Reductionist Conceptions of the Human in Modern Psychology: A Methodological and Ethical Critique

Автори:
Страници: 44-49
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54664/TAKI5944

Резюме:

Reductionist approaches in modern psychology interpret the human being primarily through biological or behavioral components, neglecting the holistic nature of human existence. This article argues that such reductionism constitutes not only a methodological deficiency but also an ethical problem. Drawing on philosophical anthropology, existentialism, and existential psychology—and engaging with Viktor Frankl’s logotherapy, Rollo May’s critique of subject–object dualism, and Takiyettin Mengüşoğlu’s ontologically grounded philosophical anthropology—the paper maintains that the human being must be understood as a holistic entity endowed with freedom, subjective experience, and moral value. The reductionist tendencies of psychoanalysis and behaviorism are characterized as an anthropological impasse (Çarkı 2022), and Kantian ethics as presented by Akarsu (1982) is deployed to show why treating persons as mere means constitutes an ethical violation. In response, the article proposes a human-centered scientific outlook grounded in ethical responsibility, addressing the human being as an anthropological whole encompassing biological as well as spiritual (noetic) dimensions. It further argues that the education of future psychologists must be reformed to integrate philosophical anthropology and ethics. A more human-centered and ethically responsible psychology is necessary to protect the irreducible worth and multidimensional nature of human existence.

Ключови думи:

reductionism, philosophical anthropology, existentialism, existential psychology, ethics, ethical responsibility, human-centered.

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