from this life.<sup>54</sup>

Man's *receptiveness* to this divine, uncreated life and grace that constitutes the person even without its created and natural activities (i.e. matter) is of paramount importance to Maximus: „each partakes according

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<sup>52</sup> *Th.oec.*, 1165BC—2.87 (transl. Berthold).

<sup>53</sup> *Q.Thal. I*, 42.26–28: τὸ τέλος τοῦ παθητοῦ τῆς φύσεως, φημί δὲ τὸν θάνατον, τῆς κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν μεταποιήσεως ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενος.—„[he] turned the end of our nature's passibility—which is death—into the beginning of our natural transformation to incorruption” (transl. Blowers).

<sup>54</sup> *Amb.Io.*, 1157CD (transl. Louth).

to his ability,"<sup>55</sup> it is the „quality of disposition [ποιότητα τῆς διαθέσεως] found in each one"<sup>56</sup> that prepares the person, or leaves him unprepared, for the ultimate unification and communion—which is promised to take place „at the end of the ages" (κατὰ τὸ πέρασ τῶν αἰώνων), in the eschatological future.

## Conclusions and Remarks

According to our examination of Maximus' passages, we have come to the following conclusions:

- (i) There is no motion or temporality of the uncreated, for the uncreated is by definition beyond these categories and divisions. To say that God is „motionless" or „timeless/eternal" bears meaning only in a relative manner, in contradistinction and comparison to the motion and temporality of creation.
- (ii) However (and while there is no motion or temporality of the uncreated), the state of motion and temporality in the complete participation of created nature in the uncreated, in deification, constitutes a third and distinct mode of motion and temporality; a mode beyond motion and motionlessness, beyond time and Aeon, beyond the division of sensible and intelligible. According to the Confessor, this third mode of motion and temporality is testified as being experienceable by human beings, which has been made possible by the incarnation and resurrection of the Λόγος, the existence of the person and hypostasis of Christ.
- (iii) The most fitting, although apophatic, characterization of this third mode of motion and temporality in deification is its description as the *ever-moving repose* (στάσις ἀεικίνητος) and *stationary movement* (στάσιμος ταυτοκίνησις) around God, in a union in all directness and immediacy (ἀμέσως συναφθῆ τῆ προνοίᾳ).

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<sup>55</sup> *Q. Dub.*, 102.5–14: „Rather, it is necessary to suppose this, that just as we have optical, auditory and respiratory ability, and these things do not receive all the air or the light or the voice—since there will then be no partaking of these things left for anyone else—but in proportion to the power that is present in each, each partakes according to their ability; thus, also the mercy of God grants both forgiveness and grace according to the quality of the underlying disposition of each one, e.g., when someone repented completely, he is also forgiven completely. One who repented partially is also forgiven partially. And the same thing also holds true for the one who loves" (transl. Prassas).

<sup>56</sup> *Q. Thal.* II, 59.165–170: Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἐκάστῳ ποιότητα τῆς διαθέσεως ὁ θεός, τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνούμενος ὡς οἶδεν αὐτός, τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐκάστῳ παρέχεται καθὼς ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ διαπεπλασμένος πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ πάντως πᾶσιν ἐνωθησομένου κατὰ τὸ πέρασ τῶν αἰώνων.



- (iv) By deification, we are referring to the human person being granted *real* identity with God in every respect except of an identity in substance/nature. According to Maximus, in deification the hypostasis of the human person is divine and uncreated, but his substance remains human and created: the mode of existence (τρόπος ύπαρξεως) is fundamentally changed and innovated, but the λόγος of substance and nature, along with substance/nature itself, remains unchanged. This is described with the language of *activities* (ένέργειαι), the hypostatically manifested activities of the substance. In deification, the human person's nature is granted to be actualized through divine, uncreated activities, actualizing an uncreated, divine hypostasis. These descriptions are, by definition, *at the edge of language*.
- (v) Deification fulfills humanity's mediation task of restoring the union of everything, so that they all may be one. This is achieved by annihilating all divisions, including the created-uncreated division, the full communion of which it restores. To annihilate divisions is to annihilate *distance*—ontological distance, temporal, spatial or otherwise.<sup>57</sup> Again: this cannot be an individual achievement of the natural person alone, but a fruit of communion, a *gift*; it must be granted to the person (i.e., „by grace”) by the one who possesses it.
- (vi) The ever-moving repose describes a radical *transformation* of temporality by the annihilation of its constitutive parts, i.e. by the annihilation of *distance*.
- (vii) In doing this, the ever-moving repose is disclosed as the dimensionless „now” of a relationship, in which the related persons are in so complete a communion that they manifest their *otherness* without actualizing *distance*.
- (viii) This completes the reconstruction of Maximus' implicit vision concerning temporality: the primary characteristic of creation is its *motion*, which can either be the *returning* motion towards the full communion with its uncreated source and cause, or a deviation from this returning motion, i.e. a motion resulting in nonrelation, individual onticity, corruption, death. Time *measures* this motion, and as such time *measures* this relationship. When this relationship is fulfilled and consummated in the actualization of existence as communion, i.e. in the mode of the uncreated,

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<sup>57</sup> The use of the term ἀδιάστατος in Maximus' passages denotes exactly what its etymological information conveys, i.e. a state without διάστασις, dimension, distance etc.

there is no *distance* to be measured by time or to be manifested in the Aeon<sup>58</sup> – and temporality is transformed into an *ever-moving repose* and a *stationary movement*.

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### Abbreviations:

#### Amb.Th.

Maximus the Confessor, *Πρὸς Θωμᾶν τὸν ἡγιασμένον*. Ambigua ad Thomam. (PG 91 1032-1060.) **CCSG 48, 3-34.** (and Conostas – DOML 28.)

#### Amb.Io.

Maximus the Confessor, *Πρὸς Ἰωάννην ἀρχιεπίσκοπον Κυζίκου*. Ambigua ad Johannem. (PG 91 1061-1424.) **Conostas – DOML 28 & 29.**

#### Car.

Maximus the Confessor, *Κεφάλαια περὶ ἀγάπης*. Capita de caritate quattuor centuriae. (PG 90 960-1073.) **Ceresa-Gastaldo.**

#### Opusc.

Maximus the Confessor, *Ἔργα θεολογικὰ καὶ πολεμικά*. Opuscula theologica et polemica. **PG 91 9-286.**

#### Th.oec.

Maximus the Confessor, *Κεφάλαια Σ' περὶ θεολογίας καὶ τῆς ἐνσάρκου οἰκονομίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ Θεοῦ*. Capitum theologorum et oeconomicorum duae centuriae. **PG 90 1084-1176.**

#### Q.Thal. I

Maximus the Confessor, *Πρὸς Θαλάσσιον, περὶ διαφόρων ἀπόρων τῆς θείας Γραφῆς* (Πρὸς Θαλάσσιον) Quaestiones ad Thalassium. **CCSG 7.**

#### Q.Thal. II

Maximus the Confessor, *Πρὸς Θαλάσσιον, περὶ διαφόρων ἀπόρων τῆς θείας Γραφῆς* (Πρὸς Θαλάσσιον) Quaestiones ad Thalassium. **CCSG 22.**

Since Conostas' critical edition (vol. I and II are Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 28 and 29 respectively) names Migne's PG column of each respective passage, while many scholars still depend on PG's *Ambigua*, we use Conostas' text of *Amb.Io.* while simply citing *Amb.Io.* with PG91 columns for the readers' convenience, as PG91 columns can be easily traced back to Conostas' pages, while the opposite is naturally not the case. When directly using Conostas' translation, we will cite Conostas' page numbers. We will cite CCSG 48 for the *Ambigua ad Thomam*, and CCT2 (Corpus Christianorum in Translation 2) for Joshua Lollar's English translation.

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<sup>58</sup> The Aeon does not measure a motion, but the motion (and distance) of intelligible creation takes place against the background of the temporality of the Aeon.

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## Summary

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### **The Temporality of Deification: Maximus the Confessor’s Ever-Moving Repose**

What is the *temporality of deification*, what becomes of *motion* and *time* when a person becomes deified? This article represents the third part of a wider project dedicated to the reconstruction of Maximus the Confessor’s conception of temporality as a *threefold* Maximian theory of time, in which *time* (χρόνος), the *Aeon* (αἰών) and the *ever-moving repose* (στάσις ἀεικίνητος) form three distinct *modes* of temporality. Temporality is a primary characteristic of createdness and is actualized in two different modes, time (χρόνος) and the Aeon (αἰών). Time is the numbering and delimitation of motion, temporality as perceived within sensible creation—as well as the reflection of the Aeon in the world of motion *as we know and perceive it*. The Aeon is time deprived of motion, and the temporality of the intelligible side of creation’s delimitation. The uncreated is not merely atemporal in the sense of not being either in time or in the Aeon, but is beyond any conception of temporality and createdness whatsoever—the very notion of a „temporality of the uncreated” is considered as a contradiction in itself. However, while there is no temporality of the uncreated, we can speak of the temporality of deification, or at least pose the question concerning it—i.e., the question of what happens in a person’s *motion* and *temporality* when it reaches deification. What is the state of temporality in *θέωσις*? An answer to that question through Maximus the Confessor’s *ever-moving repose* will be attempted here.

**Keywords:** Maximus the Confessor, time, eternity, motion, deification, ever-moving repose.