

CATHOLICITY AND INDIVIDUALITY IN THE CHRISTOLOGY OF SAINT MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR: EXISTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

In my paper, I shall treat the question of individuality under two complementary aspects. In the first place, I will rather treat ἄτομον and other terms as metaphysical concepts. I will then try to observe the notions which are more related to Maximus' soteriological vision. The two are related but also retain some autonomy.

The terms that denote particularity: ἄτομον, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον

The terms ἄτομον, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον can be conceived of as synonymous, since they can coincide in the same human subject. For example, Peter is an individual, as well as a hypostasis and a person. Nevertheless, even if they can coincide in the same subject they are not identical, since they consider it through three different aspects.

The term ἄτομον denotes a subsumption in a logical hierarchy proceeding from the most general genus to genera, species and the most specific species. When we say that Peter is an ἄτομον, what we mean is that Peter is subjected to such a logical hierarchy. Sometimes, the term ἄτομον has a more ontological meaning denoting the possibility of independent existence, such as when Maximus speaks of a "composite individual".

The term ὑπόστασις means the possibility to exist as an independent being with a certain ontological coherence. The hypostasis thus has two aspects: On the one hand it means the possibility of independence in relation to the environment and a sort of self-subsistence. On the other hand, it denotes the possibility to integrate heterogeneous realities in the same existence. The two are connected: it is because of the ontological coherence offered by the hypostasis that he can integrate the heterogeneous realities of his compositum.

The term person answers the question "who?" that is a question of personal identity. It is referring to hypostases that are gifted with intellect

and with a participation in their own movement (νοερόν, αὐτεξούσιον), and that bear a name answering the question “who?”.

My position is thus that Peter is at the same time an individual, a person and a hypostasis, but each term denotes a different aspect of Peter.

The Father, the Son and the Spirit are persons, because they answer the personal question “who?” by having a personal identity and names, whereas they also have an intellectual and free nature in an eminent way. They are hypostases, because they have hypostatical properties that characterize them as particular, i.e. as having particular modes of existence, even if this particularity is different than the one in anthropology (for example, in God each hypostasis bears the catholicity of nature and not a fragment of it; the hypostatic properties might be incommunicable in themselves but denote relation or, at least, personal causality etc). But the personal hypostases of the Trinity are not individuals. The reason is that we do not find in God a logical/ ontological hierarchy of most general genus, genus and species up to the individual, as we find it in created beings, because this would introduce composition in God. On the contrary, God’s supra-essential essence is a totally simple reality without hierarchy and composition and it is equally primordial to the divine Trinity of Persons. In this there is a possible difference between Maximus and John of Damascus.

For similar reasons, Christ is a person and a hypostasis, but He is not an individual. This is so for the following reasons: a) As Son the Logos, i.e. as a divine personal hypostasis He is not an individual, because there is no logical hierarchy of genera and species in the Trinity. b) As a result of the hypostatic synthesis, that is as Christ, He is also not an individual, because there is no species or genus of Christ; Christ as a result of the union is an absolutely unique case. c) But Christ is not an individual as a man, because the latter would entail Nestorianism. Even though Christ does have properties (ιδιώματα), these properties are not sufficient for Him to be characterized as an individual.

By these considerations, one can make the following remark. In Theology and Christology there is a theory of person and of hypostasis but not of individual. In anthropology all three notions can be applied. Animals are hypostases and individuals, but probably not persons (even though there is one application of the term πρόσωπον for the bird phoenix). There is thus in my opinion a difference in the semantic nuance of the terms, which should be studied for its own sake and not (only) in the context of a personalistic or anti-personalistic modern reading. What is sure is that when Maximus affirms that Christ is not an individual, this does not entail a depreciation of the term ἄτομον. The only term where such an exclusion entails indeed such a depreciation is the term γνώμη which is equally excluded from Christ but for other reasons, as we shall see.

1) The terms **ιδίωμα (idiom)**, **ιδιότης (attribute)**, **ποιότης (quality)**, **συμβεβηκός (accident)**

We have observed the general meaning of the term *ἄτομον*, as well as other terms which denote concrete being. The question that remains is how does individuality emerge in the first place. We should thus examine the Maximian terminology about the idioms and the qualities of beings, which pose a new series of issues about individualization. Maximus draws definitions from the philosophical as well as patristic tradition and at some points he opposes the latter to the former. One could make the following observations:

i) In the *Opusculum Theologicum et Polemicum* 26, where he gives traditional definitions, Maximus makes the following remark: «Ἄτομόν ἐστιν, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους ιδιωμάτων συναγωγή, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα ἐπ' ἄλλου θεωρεῖσθαι οὐ δύναται· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πατέρας, οἷον Πέτρος ἢ Παῦλος, ἢ τις ἕτερος τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἰδίους προσωπικοῖς ιδιώμασι τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενος. Ὑπόστασις δέ ἐστιν, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους, οὐσία μετὰ ιδιωμάτων· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πατέρας, ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπος, προσωπικῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενος». Maximus takes for granted a certain definition where the individual is identified to the assemblage or sum of idioms which cannot be found in another. He opposes a patristic definition, where the individual possesses a more personal nuance, since it refers to beings bearing a proper name like Peter or Paul, who are nevertheless separated (*ἀφοριζόμενοι*) from other human beings thanks to such personal idioms. It is not certain whether the idioms *constitute* the individual, but for sure the sum of idioms separates one individual from another.

ii) The individual is thus for the philosophers an assemblage of idioms, or, at least, it is separated thanks to the idioms. But what are these idioms? We find an important definition in the *Opusculum* 14, where Maximus refers to series of definitions, which he draws from the previous tradition: «ὑποστατικὴ διαφορὰ τυγχάνει λόγος, καθ' ὃν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν ἐνθεωρουμένων ιδιωμάτων τῷ κοινῷ τῆς οὐσίας ἑτερότης τέμνουσα κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου τὴν τῶν ἀτόμων ποιεῖται πληθύν» (PG 91,152B). According to this definition, the hypostatical difference results from an otherness as to the common of the essence, this otherness being “according to the sum of the idioms which are observed in it”. This otherness is intersecting (*τέμνουσα*) and leading to the multitude of individuals. Maximus is not absolutely clear as to the principle of individuation, but he does state explicitly that individuals and their multitude are caused by a sort of “cutting” or intersection (*τομή*) by an alterity which is linked to the sum of idioms that are observed in them. The philosophical question

one could pose is whether this alterity is identical to the sum of idioms or whether the latter is only observed in it (ένθρωγείται). In either case, individuality, alterity and assemblage of idioms are closely linked as well as the possibility to enumerate the alterities.

iii) The function of idioms is to separate (άφοριστικά ιδιώματα). There is however in Epistle 15 one distinction between two different kinds of separation, namely άφορισμός and διορισμός. Διορισμός means a form of separation, where one being can exist in itself independently of the others. Of course, what concerns us most in this context is the relation with beings belonging to the same essence (όμοούσια). The two notions are not identical. It is possible to have άφορισμός, namely a separation in the sense of a formal distinction, without having διορισμός, i.e. physical independence. We can keep this distinction in mind, and we shall observe its significance later.

iv) The separation in the sense of άφορισμός is linked to the idioms (άφοριστικά ιδιώματα). In beings with the same essence, these idioms are not the natural ones, since the natural idioms are common. The άφοριστικά ιδιώματα are not the essential ones, but are linked with (non-essential) qualities (ποιότητες) and accidents (συμβεβηκότα). Let's observe what Maximus has to say about them. In the *Opusculum* 21 (PG 91,248B-249C) he does distinguish between natural and hypostatical qualities. The natural qualities are the common qualities of nature, like reason for humanity or the nickering of the horse (λογικόν, χρεμετιστικόν). The hypostatical qualities are those that distinguish different individuals like the crooked or flat nose of a particular man (γρυπόν, σιμόν) or the grey or light color of a particular horse (ψαρόν, ξανθόν). Just like the idioms, qualities can be either natural or hypostatical, the latter being the distinguishing ones (άφοριστικάί).

v) It is to be noted that God does not have qualities properly speaking, since He is absolutely simple and there is no distinction between substance and accidents to be found in Him. It is only in a very abusive way that one can transfer such a logic to God and speak of divine natural qualities such as His all-holiness, omnipotence, absolute perfection etc. (πανάγιον, πανσθενές, παντέλειον), or of hypostatical qualities such as the innascibility of the Father, the filiality of the Son or the procession of the Spirit (άγέννητον, γεννητόν, έκπορευτόν) (ibid.)

vi) In the *Opusculum* 21 (PG 91,249B-C), Maximus concludes that quality (ποιότης), attribute (ιδιότης) and difference (διαφορά) are in general synonyms, referring to accidents of the substance. They could however be distinguished in the following way: Quality (ποιότης) is more universal and is referring to whatever is not simple. Attribute (ιδιότης) is more partial and is referring to a particular essence which differs from others. Difference (διαφορά) is constitutive and distinguishing (συστατική και άφοριστική).

The theological context when Maximus makes such distinctions is the refutation of Severus of Antioch. Maximus thus wishes to refute the view that Christ is a composite nature in which case His divinity and humanity would be mere qualities. Maximus' own view is that Christ is only a composite hypostasis, His divinity and humanity being realities (πράγματα) and essences (οὐσίαι). We can in any case keep in mind that the series from the most universal to the most particular is from quality to attribute and then to difference (ποιότης, ιδιότης, διαφορά).

vii) In the 15th Letter Maximus makes (or rather follows) an important distinction. He writes that essence is characterized by activity (οὐσία-ποιεῖν), whereas quality and accident by passion (ποιότης/συμβεβηκόσ-πάσχειν) (PG 91,561C-D). He is equally stating that essence is characterized by expansion and contraction (διαστολή, συστολή), whereas quality by alteration and movement according to alteration (ἀλλοίωσις, κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν κίνησις). (PG 91,564A-B). (The relative characteristic of quantity is increase and diminution, αὐξησις- μείωσις). Maximus seems to allude that the characteristic of essence is to be active and operate what is particular to it. On the contrary, the idioms that do not belong to the essence are subject to a passive movement which leads to the alteration of the subject. In the same Letter, Maximus links the qualities and accidents to the following distinctions: i) The most particular difference (ιδιαιτάτη διαφορά), which refers to the definition of the species, ii) the distinction (διάκρισις) of one individual from the other inside the same species, iii) the particular difference (ιδίως διαφορά) which refers to the sum of idioms inside the individual and which shows someone not only as other (ἄλλος) but also as different (ἄλλοιός), PG 91,B-C).

viii) The qualities are opposed to the essence in the context of a struggle against Severus, in order to show that the humanity and the Divinity of Christ are essences and not only qualities, as was supposed to be Severus' view. In the same *Letter* 15 (PG 91,569D-572A), Maximus distinguishes between realities (πράγματα) and qualities (ποιότητες). Against Severus of Antioch, Maximus insists that the humanity of Christ is a reality (πράγμα), on which are based the qualities, and not only a quality. In the *Opusculum* 17 (PG 91,212C-D), there is also a distinction between essence and qualities. Maximus says that there are two kinds of distinction (διαστολή). Between essences there is a distinction according to opposition (διαστολή κατ' ἐναντίωσιν), which is a simple division, as in the case between sensible and intelligible realities, or between the soul and the body. But the qualities which are based on the essence have a distinction according to contradiction (διαστολή κατὰ τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι) in which the position of the one means the removal of the other, as is the case with life and death, which cannot coexist in the same subject. It is important to keep in mind this im-

portant distinction between the qualities and the substance. In the *Dialogue with Pyrrhus* (PG 91,348B), there are opposites in the qualities, such as in the opposition between newness and oldness, whereas the substance has non-being as its only opposite. The accidents are those which are observed in another reality, either a hypostasis or an essence (PG 91,25D).

Keeping these observations in mind, we can now examine the Letter 15, where Maximus is developing the idioms in Christology.

2) The idioms in Christology.

In Letter 15, Maximus is examining the relation between what is common and what is particular, following a theoretical itinerary from anthropology to Christology and back. He thus states (PG 91,552B) about beings with the same essence: «έτεροῦπόστατα τῷ λόγῳ τῆς αὐτὰ διακρινούσης προσωπικῆς ετερότητος, καθ' ὃν ἄλλος ἄλλου διακέκριται μὴ συμβαίνοντες ἀλλήλοις τοῖς καθ' ὑπόστασιν χαρακτηριστικοῖς ιδιώμασιν· ἀλλ' ἕκαστος τῷ κατ' αὐτὸν ἀθροισμῷ τῶν ιδιωμάτων ιδικώτατον τῆς οἰκείας καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐπιφέρεται λόγον· καθ' ὃν τὴν πρὸς τὰ ὁμοφυῆ καὶ ὁμοοῦσια κοινωνίαν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται». Here Maximus states that each man has a particular logos of his personal otherness according to his hypostasis and the sum of his idioms. This is later (552C-D) contrasted to the case of the hypostatic union, which unites heterogeneous elements, like the soul and the body. There also, if the idioms which distinguish a man's body from other bodies, and the idioms which distinguish a man's soul from other souls are put in a union, then they will distinguish the hypostasis of, say, Peter or Paul, from other hypostases. We thus observe that in Letter 15, the idioms are very crucial for the distinction and separation (ἀφορισμός) of the hypostasis. From this anthropological example, Maximus moves to the Christological one: «Οὐ γὰρ οἷς ἠφορίζετο τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων ιδιώμασιν ἢ σὰρξ, τούτοις διετήρει τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον διαφορὰν· οὐτ' ἂν πάλιν οἷς τοῦ Λόγου διέφερον ιδιώμασι, τούτοις καὶ ἡμῶν ἠφορίζετο. Ἀλλ' οἷς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἠφορίζετο, τούτοις τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον διέσωζεν ἔνωσιν, ἧγουν ταυτότητα· καὶ οἷς ἡμῖν ἦνωτο φυσικῶς, τούτοις δηλαδὴ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον εἶχεν οὐσιώδη διαφορὰν. Ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ Λόγος, οἷς ἠφορίζετο τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς Θεότητος ιδιώμασιν ὡς Υἱὸς καὶ Λόγος, τούτοις πρὸς τὴν σὰρκα τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν διέσωζεν ἔνωσιν, ἧγουν ταυτότητα· καὶ οἷς ὡς Θεὸς τὴν πρὸς τὴν σὰρκα φυσικὴν ἐτήρει διαφορὰν, τούτοις Πατρὶ τε καὶ Πνεύματι κατ' οὐσίαν ἐνούμενος ἐπήλαττε τὴν τε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἄκρα διαφορὰν καὶ ταυτότητα» (PG 91,557A-B). Maximus states here that correspondingly, the idioms by which Christ's flesh is distinguished from our own are the ones that save the union and identity with the Word,

whereas the idioms by which it is united naturally with us, i.e. the natural idioms, are the ones which entail the difference to the divine nature of the Word. Inversely, the idioms by which the Word is separated from the common of Divinity as the Son and Logos are the ones which save the union and identity with the flesh. And the idioms, which guaranteed God's natural difference from the flesh, are the ones by which He was united to the Father and the Spirit. We have here a symmetrical schema, where the idioms which distinguish Christ's flesh from us mean a union with the Logos. Inversely, the personal idioms of the Logos, by which he is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit mean His union with our flesh. This symmetry is quite impressive, as it gives the impression of putting in the same scale the fact that e.g. Christ as the Son has the idiom of Filiality, receiving the human flesh in it, and, on the other hand, He has an idiom in His soul or body by which He is united to the Logos.

The passage that recapitulates Maximian Christology is the following (PG 91,557C-560C):

«Ἡ γὰρ ἀληθῆς καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσις ἐκατέρου τῶν εἰς ὄλου τινὸς σύνθεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνερχομένων μερῶν κατὰ τὴν ἅμα πρὸς ὄλου τινὸς γένεσιν σύνοδον, τὸ ἀφορίζον ἐκότερον τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν κοινότητος ἰδιώμα, τῷ κοινῷ συμπαραλαβοῦσα δείκνυσιν ἐνυπόστατον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπόστασιν· ὅτι μὴ καθ' αὐτὸ διωρισμένως ὑπέστη· τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἢ τοῦ καθ' ἔνωσιν αὐτῷ πρὸς ὄλου τινὸς γένεσιν συνυφεστῶτος ἀφοριζόμενον· ὅπερ ἰδίον ἐστὶν ὑποστάσεως. Τὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ διωρισμένως συνεστῶς ἐστὶν ὑπόστασις· εἴπερ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι φασιν, οὐσίαν μετὰ ἰδιωμάτων, ἀριθμῷ τῶν ὁμογενῶν διαφέρουσαν· ἐνυπόστατον δὲ, τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ὑφιστάμενον, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ θεωρούμενον, ὡς εἶδος ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις· ἢ τὸ σὺν ἄλλῳ διαφόρῳ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ὄλου τινὸς γένεσιν συντιθέμενον· ὅπερ καθ' ὅσον μὲν διαφέρει τοῖς ἀφορίζουσιν αὐτὸ τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ὁμογενῶν ἰδιώμασι, τοσοῦτον τῷ συγκειμένῳ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐνίζεται ταυτιζόμενον. Οὐ γὰρ οἷς ἀφορίζεται τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἰδιώμασι, τούτοις διακρίνεται καὶ τοῦ συγκειμένου καθ' ἔνωσιν καὶ συνυφεστῶτος· ἀλλ' οἷς διενήνοχε τῶν ὁμοουσίῳ ἀφοριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι, τούτοις πρὸς τὸ συγκείμενον τὴν καθ' ἔνωσιν φυλάττει ταυτότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως, ἐν τῷ πάντῃ μοναδικῷ τοῦ προσώπου συντηρουμένην· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας οἰκονομίας ἤγουν σαρκώσεως ὁ ἀληθῆς πρεσβεύει λόγος. Οἷς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἀφοριζομένη διέφευρεν ἢ σὰρξ ἰδιώμασι, τούτοις τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον καθ' ὑπόστασιν εἶχε ταυτότητα· καὶ οἷς ὁ Λόγος Πατρός τε καὶ Πνεύματος διέφευρεν ἰδιώμασι, ὡς Υἱὸς ἀφοριζόμενος, τούτοις τὸ καθ' ὑπόστασιν πρὸς τὴν σάρκα, μοναδικὸν διετήρει σωζόμενον, μηδενὶ λόγῳ παντελῶς διαιρούμενον. Οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὑπόστασις ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καθέστηκε σὰρξ. Οὐδέποτε γὰρ, οὐδόσον ἐπινοίας ψιλῆς πέφυκε τάχος χωρεῖν, καθ' ἑαυτὴν τὸ παράπαν ὑπέστη

τοῖς ἀφορίζουσιν αὐτὴν ιδιώμασι διωρισμένη τῶν ὁμογενῶν, ἢ πρὸς τὸν συγκείμενον καθ' ὑπόστασιν Λόγον, τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἔχουσα κευχωρισμένον· ἀλλ' ἐνυπόστατος ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν λαβοῦσα τοῦ εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν· καὶ αὐτοῦ γενομένη καθ' ἔνωσιν σάρξ, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐνιζομένη, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀφορίζουσης αὐτὴν ιδιότητος. Καὶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου καθ' ὑπόστασιν ποιουμένη τὸ ἴδιον· ὡς που καὶ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν κοινόν, οὗ καὶ σὰρξ ἀληθῶς καθ' ἔνωσιν γέγονεν» (PG 91,557C-560C).

This passage which recapitulates Maximus' Christology presents the following complementary views:

i) In the beginning we see two distinctions: The first is the one between ἀφορισμός and διορισμός. The second is the one between hypostasis and the enhypostaton. The ἀφορισμός entails the idioms which separate one from the individuals of the same essence. The διορισμός means the possibility to exist as an independent hypostasis. In a similar way, the hypostasis is an essence with idioms, which is different in number from the individuals of the same essence. The enhypostaton is what cannot subsist but itself but is necessarily observed in another hypostasis. In the true hypostatical union, which takes place in Christ, the idiom which separates His humanity from other men is ἐνυπόστατον and does not constitute a hypostasis. This means that the separation (ἀφορισμός), which entails the idioms of the human nature of Christ, distinguishing it from other human beings, is not sufficient for a διορισμός, i.e. for existing in an independent hypostasis. Christ's humanity is enhypostasized in the divine hypostasis. The general conclusion of this Neo-chalcedonian Christology is that it is possible to have a separation by distinction (ἀφορισμός), without an independent existence (διορισμός). Similarly, it is possible to be enhypostasized, without being a hypostasis. The theological point of these observation is the refutation of Nestorianism, in which a second human hypostasis (or person or individual) is posed next to the divine one. Maximus would also like to avoid an exaggeratingly symmetrical Chalcedonian Christology, in which the two natures would simply coexist in a parallel symmetrical way. The latter is achieved by stressing that Christ's humanity receives being in the hypostasis of the Logos («ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν λαβοῦσα τοῦ εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν» (560C). In any case, the final goal of Maximus remains the refutation of the Monophysite Christology of Severus of Antioch, which is accused of combining many different and opposing heresies, such as Nestorianism (with its "Tetradism", namely the addition of a fourth hypostasis to the Trinity) as well as the Apollinaristic confusion, the Manichean dualism and the "automatism" of Epicurus (PG 569D-572A).

ii) Maximus insists that the idioms of Christ's human nature have two functions. On the one hand they separate it from other human beings. On

the other, they contribute to its union with the hypostasis of the Logos, i.e. to forming a singular reality with Him (ένισμός). Thanks to these distinguishing idioms, Christ's humanity keeps the unity of the hypostasis preserved in the unicity of the Person. Thus, even if the idioms of Christ's humanity are not sufficient for individualizing Christ as a human individual, they arguably do something even more important, namely they contribute to the hypostatic singularity of the Word. Maximus uses one of his favorites schemas (560A), that of the «τοσοῦτον ... ὅσον», in order to express that to the degree that Christ's humanity differs from the individuals of the same essence thanks to the distinguishing idioms, it becomes a singular reality with the Divinity in the Person of the Word. In other words, the distinguishing idioms also have the function of unification with Divinity and of strengthening the hypostatical union. One could say that a strict "Neochalcedonian" model, where the "work" of the union is asymmetrically performed by the hypostasis of the Word is completed by another vision, in which it is also the humanity of Christ which contributes to hypostatical singularity by its individual features. It could be argued that the idioms of Christ's humanity even play a role in our salvation, since Maximus is even comparing them to the hypostatical idioms of the Word. He writes that thanks to the hypostatical idioms by which the Word is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit, i.e. filiality, He is united hypostatically to humanity. It is quite impressive that a divine hypostatical idiom, namely filiality, is compared to the human idioms as contributing to Christ's hypostatical unity. This view is concluded in the phrase that "[the flesh] of the Logos is performing His particularity according to the hypostasis" («[ἡ σὰρξ] αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου καθ' ὑπόστασιν ποιουμένη τὸ ἴδιον») (560C), i.e. His human flesh is contributing to the particularity of the Logos as a total composite hypostasis.

Even though I have insisted on the importance of the idioms of Christ's humanity it is equally important to consider a complementary part of Maximus' Christology. The last phrase of the abstract states that the flesh of the Word is offering the "commonality according to essence" with humanity. How are we to understand this commonality? A question that has preoccupied the specialists is whether Christ's human nature is the universal human nature or an individual one. The answer to this question is not an easy one. This is a question which has a rich history in Neochalcedonian thinking. One could summarize the following points:

i) Christ's human nature is not an abstract one. Maximus does not repeat John the Grammarian's view about a common human nature of Christ in an abstract sense. On the contrary, he insists on the idioms of Christ, which separate Him from other men. Christ, even though not being an individual, does have the idioms of Jesus of Nazareth. We thus avoid the danger of Docetism as well as any abstract view of Christ's humanity.

ii) On the other hand, the fact that Christ is not a human individual (or a human hypostasis or person for that matter) does have its significance. Jesus of Nazareth is not a human individual for Maximus; He is the Logos Who received human nature. This “idioms without an individual” could be considered as a deficient individualization of Christ. Besides it is to be noted that while Christ is a hypostasis and a person, namely that of the Logos, He is not an individual at all. This means that salvation is offered by Someone who is a person and a hypostasis but not an individual. Of course the view that Christ is not an individual is relative to the effort to avoid Nestorianism, as well as to the notion that being individual means being subsumed by species and genera. (Of course, Christ’s humanity is subsumed by species and genera, but not as an individual thus subsumed). One could thus consider a “soteriological” priority of the person over the individual. But this does not entail an anachronistic personalistic depreciation of the individual. Such a depreciation is not to be found in Maximus. What I mean is that we do find a soteriological significance in Christ being a person, namely that He is related to the Father in the Spirit and we enter this relation through the adoption by grace. There is a soteriological significance in Christ being a hypostasis, namely that he can hypostatize His human nature along with His divine one. But there is not a similar soteriological significance of Christ being an individual, since He is not. This remark however does not entail a depreciation of the individual as such and it would be anachronistic to project such a personalist understanding on Maximus.

iii) Another dimension of this issue is that Maximus adopts a Pauline and Patristic notion of Christ’s human nature being the recapitulation and the beginning (“ἀπαρχαί”) of humanity. In many passages, Maximus insists that the resurrection of the human nature of Christ means my own resurrection, that I am myself resurrected. Or that even the salvation or divinization of Christ’s humanity means my own salvation and divinization. (It is to be noted that there is a distinction here: The resurrection of Christ entails the resurrection of the whole human nature including “me”. But salvation and divinization is a matter of personal reception, since the resurrection can be a resurrection of salvation or of “judgment”. The former means a participation in God whereas the latter an external knowledge of God without participation (“ἐπίγνωσις ἄνευ μεθέξεως”). This emphasis on the soteriological and eschatological reception and resurrection of Christ’s humanity has led some specialists to consider that Christ’s human nature is the universal, the catholic one. This could be formulated in different ways. For example, Jean-Claude Larchet holds that the fact that Christ is not an individual has a soteriological significance, since it entails that He can thus save human nature in its catholicity and offer salvation and divinization to

its entirety. Marcel Doucet speaks of a neoplatonic influence on Maximus who considers nature as a “universal particular”. This means that Christ’s nature could be particular, but this does not hinder it from also being the universal human nature. This could arguably be linked to a sort of realism *avant la lettre*, according to which the catholicity of human nature subsists in a real way in the particularity of Christ’s human nature. In some passages Maximus is close to a realist view, when he speaks about the logos of human nature which is not divided but remains wholly present in the individuals. In other passages he is close to a nominalist position when he insists that there can be no universal essence if the hypostases vanish. He rather combines realistic and nominalist elements in a sort of realism *in re*, according to which the universal is really present in the particulars in some undivided way, but it also needs them for its subsistence. In such a sense, Christ can be particular and with idioms, but at the same time He is bearing the universal human nature, meaning that what happens to Christ happens to all of us. Besides, this is not only due to a Neoplatonic influence, but to the biblical, Pauline and Patristic theological theme of the “recapitulation” of humanity in Christ. It would thus be difficult to answer in one word whether Christ’s human nature is the universal or the individual one. One could make the following remarks: a) Christ’s human nature is individual in the sense that it has idioms which make it concrete, thus avoiding Docetism. b) It is not individual in the sense that Christ is an individual, since the latter is explicitly rejected. Maximus’ quite subtle view is that Christ somehow has an individual nature without being Himself an individual. Then, if someone chooses to ask the more difficult questions whether Christ’s human nature is individualized or if it is the one observed in the individual (“ἡ ἐν ἀτόμῳ θεωρουμένη”), my answer would rather be that it is individualized in the sense that it does have idioms, but not in the sense that Christ is an individual. Similarly, it is not the “one observed in the individual” but it is observed in idioms (“ἐν ιδιώμασι θεωρουμένη”). Finally, it is to be noted that this Maximian notion of idioms which are not an obstacle for universality but rather contribute to it could be considered to entail a very dynamic ontology. One could speak of an ontology of mode, where the fact that Christ has a particular mode (πῶς εἶναι) does not hinder but contributes to the communion of all human beings with Him. For example the fact that Christ is a Jew or male rather contributes to the possibility of non-Jews and non-males to be in communion with Him, maybe exactly because of the subtle position that Christ has idioms without being an individual. (Christology thus escapes the opposite dangers of Supersessionism and exclusivism). In a Pneumatological and ecclesiological extension of Christology, this could be considered as the ground for a sort of communion of different charismas, which is witnessed in the Church. Namely, an ecclesiological “idiom”,

like for example that of being a priest, or a prophet, or a theologian rather contributes to communion, through an ecclesial perichoresis of such idioms. Idioms and universality coexist in Ecclesiology just as they coexist in Christology.

iv) One should necessarily add here the fundamental theological theme of Christ's relation to Adam, which entails a more existential understanding of the relation between individuality and communion, since it is linked to eschatology and to the Fall. The "lapsarian" condition means for Maximus a fragmentation of human nature, which is linked to three dimensions, namely egoism (φιλαυτία), gnomonic will (γνώμη) and pleasure (ήδονή). Φιλαυτία is a self-referential turning; γνώμη is the fragmentation of human catholicity; ήδονή entails a vicious circle with pain (όδύνη), linked to sexual reproduction which also constitutes a fragmentation of humanity. Christ is the new Adam, precisely because He does not participate in these three features. His turning to the Father is the opposite of φιλαυτία, He does not have a gnomonic will and He does not participate in sexual reproduction. This means that His human nature subsists in a mode which is not that of lapsarian division and fragmentation. More concretely, Maximus' vision is that the fact that Christ is born from the Virgin in the Spirit means that He does not participate in a mode of multiplication of the human individuals which is linked to διαδοχή, i.e. to the substitution of human beings by other human beings due to death. But this means that His human nature is universal in a very different way than ours. The same is true about His not having a gnomonic will. Among specialists there is of course a certain debate whether γνώμη belongs to the created character of humanity or if it is due to the Fall. A subtle but I believe just answer would be that γνώμη belongs to the created character of human personhood. But before the Fall γνώμη was a simple disposition (διάθεσις), whereas after the Fall it becomes division and "revolt" against nature (διαίρεσις, διάστασις, στάσις). This means that each individual has an opinion (opinion is one of the meanings of γνώμη), precisely because his nature is fragmentary and he thus only has a partial approach to truth. For Maximus, the fact that Christ does not have a gnomonic will is related to a sort of catholicity of His nature which has a different mode than the lapsarian one of Adam. The question of the catholicity of Christ's nature has thus one more existential and soteriological aspect linked to Christ's exemption from gnomonic will and sexual reproduction. It is to be noted that in this consideration, what happens in Christology is what is expected to happen in eschatological anthropology. According to the Maximian eschatological vision, after the end of History men will surrender their gnomonic will to Christ (έκχώρησις γνωμική), and the multiplicity of human hypostases will survive after the abolishment of death and sexual reproduction. But this means that in the

eschaton the human nature will attain a catholicity which is very different from the historical one. We thus arrive at the last chapter, in which we will conclude with anthropology.

3) The anthropological consequences of Christology on the issue of individuality.

Christology and anthropology are linked but also distinct in Maximian thought. This interconnection entails that the question of individuality is put in both levels.

i) As we have observed, it is not absolutely clear whether in anthropology the individual is identified to the sum of idioms or if it is only observed in it. Maximus draws from the philosophical tradition a definition of the individual as a sum of idioms, but he considers that in the patristic tradition the individual is an answer to the question “who”. It is possible that he considered that the individual is observed in the properties without however formulating a full-blown theory about individualization, for example whether the sum of properties is the principle of individualization. The fact that Christology led Maximus to the paradoxical conception of the possibility of idioms without an individual might also have led him to a way of thinking that in anthropology too individual existence is not caused by the properties but by a sort of hypostatic subsistence in which the idioms are only observed. It is also to be noted that among the logoi of beings, which have such an important place in Maximian ontology as rational principles, there are logoi of individuals, but also of properties, qualities or even events. Basically everything that is willed by God does have a logos. Only evil and what does not belong to God’s good will is deprived of logos.

ii) In anthropology, however, individuality is very important in the context of an anti-Docetic spiritual stance. The emphasis on the properties of Christ could also be considered as taking place in such an anti-Docetic context. Idioms do have logoi and man enters in a dia-logical relation with them. Besides, it is through the idioms that man can acquire a modality ($\pi\omega\varsigma \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$), which is necessary for his being ($\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\omega\varsigma \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$), in order to truly exist.

iii) The question of the relation between universality and individuality should also contain the subject of gnostic will ($\gamma\nu\omega\mu\eta$). It should be noted here that the term $\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\mu\omicron\nu$ is rather a logical and metaphysical term. The term which poses the existential depth of the question is rather the term $\gamma\nu\omega\mu\eta$. And I would like to make the following proposition here. In contemporary efforts to bring Maximus in dialogue with modern notions such as that of the individual specialists and especially theologians turn to the obvious term $\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\mu\omicron\nu$. If this takes place in the context of a personalist

reading, they sometimes make a contradistinction between person and individual. Critics of this reading tend, on the other hand, to reject this interpretation as anachronistic and insist that the two terms are synonymous. What I would like to propose is that if one is interested in Maximian precursors of the modern notion of the individual, then the important term is not ἄτομον which is the typical translation of individuum, but the term γνώμη. The modern individual, which was arguably initiated by the interiority of Augustine of Hippo, but was later developed with the Cartesian cogito, subjective idealism etc. has characteristics such as inwardness, self-referentiality, self-reflectivity, self-consciousness as an interior center of spiritual life, a break from the surrounding nature and History etc. All these characteristics are much closer to the Maximian notion of γνώμη than to the term ἄτομον which does not have these connotations. Therefore when speaking about individuality in Maximus the subject of γνώμη must absolutely be treated. I shall try to summarize some crucial points of the treatment of γνώμη as a form of individuality. Γνώμη rather exists before the Fall and is not exclusively a lapsarian condition. Maximus describes how the fall has happened “according to the γνώμη”, thus alluding a pre-existence of the gnostic disposition. The difference is that before the Fall, γνώμη is a disposition towards God and the historical way that humanity has to cover towards its accomplishment. After the Fall, γνώμη turns into conflict and division (διάστασις, διαίρεσις). It means that human nature lacks catholicity. Γνώμη is thus a rupture in human nature and it is exactly due to this lack of catholicity that each person can have a personal opinion (opinion is one of the meanings of γνώμη), or a “point of view” about truth, since he only bears a fragment of nature. The lapsarian γνώμη is thus linked to a sort of reproachable (διαβλητή) sinful ignorance. Γνώμη is nevertheless not sinful in itself and the fact that Christ does not have a gnostic will according to Maximus is not due to the fact that it is sinful. Christ does not have a gnostic will, because He is the hypostasis of the Word and His humanity is thus divinized from its very conception. Therefore, it does not have to cover a historical way towards its accomplishment and consequently His freedom does not pass from dilemmas between given choices. In the eschaton men surrender their gnostic will to God.

iv) The reason a study of individuality in Maximus must absolutely concentrate on the subject of γνώμη is also because of the ambiguity of the term in Maximus. On the one hand, Maximus favors a theology of catholicity against what he perceives as the fragmentation, the revolt against nature and the loss of universality that are intrinsically linked to the fallen γνώμη, the only way out being the eschatological surrender of the gnostic will to God. It is not by chance that γνώμη and sexual reproduction are par excellence the two realities that are excluded from Maximian Christology. On

the other hand, in an anthropological context, γνώμη does not always have a negative meaning. Quite the contrary, there are plenty of passages where γνώμη is used in a very positive sense in order for example to denote a disposition of virtue, of affirmation of the divine plan, of good will etc. It seems that there is only one thing which is worse than the gnostic will and that is to pretend that one does not have a gnostic will. In other words, there is only one thing worse than loss of universality, and that is a false universality. Maximus' stance is that the Christian is rather called to assume her gnostic will and her partiality inside a spiritual struggle with the most selfish of its elements. What the Church tries to do is the promotion of a coordination of gnostic wills (ὁμογνωμοσύνη), i.e. a putting together of the fragments of human nature that are the individual gnostic wills. Whereas the unity of will in the Trinity is presented as a συμφυία, which is a very strong word, in History humanity can rather aspire for ὁμογνωμοσύνη; there is thus no easy imitation of the Trinitarian model. Man has to work on the finite and partial character of his gnostic will in order to achieve a step-by-step catholicity. One could thus claim that Maximus favors an assumption of individuality, i.e. an assumption of man's finitude and mortality. Mutatis mutandis, with the danger of committing an anachronism, one could say that Maximus would favor an assumption of the individuality as a break and a rupture or even as a self-reflexive partiality. The relation between love and γνώμη is conceived as one of persuasion. On the other hand, for Maximus this rupture does not have the last eschatological word. The break of the gnostic will should be assumed in order to be surrendered and in this Maximus is after all well-rooted in the Eastern tradition. It is to be noted that in eschatology there is a form of individuality that survives, which consists in a mode of disposition (διάθεσις) and movement towards God without division. Individuality could thus have an eschatological significance but not in its aspect of a rupture in the catholicity of nature. The issue of the relation of the notion of γνώμη and individuality in Maximus as well as in his successors is thus one that should be studied further.

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Key texts

Opusculum 26a PG 91,276A-B

Ἄτομόν ἐστι, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους ιδιωμάτων συναγωγή, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα ἐπ' ἄλλου θεωρεῖσθαι οὐ δύναται· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πατέρας, οἷον Πέτρος ἢ Παῦλος, ἢ τις ἕτερος τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἰδίοις προσωπικοῖς ιδιώμασι τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενος. Ὑπόστασις δὲ ἐστίν, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους, οὐσία μετὰ ιδιωμάτων· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πατέρας, ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπος, προσωπικῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενος

Additamentum 20 Correction in the forthcoming critical edition by Bram Roosen:

Ὑπόστασις ἐστίν, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους, οὐσία μετὰ ιδιωμάτων, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς πατέρας, καθ' ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπον προσωπικῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενον

Opusculum 14 PG 91,152B

ὑποστατικὴ διαφορὰ τυγχάνει λόγος, καθ' ὃν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν ἐνθεωρουμένων ιδιωμάτων τῷ κοινῷ τῆς οὐσίας ἑτερότης τέμνουσα κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου τὴν τῶν ἀτόμων ποιεῖται πληθύν

Opusculum 16 PG 91,201D-204A

οὐδὲ ἄτομον κυρίως τὸ κατὰ Χριστὸν σύνθετον λέγεται πρόσωπον. Οὐ γὰρ σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους διὰ τῶν ὑπάλληλα καθιεμένην γενῶν πρὸς τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος διαίρεσιν, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν οἰκείαν πρόοδον περιγράφουσαν. Ὅθεν διὰ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸν σοφώτατον Κύριλλον, τὸ Χριστὸς ὄνομα οὔτε ὄρου δύναμιν ἔχει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄτομόν ἐστι, πρὸς εἶδος ἢ γένος ἀναγόμενον, ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπὸ τούτων περιγραφόμενον· ἀλλ' ὑπόστασις σύνθετος, τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ἄκρων διαίρεσιν ἐν ἑαυτῇ κατ' ἄκρον ταυτίζουσα, καὶ εἰς ἐν ἄγουσα τῆ τῶν οἰκείων ἐνώσει μερῶν.

Opusculum 21 PG 91,248C

Ποιότητα γοῦν εἶναι φασιν, οὐσιώδη μὲν ὡς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου τὸ λογικὸν ἢ ἵππου τὸ χρεμετιστικόν· ὑποστατικὴν δὲ τοῦ τινος ἀνθρώπου γρῦπὸν ἢ σιμόν· ἢ τοῦ τινος ἵππου τὸ ψαρὸν ἢ ξανθόν. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει γενητῶν ἀπάντων οὐσιῶν καὶ ὑποστάσεων

Epistola 13 PG 91,517D-520A

Εἰ μὲν γενικὴ φύσις ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός, κατὰ πολλῶν ἔσται δηλονότι καὶ διαφερόντων τῶ ἀριθμῷ κατηγορούμενος· καὶ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἔσται μόνην, ἐν οἷς τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἔχει· καὶ οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν ἰδίᾳ τινὶ ὑποστάσει γνωριζόμενος· χωρὶς τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸν ἀτόμοις συμβεβηκότων. Τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ πάσης γενικῆς φύσεως ὄρος τε καὶ λόγος· καὶ εἰσήχθη πλῆθος ἡμῖν Χριστῶν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον τὴν οἴαντο ἔχόντων πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἢ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ταυτότητα, διὰ τὴν Σευήρου κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας περιττὴν καὶ ἀκάθεκτον μανίαν. Εἰ δὲ μοναδικὴ φύσις ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός, ἵνα παρῶμεν λέγειν ὡς οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ τὸ σύνολον φύσις ἐνὶ προσώπῳ περιγεγραμμένη· καὶ εἰ τὰ μάλιστα τὸν μυθεύμενον ὄρνιθα τὸν φοίνικα, καθάπερ τι μέγα καὶ ἄμαχον παράδειγμα τῆς ἑαυτῆς δόξης συστατικὸν τελευταῖον προβάλλονται.

Epistola 15 PG 91,549C

τούτέστιν τὰ μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ὄντα καὶ φύσεως ἀλλήλων διακέκριται ταῖς ὑποστάσεσιν, ἡγουν προσώποις, ὡς ἐπ' ἀγγέλων ἔχει καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν εἴδει καὶ γένει θεωρουμένων κτισμάτων. Ἄγγελος γὰρ ἀγγέλου καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου καὶ βοῦς βοῦς καὶ κύων κυνὸς διακέκριται κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν.

Opusculum 21 PG 91,249B-C

Ὅθεν ταῦτὸν μὲν ἀλλήλοις ὑπάρχειν ταῦτά φασι, ποιότητά φημι καὶ ιδιότητα καὶ διαφορὰν καὶ τῶν τε συμβεβηκότων ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑποκειμένου τινος ἡγουν οὐσίας λόγον ἐπέχειν. Διαφέρειν μὲν τῶ τὴν ποιότητα καθολικωτέραν εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀπλῶς εἴπερ οὐδὲν παρεξ Θεοῦ ἄποιον, ὡς οὐκ ἄσχετον, οὐδὲ ἀνείδεον. Τὴν ιδιότητα δὲ μερικὴν ὡς πρὸς ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπασῶν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς καὶ τοιῶσδε λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆσδε τῆς οὐσίας καὶ οὐκ ἄλλης· τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν ὡς συστατικὴν τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀφοριστικὴν. Ὅθεν καὶ οὕτω ταύτην κατονομάζουσι συστατικὴν καλοῦντες διαφορὰν διευκρίνουσαν, ὡς ἔφην, τὰ ὄντα κατὰ τε οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν, κατὰ τε πρόσωπον καὶ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ πᾶσαν πασῶν ἐλαύνουσαν τροπὴν τε καὶ σύγχυσιν.

Epistola 15 PG91,557A-B

Οὐ γὰρ οἷς ἠφορίζετο τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων ιδιώμασιν ἢ σάρξ, τούτοις διετήρει τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον διαφορὰν· οὐτ' ἂν πάλιν οἷς τοῦ Λόγου διέφερον ιδιώμασι, τούτοις καὶ ἡμῶν ἠφορίζετο. Ἀλλ' οἷς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἠφορίζετο, τούτοις τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον διέσωζεν ἔνωσιν, ἡγουν ταυτότητα· καὶ οἷς ἡμῖν ἠνωτο φυσικῶς, τούτοις δηλαδὴ

τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον εἶχεν οὐσιώδη διαφορὰν. Ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ Λόγος, οἷς ἠφορίζετο τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς Θεότητος ιδιώμασιν ὡς Υἱὸς καὶ Λόγος, τούτοις πρὸς τὴν σάρκα τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν διέσωζεν ἔνωσιν, ἤγουν ταυτότητα· καὶ οἷς ὡς Θεὸς τὴν πρὸς τὴν σάρκα φυσικὴν ἐτήρει διαφορὰν, τούτοις Πατρὶ τε καὶ Πνεύματι κατ' οὐσίαν ἐνούμενος ἐπήλαττε τὴν τε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἄκρα διαφορὰν καὶ ταυτότητα

Epistola 15 PG 91,557C-560C

Ἡ γὰρ ἀληθὴς καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσις ἑκατέρου τῶν εἰς ὅλου τινὸς σύνθεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνερχομένων μερῶν κατὰ τὴν ἅμα πρὸς ὅλου τινὸς γένεσιν σύννοδον, τὸ ἀφορίζον ἑκάτερον τῆς καθ' οὐσίαν κοινότητος ιδίωμα, τῷ κοινῷ συμπαραλαβοῦσα δείκνυσιν ἐνυπόστατον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπόστασιν· ὅτι μὴ καθ' αὐτὸ διωρισμένως ὑπέστη· τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἢ τοῦ καθ' ἔνωσιν αὐτῷ πρὸς ὅλου τινὸς γένεσιν συνυφεστῶτος ἀφοριζόμενον· ὅπερ ἴδιόν ἐστιν ὑποστάσεως. Τὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ διωρισμένως συνεστῶς ἐστὶν ὑπόστασις· εἴπερ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι φασιν, οὐσίαν μετὰ ιδιωμάτων, ἀριθμῷ τῶν ὁμογενῶν διαφέρουσαν· ἐνυπόστατον δὲ, τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ὑφιστάμενον, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ θεωρούμενον, ὡς εἶδος ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις· ἢ τὸ σὺν ἄλλῳ διαφόρῳ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ὅλου τινὸς γένεσιν συντιθέμενον· ὅπερ καθ' ὅσον μὲν διαφέρει τοῖς ἀφορίζουσιν αὐτὸ τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ὁμογενῶν ιδιώμασι, τοσοῦτον τῷ συγκειμένῳ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐνίζεται ταυτιζόμενον. Οὐ γὰρ οἷς ἀφορίζεται τῶν ὁμογενῶν ιδιώμασι, τούτοις διακρίνεται καὶ τοῦ συγκειμένου καθ' ἔνωσιν καὶ συνυφεστῶτος· ἀλλ' οἷς διενήνοχε τῶν ὁμοουσιῶν ἀφοριστικοῖς ιδιώμασι, τούτοις πρὸς τὸ συγκείμενον τὴν καθ' ἔνωσιν φυλάττει ταυτότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως, ἐν τῷ πάντῃ μοναδικῷ τοῦ προσώπου συντηρουμένην· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας οἰκονομίας ἤγουν σαρκώσεως ὁ ἀληθὴς πρεσβεύει λόγος. Οἷς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἀφοριζομένη διέφευγεν ἢ σὰρξ ιδιώμασι, τούτοις τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον καθ' ὑπόστασιν εἶχε ταυτότητα· καὶ οἷς ὁ Λόγος Πατρός τε καὶ Πνεύματος διέφευγεν ιδιώμασιν, ὡς Υἱὸς ἀφοριζόμενος, τούτοις τὸ καθ' ὑπόστασιν πρὸς τὴν σάρκα, μοναδικὸν διετήρει σωζόμενον, μηδενὶ λόγῳ παντελῶς διαιρούμενον. Οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὑπόστασις ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καθέστηκε σὰρξ. Οὐδέποτε γὰρ, οὐδόσον ἐπινοίας ψιλῆς πέφυκε τάχος χωρεῖν, καθ' ἑαυτὴν τὸ παράπαν ὑπέστη τοῖς ἀφορίζουσιν αὐτὴν ιδιώμασι διωρισμένη τῶν ὁμογενῶν, ἢ πρὸς τὸν συγκείμενον καθ' ὑπόστασιν Λόγον, τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἔχουσα κεχωρισμένον· ἀλλ' ἐνυπόστατος ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν λαβοῦσα τοῦ εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν· καὶ αὐτοῦ γενομένη καθ' ἔνωσιν σὰρξ, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐνιζομένη, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζούσης αὐτὴν ιδιότητος. Καὶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου καθ' ὑπόστασιν ποιουμένη τὸ ἴδιον· ὡς που καὶ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν κοινόν, οὐ καὶ σὰρξ ἀληθῶς καθ' ἔνωσιν γέγονεν

Epistola 12 PG 91,468C

διὰ τὸν μεσίτην ὄντα Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων [τὸν Χριστὸν] δεῖν κυρίως ἀποσώζειν τὴν πρὸς τὰ μεσιτευόμενα φυσικὴν οἰκειότητα τῷ ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοτέρω· ὅπως αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ δι' ἑαυτοῦ συνάψας τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις τὰ ἐπίγεια τὴν ὑλικὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν τὴν δι' ἁμαρτίας πολεμωθεῖσαν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Πατρὶ προσαγαγὼν σωθεῖσαν, φιλωθεῖσαν τε καὶ θεωθεῖσαν· οὐκ οὐσίας ταυτότητι ἀλλὰ δυνάμει ἀρρήτῳ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως· θείας κοινωνοὺς φύσεως διὰ τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀγίας αὐτοῦ σαρκὸς ὡς ἀπαρχῆς καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάσεται.

Opusculum 9 PG 91, 128D

Αὐτὸς ὁ φύσει καὶ μόνος Θεὸς ὅλον με προσλαβὼν μετὰ τῶν ἐμῶν ἴν' ὅλω μοι τὴν σωτηρίαν χαρίσεται

Ambigua ad Thomam PG 91,1044A

ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐμὲ φέρων μετὰ τῶν ἐμῶν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν ὀλόκληρον ἐνώσει τῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν μετὰ τῶν αὐτῆς ἀδιαβλήτων παθῶν

Ambigua ad Ioannem 7 PG 91,1097A-B

Τὸ γὰρ μυστήριον τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν γενεῶν, νῦν δὲ φανερωθὲν διὰ τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ ἀληθινῆς καὶ τελείας ἐνανθρωπήσεως, τοῦ ἐνώσαντος ἑαυτῷ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἀδιαιρέτως τε καὶ ἀσυγχύτως τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν καὶ ἡμᾶς διὰ τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμετέρας νοερώς τε καὶ λογικῶς ἐψυχωμένης ἀγίας αὐτοῦ σαρκὸς, ὡσπερ δι' ἀπαρχῆς ἑαυτῷ συμπηξαμένου καὶ ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπότητα καταξιώσαντος, καθὼς προωρίσθημεν πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι ὡς μέλη τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, ψυχῆς τρόπον πρὸς σῶμα ἐν πνεύματι συναρμολογοῦντος ἑαυτῷ καὶ συμβιβάζοντος καὶ εἰς μέτρον ἄγοντος ἡλικίας πνευματικῆς τοῦ κατ' αὐτὸν πληρώματος, ἔδειξε καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τούτῳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ τὸν πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων περὶ ἡμᾶς παντάγαθον τοῦ Θεοῦ σκοπὸν μὴ δεξάμενον καθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν καινισμόν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, εἰς πληρωσιν δ' ἐλθόντα δι' ἄλλου δηλαδὴ ἐπεισαχθέντος καινοτέρου τρόπου.

Epistola 2 PG 91,396C-397A:

καὶ [ἡ ἀγάπη] πείθουσα τὴν γνώμην κατὰ τὴν φύσιν πορεύεσθαι, μηδαμῶς πρὸς τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως στασιάζουσιν· καθ' ὃν ἅπαντες ὡσπερ μίαν φύσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ μίαν γνώμην καὶ θέλημα ἐν Θεῷ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἔχειν δυνάμεθα, οὐδεμίαν πρὸς Θεὸν καὶ ἀλλήλους διάστασιν ἔχοντες, ὅτ' ἂν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς χάριτος, δι' οὗ τὸν νόμον τῆς

φύσεως γνωμικῶς ἀνακαινίζομεν, στοιχεῖον προαιρούμεθα. Ἀμήχανον γὰρ τοὺς μὴ πρότερον Θεῷ καθ' ὁμόνοιαν συναφθέντας ἀλλήλοις συμβαίνειν δύνασθαι κατὰ τὴν γνώμην. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κατ' ἀρχὰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ ἀπατήσας διάβολος δόλω κακούργως μεμηχανημένῳ διὰ φιλαυτίας καθ' ἡδονῆς προσβολὴν ἀπατήσας Θεοῦ καὶ ἀλλήλων ἡμᾶς κατὰ τὴν γνώμην διέστησε, τό τε εὐθὲς διατρέψας καὶ τὴν φύσιν κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον μερίσας κατέτεμεν εἰς πολλὰς δόξας καὶ φαντασίας καὶ τὴν ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ κακῷ μέθοδόν τε καὶ εὐρεσιν τῷ χρόνῳ νόμον κατέστησε ταῖς ἡμῶν πρὸς τοῦτο δυνάμεσι συγχρησάμενος καὶ πονηρὸν πρὸς διαμονὴν τοῦ κακοῦ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνθέμενος ἔρεισμα τὸ κατὰ τὴν γνώμην ἀσύμβατον· ἀφ' οὗ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἅπαξ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως τραπήναι παρέπεισε καὶ πρὸς τὸ κεκωλυμένον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτετραμμένου κινήσαι τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τρία τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἀρχαῖα κακὰ καὶ πάσης ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακίας γεννητικὰ ἑαυτῷ ὑποστήσασθαι· ἄγνοιαν, φημί, καὶ φιλαυτίαν καὶ τυραννίδα ἀλλήλων ἐξηρημένους καὶ δι' ἀλλήλων συνισταμένας

Epistola 3 PG 91,408C-409D

ὅτι πρὸς τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ ἀλλήλοις ἡμᾶς ἐνῶσαι βουλόμενος [ὁ Θεὸς] καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἅπαν ὧτῶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, τὰς σωτηρίους φιλανθρώπως ἡμῖν ἐντολὰς διεχάραξεν· ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φιλαυτία [...] εἰς πολλὰς μοῖρας τὴν μίαν φύσιν κατέτεμε· καὶ τὴν νῦν ἐπικρατοῦσαν αὐτῆς ἀναληγσίαν εἰσηγησάμενη, αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτῆς τὴν φύσιν διὰ τῆς γνώμης ἐξώπλισε. Διὰ τοι τοῦτο πᾶς ὅστις σῶφρονι λογισμῷ καὶ φρονήσεως εὐγενείᾳ ταύτην λῦσαι δεδύνηται τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν, ἑαυτὸν μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἠλέησε, τὴν γνώμην κατὰ τὴν φύσιν δημιουργήσας καὶ Θεῷ κατὰ τὴν γνώμην διὰ τὴν φύσιν προσχωρήσας· καὶ δεῖξας ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν, τίς τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα λόγου ὁ τρόπος· καὶ πῶς ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεὸς πρεπόντως κατ' ἀρχὰς, ὁμοίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἀγαθότητος ἀρίδηλον ἀπεικόνισμα δημιουργήσας κατέστησεν· αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ κατὰ πάντα τὴν αὐτὴν· ἄμαχον, εἰρηνικὴν, ἀστασίαστον, πρὸς τε Θεὸν καὶ ἑαυτὴν δι' ἀγάπης ἐσφιγμένην· καθ' ἣν Θεοῦ μὲν ἐφετώς, ἀλλήλων δὲ συμπαθῶς ἀντεχόμεθα. [...] Εἰ δέ τις [...] τοὺς χρήζοντας ἀνθρώπους περιορᾷ, ἑαυτοῦ μὲν ἐκείνους, ἑαυτὸν δὲ Θεοῦ εἰκότως ἀπορρηξίας δειχθήσεται· ὡς τὴν φύσιν διὰ τὴν γνώμην ἀγνοήσας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ διὰ τὴν γνώμην, τὰ τῇ φύσει προσόντα ἀγαθὰ διαφθείρας. Ταῦτα μὲν ὅσοι τοῦ φιλανθρώπου τὸ ἀπηγὲς προείλαντο γνωμικῶς, καὶ τῶν ὀβολῶν τὸ συγγενές, καὶ ὁμόφυλον ἀτιμότερον κρίνοντες [...]· ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὅσοι τὰ τῆς φύσεως ῥήγματα ἐνῶσαι σοφῶς σπουδάζουσι τῷ φιλαλλήλῳ τρόπῳ καὶ τοῦ συνεργῆσαι Θεῷ χάριν διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης, τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὅσον τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν γνώμην ταυτότητα, πάντων καταφρονοῦντες τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ὡς

ἀληθεῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τῶν ἔργων συνήγοροι. Ὅπερ ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς νῦν τε καὶ πρότερον ἀπεφάνθητε, ἡγαπημένοι· παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ τρόπῳ καὶ σκορπισμῷ δεξιῶ τῶν προσόντων πᾶσιν ἑαυτοὺς προθύμους καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι ἐπιμερίζοντες, καὶ ταυτὸν οὖσαν δεικνύντες ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς τῇ φύσει τὴν γνώμην, καθ' ἓν μόνον πλεονεκτουμένην ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν λαβοῦσα ἔχει τῶν γενομένων τα σπέρματα· μᾶλλον δὲ Θεοῦ ἐξ οὗ καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν καλῶν αἱ δυνάμεις προκαταβέβληται

Summary

Dionysios Skliris (Athens)

Catholicity and Individuality in the Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor: Existential Implications

In this paper, I shall treat the question of the individuality and catholicity of Christ's humanity under two complementary aspects. In the first place, I will treat ἄτομον, πρόσωπον, ὑπόστασις and other terms as metaphysical and logical concepts. I will then try to observe the notions which are more related to Maximus' soteriological vision. My position is that even though the terms ἄτομον, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον can be conceived of as synonymous, since they can coincide in the same human subject, they are not identical, since they consider it under three different aspects. The term ἄτομον denotes a subsumption in a logical hierarchy proceeding from the most general genus to genera, species and the most specific species. The term ὑπόστασις means the possibility to exist as an independent being with ontological coherence. The hypostasis thus has two aspects: On the one hand it means the possibility of independence in relation to the environment and a sort of self-subsistence. On the other hand, it denotes the possibility to integrate heterogeneous realities in the same existence. The term person answers the question "who?" that is a question of personal identity. It is referring to hypostases that are gifted with intellect and with a participation in their own movement (νοερόν, ἀντεξούσιον), and that bear a name answering the question "who?" My position is that Christ is a person and a hypostasis, but He is not an individual, for reasons explained in the article. After a thorough examination of various terms denoting particularity, I am making a shift towards the modern theological discussion. I remark that in the Byzantine era the term ἄτομον is rather a logical and

metaphysical term. The term which poses the existential depth of the question of individuality in its modern sense is rather the term γνώμη. The modern individual, which was arguably initiated by the interiority of Augustine of Hippo, but was later developed with the Cartesian cogito, subjective idealism etc. has characteristics such as inwardness, self-referentiality, self-reflectivity, self-consciousness as an interior center of spiritual life, a break from the surrounding nature and History etc. All these characteristics are much closer to the Maximian notion of γνώμη than to the term ἄτομον which does not have these connotations. I therefore examine briefly why the gnostic will is excluded from Christ. But I equally examine the importance of the gnostic will in anthropology and whether there is an eschatological future for γνώμη after its surrender to God (ἐκχώρησις γνωμική) and in what sense.

Keywords: St Maximus the Confessor, christology individuality, catholicity, person, hypostasis.